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Abstract
Class actions cases illuminate the theoretical underpinnings of private law in a way that
traditional two-party litigation does not. Many class actions deal with plaintiffs who have not
suffered a large loss (or a quantifiable monetary loss at all), or the defendant has made profits
that are disproportionately greater than the plaintiffs’ compensable loss (if any). Applying
orthodox principles of private law and negligence to these cases results in barring plaintiffs
from recovery despite their rights being violated and defendants not disgorging profits made
from wrongdoing. The solution resolving these dilemmas should not be to create separate law
only applicable to class actions. Rather, the traditional interpretations of damage and
disgorgement must be reconsidered generally. By refocusing on a view of negligence as
serving to vindicate litigants’ rights and reconsidering orthodox principles, class actions
dilemmas can be resolved in a way that is consistent with, and clarifies, the private law.
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Chapter 1
1. Introduction
1.1

Overview
The purpose of enacting class proceedings legislation in Canada was to create a

mass remedy for mass wrongs. The stated goals of class actions are to provide access to
justice, enhance judicial economy, and prompt behaviour modification.1 As class actions
have proceeded through the stages of litigation in Canada, it has become apparent that certain
problems create barriers preventing these goals from being meaningfully achieved. Thus far,
courts have attempted to solve these problems in a way that is sometimes inconsistent with
principles of private law and results in confusion and arguably incorrect modifications to the
substantive law.
Class actions cases illuminate the theoretical underpinnings and goals of the private
law in a way that decisions in traditional two-party litigation do not. Many class actions deal
with individual litigants who have not suffered a large loss (or an immediately quantifiable
monetary loss at all) but the aggregate injury or loss of the entire class is sizeable, the
defendant has made a profit that is disproportionately larger than the class’s compensable
loss (if the class has suffered a quantifiable monetary loss at all), the alleged wrongdoing is a
result of institutional or systemic practices, or the facts of the case combine more than one of
these circumstances. Orthodox principles dictate that a plaintiff must prove loss in order to
maintain a claim in negligence and disgorgement of profit is not a generally available remedy

1

Hollick v Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68 [Hollick] at para 27.
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if negligence is established. Applying these orthodox principles to many class actions cases
results in barring plaintiffs from recovery if they cannot show loss, even if their rights have
been violated, and barring disgorgement and gain-based remedies thereby allowing
defendants to retain profits from wrongdoing.
Individuals in two-party procedure do not typically litigate cases with facts that test
the boundaries of orthodoxy because the loss (if any) does not justify the expense of
litigation, the defendant is too large a corporate entity for an individual to challenge in court,
or the plaintiff is in some other way marginalized. When these types of cases go forward as a
class action, in the aggregate, the group is more empowered, the loss is more substantial, and
a single individual does not shoulder the entire economic risk of litigation. However, a class
action, in theory, is nothing more than an aggregation of individual claims. Analysis of what
the boundaries of orthodoxy are should not proceed on the basis of considering the plaintiffs’
aggregate loss or the defendants’ aggregate gain. Class actions judges are therefore driven to
question critically the limits, purpose, and theoretical foundations of the private law when
deciding these cases. To this point, however, judges often analyze these issues in a way that
impliedly confines the legal questions to class actions. The answers ought not be crafted
through the lens of, or be applicable only to, class actions; rather, the answers ought to be
consistent with and applicable to private law generally.
This dissertation advances the thesis that certain dilemmas presented by class
actions can be resolved if certain principles of the private law are re-conceptualized. There is
no need to confuse, alter, or otherwise misinterpret the private law in order to properly
analyze class actions cases. If the private law is viewed in a way that is consistent with its
underlying principles and functions but re-conceptualized as being focused on rights rather

3
than loss, then the problems in class actions can be resolved in a more coherent fashion that
is in line rather than in conflict with the private law.
The focus here will be on cases of negligence, both because it is an area of the
private law that has been described as being a “modern mess”2 as well as because it is the
cause of action most frequently pleaded in class actions. This dissertation advances the
argument that the fundamental concepts underlying claims in negligence (injury, damage,
harm and loss) can be reconsidered and are best understood as defined in relation to the
content of litigants’ rights and duties as opposed to in relation to physical or economic loss.
Further, if the focus of negligence is viewed as a principled understanding of litigants’ rights,
the remedies available to vindicate plaintiffs’ violated rights can be similarly reconsidered.
While quantification of the measure of damages required to vindicate a violated right may
best or oftentimes be calculated in reference to the plaintiff’s compensable loss, it is equally
justifiable to measure the remedy with respect to the defendant’s gain. This dissertation will
argue that loss is not necessarily required to maintain a cause of action. That is, a rights
violation can occur without necessarily resulting in physical or economic detriment. If the
focus is on rights rather than simply determination of economic loss, the analysis of whether
there has been sufficient damage to indicate the plaintiff’s right is violated can be understood
in a more consistent and principled way. While it may seem that the argument presents a
radical departure from the orthodox view, analysis of the case law reveals that focusing on
loss as determinative of damage is problematic and leads to arbitrary, policy-based decisions.
If damage is reconsidered, and viewed as conceptually distinct from loss, the measure of the

2

Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 18-19.
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remedy available to vindicate the violated right can similarly be more properly analyzed if it
is not limited to or circumscribed by loss.
When the underpinnings of negligence are reconsidered and viewed in this way, the
problems that manifest in class actions can be answered in a manner that is consistent with a
principled view of the private law. Class actions can therefore be defended as a procedural
vehicle that does not require modification of the substantive law or litigants’ rights in order
to meaningfully achieve the stated goals. The aim of this dissertation is to construct an
interpretive framework within which class actions can be analyzed as a subset of private law
cases rather than as a separate category. First, Chapter 1 will set out the dilemmas class
actions in Canada illuminate. These dilemmas create the framework that defines the scope of
the discussion. The primary focus of the argument is negligence and, as will be discussed in
Chapter 1, the crucial issues are the damage required to maintain an action in negligence and
the nature of remedies available once a claim is established. Chapter 2 will focus on
reconsidering damage and will argue that the concept of actionable damage ought not be
defined in relation to physical or economic loss. Requiring loss as necessarily entailed in the
definition of actionable damage is arbitrarily restrictive and does not conform to a consistent
and principled view of the nature of litigants’ rights and duties. Following logically from, but
not necessarily dependent on, the conclusions in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 will argue that
disgorgement is available as a remedy for claims of negligence. The historical development
of disgorgement confines gain-based remedies to property-based torts. However, there is no
principled reason why violations of some rights (property rights) should give rise to a gainbased remedy while violations of other rights (personal rights) do not. Further, as case law
demonstrates disgorgement has historically been available regardless of the defendant’s
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intention to cause harm. There is no principled reason why the intentional violation of rights
should give rise to gain-based remedies while negligent violations do not. As Chapter 4
concludes, if the underlying nature of negligence is reconsidered as being concerned with
defining and vindicating plaintiffs’ rights, these conclusions can be applied to class actions.
We can then being to construct legal and principled answers to the questions set out in
Chapter 1 that do not require or depend on arbitrary or inconsistent policies. Though the
conclusions reached throughout will help advance class actions’ goals by resolving these
dilemmas, the overarching aim is to achieve a better understanding of the private law as a
whole.
1.2

Dilemmas Illuminated by Canadian Class Actions
We are in an age where the evolution of technology and the trend of

commoditization seemingly dictate how we live our lives. Modes of construction,
commercialization, and consumption that were once inconceivable are now commonplace.
As society evolves, so must the law, but how should it evolve and to what extent? The story
of class actions in Canada is exemplary of such an evolutionary struggle:
Trite as the observation necessarily is, it bears emphasizing that we live in a corporate
society, characterized by mass manufacturing, mass promotion, and mass consumption. The
production and dissemination of goods and services is now largely the concern of major
corporations, international conglomerates, and big government, whose many and diverse
activities necessarily affect large numbers of persons in virtually all aspects of their lives.3

3

Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1982)

Vols. I-III [OLRC Report], Vol. I at 3. Similar reports were commissioned in other common law provinces:
Alberta Law Reform Institute, Class Actions (Memorandum No 9, 2000); Alberta Law Reform Institute, Class
Actions (Report No 85, 2000); Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Class Proceedings (Report No 100, 1999).
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Seeing that existing civil procedure was simply inadequate to accommodate the new and
burgeoning age of mass production that would inevitably lead to mass litigation, lawmakers
in Canada were called upon to provide a solution.
The Ontario Law Reform Commission billed class proceedings legislation as a mass
remedy for mass wrongs.4 The goals of class proceedings legislation are to promote access to
justice, behaviour modification, and judicial economy.5 In crafting class proceedings
legislation,6 lawmakers envisioned a mechanism enabling litigants to bring a claim as a group
in circumstances in which they otherwise, as individuals, “would not be able to bring the
Defendant to the seat of justice”.7
However, latent in the policy rationales articulated as underpinning the impetus for
class proceedings legislation is the notion that this evolving landscape only exacerbated
existing problems with the legal system rather than created wholly new ones. Long and
drawn-out proceedings weighing expense on the court system, economically forceful
defendants overwhelming financially precarious plaintiffs, and wrongs committed with the
knowledge that certain types of affected people cannot or will not sue are not problems
4

OLRC Report, supra note 3, Vol. I at 29.

5

Hollick, supra note 1 at para 27.

6

Quebec was the first province to introduce legislation in 1978 (An Act Respecting the Class Action, SQ 1978, c

8). Ontario was the second, in 1992 (Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 6 [Class Proceedings Act]) with
the other common law provinces following shortly thereafter. The focus here is on cases from the common law
provinces: Alberta: Class Proceedings Act, SA 2003, c C-16.5; British Columbia: Class Proceedings Act,
RSBC 1996, c 50; Manitoba: The Class Proceedings Act, CCSM, c C130; New Brunswick: Class Proceedings
Act, RSNB 1996, c 50; Newfoundland and Labrador: Class Actions Act, SNL 2001, c C-18.1; Nova Scotia:
Class Proceedings Act, SNS 2007, c 28; Saskatchewan: The Class Actions Act, SS 2001, c C-12.01.
7

Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP, 2014 ONSC 4118 at para 204. Justice

Perell describes the quintessential case in which an individual claim would not be economically viable because
the cost of a proceeding greatly outweighs the individual’s loss.
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unique to an expanded corporate globalization. Though these problems may have long
existed, it is arguably because certain cases gained media attention,8 and lawmakers realized
that the effect of mass production could lead to injuring hundreds or thousands of people at
once, these procedural problems could no longer be ignored.
The Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended and encouraged explicitly
creating or modifying litigants’ rights via class proceedings legislation in order to effect more
substantive solutions.9 No such modifications were introduced in any of the common law
provinces’ statutes, and the Supreme Court of Canada maintains that “class actions overcome
barriers to litigation by providing a procedural means to a substantive end”.10 In theory, the
procedure does not change the substantive law or litigants’ rights: “[T]he substantive law
continues to apply as it would in a traditional individual proceeding”.11
Viewed in one way this principle – that the substantive law applies as it otherwise
would in two-party litigation – makes sense in that it ensures that class actions are consistent
with the rest of private law and do not create a separate system of justice. Viewed in another
way, however, in application it seems the principle is perhaps forcing a square peg into a
round hole. That is, if there was something about the substantive law that was proving
prohibitive for litigation of these types of claims, creating a different kind of procedure is not
8

See, e.g., OLRC Report, supra note 3, Vol. I at 90-100 discussing the widely publicized cases of the

Mississauga Train derailment, reconstruction of houses due to the installation of formaldehyde foam insulation,
the collapse of a major public trust, and faulty Firenzas.
9

OLRC Report, supra note 3, Vol. II at Ch 14. The report suggests, for example, that cases where the plaintiff

is only seeking monetary relief ought to admit of relaxed evidentiary standards for proving loss on both a
common and individual basis.
10

AIC Limited v Fischer, 2013 SCC 69 at para 34.

11

Bisaillon v Concordia University, 2006 SCC 19 at para 18. This point was recently debated and ultimately re-

emphasized in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Green, 2015 SCC 60 at para 62.
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an adequate solution. As class actions proceeded to work their way through the stages of
litigation various problems began to arise, primarily in the context of initial certification
motions, which require satisfaction of statutory procedural tests in order to maintain the
action as a class claim.12 Three dilemmas in particular present barriers to class actions being
able to meaningfully achieve the three stated goals; these are first briefly outlined and then
discussed in detail below. First, the problem of loss: courts face the question of whether to
certify actions that include plaintiffs that have not suffered any demonstrable compensable
loss but the circumstances of the case make it clear that the defendant (by admission or
otherwise) breached a duty and standard of care owed to the class. Second, the problem of
profits: courts face cases in which the amount of compensable loss suffered, if any, by the
plaintiff class is far less than the profits made by the defendant’s wrongdoing such that
remedies limited to compensable loss fail to achieve justice or behaviour modification in the

12

The statutory framework outlining the test that must be met in order to certify an action in Canada is slightly

different, but fundamentally similar, in each of the common law provinces: see statutes as listed supra note 6.
Generally, courts must certify a case as a class action if there is a properly pleaded cause of action, a class that
is identifiable and definable by objective and sufficiently specific criteria, common issues that would advance
the litigation and can be answered in relation to every member of the defined class, an appropriate
representative plaintiff, and a litigation plan for resolving issues and evaluation of damages after the common
issues trial. The Supreme Court of Canada discussed and developed the tests for the certification criteria in the
first class actions trilogy of decisions in 2001 (Western Canadian Shopping Centers v Dutton, 2001 SCC 46;
Hollick v Toronto (City), supra note 1; and Rumley v British Columbia, 2001 SCC 69). These decisions were all
unanimous, written by Chief Justice McLachlin, and continue to be the touchstone for class actions law in
Canada. The first Ontario Court of Appeal trilogy interpreting the Supreme Court of Canada’s trilogy was the
cases of Cloud v Canada (Attorney General) (2004), 73 OR (3d) 401 (CA); Markson v MBNA Canada Bank,
2007 ONCA 334; and Cassano v The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2007 ONCA 781. The most recent 2013
Supreme Court of Canada trilogy affirmed the original trilogy, and clarified certain questions about the
availability of class actions for indirect purchasers, and the scope of the test for preferable procedure: Pro-Sys
Consultants Ltd. v Microsoft Corporation, 2013 SCC 57 [Pro-Sys]; Sun-Rype Products Ltd. v Archer Daniels
Midland Company, 2013 SCC 58; and AIC Limited v Fischer, supra note 10.
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circumstances. Third, the problem of individual issues: in order to achieve the goals of access
to justice, behaviour modification and judicial efficiency, courts face the difficulty of
deciding whether or how to certify cases that require significant individual issues to be
determined in order to find liability. It is an error to view these problems as confined to class
actions. At the heart of each of these issues are questions about how the fundamental
principles of private law ought to operate or be reconsidered.
1.2.1

The problem of loss and the need to reconsider the concept of damage

It is axiomatic that to maintain a claim in negligence the plaintiff must prove
actionable damage: “[T]he cause of action is not complete without proof of damage” and
damage is, therefore, the “gist” of the action.13 If a car hits you, it is uncontroversial that you
have been damaged. But what if an enthusiastic driver turns a corner too quickly and
narrowly misses you, causing you to jump back in order to avoid injury? What does it
actually mean to suffer damage? Though stated unquestionably in the positive law that the
plaintiff must prove actionable damage in negligence, the law is confused and convoluted as
to what this requires in substance. Most of the courts’ attention in the development of
negligence law focused on determining when a duty of care is owed and to whom.14 Equally
important, however, is determining what exactly it means to be injured. We can understand
injury in colloquial terms as, for example, the physical injury you suffer when hit by the car.

13

Nicholls v Ely Beet Sugar Factory, Limited, [1936] 1 Ch 343 (CA) at 350-351.

14

Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, “The Changing Face of the Gist of Negligence” in Jason W Neyers, Erika

Chamberlain & Stephen GA Pitel, eds, Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 467 at
468. Amirthalingam refers to the duty of care analysis as “over-worked” and suggests the first shift away from
the focus on duty was to determine issues of causation. The discussion here agrees with Amirthlingam’s overall
suggestion that the locus of advancement in the law of negligence ought to be analysis of actionable damage.
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However, we can also understand injury more technically as the violation of a legal right.
The question then becomes, what is the content of that legal right and which understanding of
injury ought to prevail?
The concept of damage is perhaps most simply and most often equated with the
plaintiff suffering identifiable financial or compensable loss. In the majority of cases the
question of what constitutes damage is not in issue because plaintiffs usually sue when they
have easily demonstrable compensable loss. Judges do not frequently set out to determine
whether the issue is about vindicating a plaintiff’s rights, compensating for his or her
financial loss, or rectifying the damage that has been done. Generally, when courts award
whatever damages the plaintiff claims that award succeeds in serving all these functions:
vindication, compensation, and rectification. However, in certain kinds of two-party cases,
and more frequently in class actions, the concept of damage is pulled apart and uniquely
illuminated because, for example, some or all class members have not suffered any clearly
identifiable loss that could be compensated but the overall claim presents a potential
aggregate value that makes the case worth litigating.
The problem of loss is created in cases in which some or all class members have not
suffered any cognizable loss or injury. For example, each of a group of consumers buys a
washing machine. The washing machine is defectively manufactured or designed and in
some cases causes flooding in some consumers’ homes or retains water and causes some
consumers’ clothes to become mouldy. However, not every member of the group experiences
flooding or mould, perhaps some only experience an occasional foul odour coming from the
machine or minor water leakage when the machine is running. But, each consumer has the
same make and model of washing machine that has proven in some cases to completely
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break and cause substantial loss. If consumers have not yet suffered any injury or loss, should
they be included as members of the class that claims negligence against the manufacturer? To
slightly change the example, say that the defendant admits that the washing machine was
designed and manufactured in violation of certain industry or other standards. Despite this
admission the defendant maintains it does not have any liability to the class members who
have not been injured. The result is that the defendant (assuming all other elements of the
claim are proven) has put a defective product on the market and is liable to some consumers
of that product but others who bought and continue to use the same sub-standard washing
machine have no cause of action. The problem of loss is not unique to class actions, but is
brought to the forefront of the analysis because it is not an issue that typically arises in twoparty litigation. Absent a loss that is worth the cost of litigation a plaintiff is unlikely to sue.
The price of claiming over a foul odour or a small puddle on the laundry room floor is hardly
worth the effort.
If we shift the lens away from a traditional view of negligence as only concerned
with compensating financial loss and understand the function of private law as vindicating
rights, the problem of loss can be analyzed and the definition of damage reconsidered. Jane
Stapleton argues that the focus of the damage that is required in order to maintain a cause of
action and prove a wrong ought not be muddied by a concept of damage that is blended with
or dependent on monetary loss:
The modern law of torts is in need of a coherent doctrine about the notion of ‘damage’. The
word is bandied about in a number of different contexts, usually without clear definition yet
equally without apparent awareness of the importance of precision in its use.15

15

Jane Stapleton, “The Gist of Negligence: Part I – Minimum Actionable Damage” (1988) 104 Law Q Rev 213

at 213.
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Similarly, Donal Nolan argues, “one consequence of the academic neglect of the actionable
damage issue is the absence of an established framework of governing principles”.16
Seemingly over-looked, but what Nolan calls a rather elementary point, is that “the issue of
the damage sufficient to establish a cause of action should not be confused with the harms for
which recovery is permitted once the cause of action has been established.”17 That is, once
the cause of action in negligence is established, the issue of determining the value of perhaps
a trivial inconvenience is merely an exercise of quantification. If the washing machine
leaked, caused substantial flooding requiring significant repair to the consumer’s house, there
is no question that this would constitute sufficient injury and loss to maintain a negligence
claim. The loss to the plaintiff in having mouldy smelling clothes that need to be dry cleaned
in addition to the cost of structural repairs is recoverable as consequent damage if liability is
established. Any issues of whether that damage is too trivial are questions of valuation. But
the real heart of the problem is determining whether the actionable damage sufficient to
maintain a claim is the flooding and loss or the fact that the plaintiff bought a sub-standard
washing machine. Though Nolan’s point is indeed elementary, the inquiry is perhaps not as
simple as his argument suggests.
Chapter 2 will aim to build on the arguments Stapleton and Nolan set up and attempt
to offer a comparison of two views of actionable damage drawn from Canadian and English
common law. The discussion will consider what courts have defined actionable damage as
for certain cases and argue that a broad conception of damage not focused on loss can better
reconcile controversial cases and better account for the nature of litigants’ rights.

16

Donal Nolan, “New Forms of Damage in Negligence” (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 59 at 60.

17

Ibid at 61.
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1.2.2

The problem of profits and the need to reconsider disgorgement

The orthodox view of damages in tort, and the orthodox view of the “essential
purpose of tort law”, is to compensate plaintiffs by returning them to the position they were
in but for the wrong.18 However, there is an equally well-established principle that a person
ought not profit from wrongdoing.19 One of the goals of class actions is to promote behaviour
modification and the problem of profits is the pressing concern that in some cases even if
plaintiffs are compensated, damages award that are limited to the measure of compensable
loss pale in comparison to the defendant’s profits and thus behaviour modification is not
achieved. The problem of loss is in some ways tied up with the problem of profits because
courts focus on what in explicit practical terms both the policy rationale underlying class
actions and the judicial decisions analyzing the cases imply: ensuring defendants do not
retain profits made from wrongdoing. While a causal relationship between wrong and profit
or a policy-based reason may ground a decision that a defendant should be made to disgorge
its profits, such reasoning does not provide a principled answer as to why the plaintiff has a
right to receive those profits. 20 The counterpart conclusion is that a principled answer as to
why a defendant is obligated to disgorge profits is similarly absent.

18

Athey v Leonati, [1996] 3 SCR 458 at para 20. See also, Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Company (1880), 5

App Cas 25 (HL).
19

The Latin maxim is variously stated as commodum ex iniuria aua nemo habere debet (Edelman, supra note

21 at 81); ex turpi causa non oritur actio (Blackwater v Plint, [2005] 3 SCR 3 at para 83); and nullus
commodum capere protest de injuria sua propria (Lundy v Lundy (1895), 24 SCR 650 at 653, citing Cleaver v
Mutual Fund Life Assn. (1891), [1892] 1 QB 147). The principle applies equally to criminal as well as private
law.
20

Ernest J Weinrib, “Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice” (2000) 1 Theor Inq L 1 at 1. There are

different arguments about the justification and reason for awarding restitution, disgorgement, or gain-based
remedies (as they are variously referred to) in cases of wrongs (as distinct from cases of unjust enrichment). The
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The problem of profits contributes to heavier reliance on arbitrary policy-based
decision-making. It has been established by the Supreme Court of Canada that civil damages
can serve a prophylactic and deterrent function21 and it could be argued that this rationale
justifies disgorgement awards. However, the concept of disgorgement as a remedy that arises
by right because of a wrong needs to be separated from the concept of disgorgement as a
category of discretionary damages (akin to punitive damages) awarded to serve a deterrent
function. It will be argued, though contrary to the orthodoxy but supported by the historical
development of the common law, that the remedies available for rights violations ought not
be limited or categorized by either the loss suffered or by the type of tort alleged. If the
private law is understood as functioning to vindicate rights, compensation is but one measure
of remedy. If a right has no inherent value, the measure of its value can be equally focused on
the defendant (the value of the profits) as on the plaintiff (the value of the loss). Further, if
disgorgement is recognized as an available remedy for the negligent violation of some types
of rights, it ought to be available for claims of negligence generally.
The orthodox view is that cases of negligence cannot ground gain-based remedies
because the “wrongfulness consists in creating the prospect of a loss…the fact that the
defendant has realized a gain as well adds nothing to the plaintiff’s case.”22 As Ernest
Weinrib argues, the fact that loss is the locus of the injustice means “[t]he parties do and

contention here is that the orthodox view that such remedies are only available for specific proprietary torts,
fraud, or breach of fiduciary duty is generally agreed to across these theories, even if the justification differs.
See, e.g., Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at Part IV “The
Right to Restitution”; IM Jackman, “Restitution for Wrongs” (1989) 48 CLJ 302; JM Martin, “Waiver of Tort:
An Historical and Practical Survey” (2012) 52 Can Bus LJ 473 at 545-548.
21

Strother v 3464920 Canada Inc., [2007] 2 SCR 177 at paras 75-77.
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Weinrib, supra note 20 at 11.
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suffer injustice only with respect to the loss, not the gain; the gain remains external to their
relationship.”23 The kinds of cases that permit gain-based remedies are those where “the
defendant’s gain is of something that lies within the right of the plaintiff.”24 Thus, torts
dealing with another’s property give rise to restitutionary damages but torts dealing with
personal injury do not.25 Though the historical application of disgorgement is limited to
violations of property-based rights, there is no principled reason that the rationale of the law
seeking to vindicate violated rights generally should not equally apply to make disgorgement
available for all rights violations as opposed to only a restricted category.
In theory, if there is a compensable loss resulting from some wrongdoing,
compensating each member of the class for that loss should equal some amount that renders
the wrongful activity unprofitable. Consider the defendant’s sale of each negligently
designed and manufactured washing machine for $100. The sale price includes $50 profit to
the defendant per unit. If each member of the class has a cause of action based on at least a
$100 loss, compensating the class by $100 per person at a minimum (perhaps there is
additional compensation for having to replace floors damaged by flooding) should result in
the defendant paying back to the class all of the profits made on the sale of the washing
machines included as part of that compensation. It could be the case, however, that because
the plaintiffs have no provable monetary loss, they cannot recover and the defendant retains
its profits despite a finding the machine is defective and negligently manufactured. Or it
could be the case that because of the sale of the washing machines the defendant realizes
another kind of profit. For example, the defendant could be a public company that set out in
23

Ibid.

24

Ibid.

25

Ibid at 12-13.
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its circular to shareholders that it would manufacture and sell one million washing machines
and in so doing would be the leading manufacturer and distributor in the country, thus
guaranteeing greater market share. Achieving the sale of the one million washing machines
secures this market share making the company more profitable, and perhaps results in a
contract to produce an additional ten million machines. Even if the defendant is made to pay
back ten million dollars to the class, some greater profit could have been achieved such that
the defendant is still financially better off than it would be never having sold negligently
manufactured washing machines.
The tone throughout some class actions decisions is indicative of criticism towards
this latter type of scenario. In some cases there is a prima facie or proven case of
wrongdoing and the class has either no prospect of compensation or compensation of a sum
that pales in comparison to the defendant’s profits. Behaviour modification is not achieved
and the result is arguably that justice is not done.
Some cases suggest that the answer to the problem of profits is to create new causes
of action or modify existing private law principles.26 This strategy only obfuscates the real
question: why are certain remedies limited or defined by the violation of certain rights and
bounded by compensable loss? The orthodox view is that certain remedies are not available

26

See, e.g., Serhan (Trustee of) v Johnson & Johnson, [2004] OJ No 2904 (SC), aff’d [2006] OJ No 2421 (Div

Ct) [Serhan] in which Justice Cullity held that the plaintiffs’ pleadings supported a claim of waiver of tort as an
independent cause of action and consequently the plaintiffs would have an advantage in not being required to
prove loss. After certification the case settled (2011 ONSC 128) and the issues were therefore not resolved on
the merits. Cases contemporary with and following Serhan compounded the confusion both about the status or
availability of waiver of tort as an independent cause of action or a remedy and the requirement that these
questions needed to be decided on a full factual record. See, e.g., Amertek Inc. v Canadian Commercial Corp.
(2003), 229 DLR (4th) 419 (ON SC); Reid v Ford Motor Co., 2006 BCSC 712; Heward v Eli Lily & Co (2007),
39 CPC (6th) 153 (ON SC).
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for certain kinds of wrongs or wrongs committed in certain kinds of ways. The tension in the
case law arguably leads to the conclusions that the orthodoxy is unsatisfactory. The solution,
however, should not be a finding that certain remedies are only available for class actions or
interpreting the discretion judges are afforded vis-à-vis class procedure so broadly as to
permit a departure from private law principles. This would be both unfair and in violation of
the principle that class procedure does not alter the substantive law. The solution is to view
disgorgement-based remedies as available for all types of rights violations. There is no
principled reason to exclude cases of negligence. As with the arguments reconsidering
damage, it may seem at the outset that the view presented here is similarly a radical departure
from orthodoxy. However, it will be argued that the solution is consistent with underlying
principles, is equally applicable to two-party litigation, and provides a more coherent view of
the law.
1.2.3

The problem of individual issues as motivating impermissible changes to the
requirements of negligence

The purpose of a class proceeding is to decide the case on a common basis and
answer questions that will resolve all of the issues for the entire class. However, a class
action is in substance still an aggregation of individual claims despite being a more
procedurally efficient vehicle. Liability, then, is still ultimately a question dependent on the
individual circumstances of each person in the class. This presents the problem of individual
issues – having to determine liability on an individual basis to ensure the procedure does not
alter litigants’ substantive rights is a barrier to being able to resolve issues on a common
basis and consequently a barrier to achieving class actions’ three goals. The problem is
unique to class actions but is an outgrowth of the requirements of proving certain causes of
action equally applicable to two-party litigation. The problem is best illuminated by
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negligence. For a claim in negligence to succeed, the plaintiff must show the defendant owed
him or her a duty of care, breached that duty by failing to act in accordance with the standard
of care, and caused the plaintiff damage thereby, and that the damage caused was reasonably
foreseeable or not otherwise too remote.27 Though for class actions there may be some
procedural flexibility in the mechanisms or evidence required to assess individual damages,28
for claims such as negligence to succeed there are critical elements of the cause of action that
require individual proof. There is no flexibility built into the statutes regarding the
substantive elements which the plaintiff has the burden of proving to establish liability.
The problem of individual issues manifests in two different ways. First, if the
individual issues are overwhelming in that there are few, if any, issues that can be resolved
on a common basis, the class action will not be certified.29 Second, even if the action is
certified, questions of damages, for example, are not certified as common issues if they are
dependent on the idiosyncrasies of each plaintiff’s loss. That is, Mr. Smith’s house may have
been totally destroyed by water damage because his washing machine broke while he was on
vacation and caused flooding for two weeks, but Ms. Jones may have only had to replace the
27

GHL Fridman et al, The Law of Torts in Canada, 3rd ed (Toronto, Carswell: 2010) at 295; cf M’Alister (or

Donoghue) v Stevenson, [1932] AC 562 (HL).
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For example, Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act, supra note 6 at s. 24 provides for monetary damages to be

calculated in the aggregate based on statistical or sampling information. As the Supreme Court of Canada
recently re-clarified, these provisions cannot be used to establish liability by showing proof of loss. Such
sections are only to aid procedural efficiency once all the elements of liability have been independently
established: Pro-Sys, supra note 12 at paras 127-135.
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For example, in McCracken v Canadian National Railway Company, 2012 ONCA 445 the Ontario Court of

Appeal upheld the motion judge’s denial of certification on the basis that common issues litigation of the
plaintiffs’ claim, that employees had been misclassified as managers and therefore denied the protection of
relevant employment standards legislation, could not resolve “the fundamental issue of misclassification on a
class-wide basis” (para 7). The court found that individualized assessments and evidence would be required to
establish the fundamental features of the claim.
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flooring in one room because of water damage. The measure of compensation for Mr. Smith
and Ms. Jones is very different and based on individual circumstances. After a common
issues trial, individual issues of damages and causation, which are essential to liability,
remain to be proven.
If, as in the first instance of the problem, certification is denied, none of the three
goals can be met. If, as in the second instance, each individual must prove some element of
the cause of action in order to establish liability, then class actions more or less break down
to nothing more than single two-party claims and present all the hardships of individualized
litigation. The statutes provide for some streamlining of procedure for litigation of individual
issues that are not merely matters of assessment or quantification of damages. For example,
s. 25 of Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act provides the court has discretion to determine the
procedure to hear the individual issues, appoint a referee, and dispense with unnecessary
procedural steps.30 Research thus far reveals this section, and similar sections in other
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Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act, supra note 6 at s. 25 (1):
25(1) When the court determines common issues in favour of a class and considers that the
participation of individual class members is required to determine individual issues, other than those
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Plaintiffs frequently set out in their litigation plan that a referee will decide individual issues, but this approach
has been criticized. For example, in Keatley Surveying Ltd. v Teranet Inc., 2012 ONSC 7120, Justice Horkins
questioned the propriety of having a referee decide main issues of liability: “In this case individual issues are
numerous and they go to the heart of the action. In my view, a reference is an inappropriate mechanism to
resolve the complex individual issues that arise in this case” (para 246). The case was not certified, in part
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provinces’ statutes, has not been invoked or judicially analyzed because any trial or summary
judgment decisions make liability findings on a common basis or the matters settle.
Even if the procedure is streamlined, the three goals cannot be meaningfully
achieved if at some stage individual class members are still required to go up against the
defendant to prove an element of liability. Access to justice is denied if defendants can still
overwhelm plaintiffs in individual proceedings. Judicial efficiency is undermined if in
essence some form of individual trial is still required after the common issues trial. If
defendants are never found liable or made to pay damages for wrongdoing (as in the example
of the admittedly defective but profitable washing machine), their behaviour is not modified.
The answer to the problem of individual issues, however, cannot be to relax the
process or modify the litigants’ rights to make it easier for plaintiffs to overcome these
obstacles or to certify cases based on a finding that the process will be relaxed. If defendants
are forced to pay for individual trials, or if their opportunity to present a full answer and
defence is in anyway curtailed, then the result is unfair. If courts assume from the outset that
large corporate defendants are likely liable for some wrongdoing and proceed on the basis
that the plaintiffs need procedural favours or protection, then this leads to denying defendants
due process and defies the foundation of fairness and justice on which the Canadian legal
system is built. Proceeding in this way gives credence to the criticisms that class actions are
procedural blackmail31 or covertly morph the private law into a system of strict liability.32
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1.2.4

Convergence of the three dilemmas resulting in the waiver of tort problem

Waiver of tort has been described as “an archaic legal doctrine” and enables the
plaintiff, after a wrong has been proven, to “relinquish the right to compensation for damages
and instead receive disgorgement of the defendant’s wrongful gains.”33 Canada’s class
actions judges and lawyers are all too familiar with the ‘waiver of tort problem’ – confusion
that is driving an incorrect application and development of waiver of tort that results from
judges and lawyers alike being unsure of what waiver of tort is, how it ought to apply, and
what the status of the law is in Canada. The problem is not with the doctrine of waiver of
tort itself, though the doctrine is recognized as confusing and difficult to understand. The
problem is that judges are seeking to answer the dilemmas of the problems of loss, profits,
and individual issues, by using or interpreting waiver of tort incorrectly rather than parsing
out the dilemmas individually and tackling them directly. Familiarity with the debate about
waiver of tort and the problem it is creating has not resulted in clarification of the law or a
better understanding of the doctrine. Class counsel began pleading waiver of tort framed both
as a remedy and as an independent cause of action in cases in which the defendants made a
large profit from their alleged wrongdoing or it was difficult to identify or quantify a
compensable loss for class members. The most clear, and perhaps most cited, example of the

clearly in part motivated by a finding that the defendants had committed some wrongdoing because they had
been prosecuted in the United States:
Though procedural reforms may have unleashed class actions “as potent judicial weapons” to regulate
conduct in the commercial sphere, in my view, the principles inherent therein should be subject to
close judicial scrutiny at an early stage. The new trend need not import holus-bolus the principle of
strict liability into products liability cases, exemplified by the plethora of claims against various
industries in the United States. Clearly, the mere assertion of injustice cannot be sufficient to avoid
scrutiny of the restitutionary elements of a claim for damages. In the instant case, the plaintiffs’ claim
based on waiver of tort as a cause of action cannot be sustained on the facts pleaded. It is plain and
obvious that such an action would fail (para 258).
33
Greg Weber, “Waiver of Tort: Disgorgement Ex Nihilo” (2014) 40 Queen’s LJ 389 at 389.
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waiver of tort problem is the certification decisions at first instance and on appeal to the
Divisional Court in Serhan v Johnson & Johnson.34 Serhan was about allegedly defective
“SureStep” blood glucose meters and blood measuring strips manufactured by the
defendants, a LifeScan group of corporations, ultimately wholly-owned subsidiaries of
Johnson & Johnson. The plaintiffs claimed negligence, negligent and fraudulent
misrepresentation, breach of the federal Competition Act35 and conspiracy.36 The defendants
admitted the meters were defective. In some cases the meters displayed an error message
rather than indicating the existence of a high blood glucose level reading. The strips were
defective in that by not being fully inserted (to a measure of a 15 thousandth of an inch) users
were given erroneously low readings.37
Federal agencies in the United States investigated LifeScan’s United States’ entities,
leading ultimately to LifeScan paying almost $29.5 million in fines for offences relating to
“false and misleading reports” provided to federal agencies, and the “delivery of an
‘adulterated and misbranded medical device’ into interstate commerce”.38 Plea agreements
were based on admissions that LifeScan had learned of the defects of the strips and the
meters as early as four years before they were distributed on the Canadian market.39
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As Justice Cullity noted in the certification decision, the plaintiffs’ largest hurdle
was “virtually no evidence that either of the representative plaintiffs, or any other members
of the putative class, suffered any injurious effects to their health by using the meter or the
Strips”.40 Almost half of the allegedly defective meters sold or distributed in Canada were
replaced with corrected meters, and the meters provided to the proposed representative
plaintiffs, as well as putative class members, were supplied through the Ontario Drug Benefit
Program with no cost to the user.41
On the motion for certification the defendants conceded the plaintiffs had properly
pled causes of action, and only contested the s. 5(1)(a) criterion42 insofar as submitting that
even if proven, the facts and the causes of action pled would not entitle the plaintiffs to any
remedy. Justice Cullity in effect reinterpreted the pleadings to conclude the plaintiffs could
proceed on the basis of an independent cause of action of waiver of tort:
Waiver of tort, by that name, has not been pleaded but…I believe, [the statement of claim
alleges] material facts that if proven, could entitle the plaintiffs to a remedy on the basis of
that doctrine. Such facts would constitute a cause of action for which the remedies of a
constructive trust or, alternatively, an accounting of revenues, are claimed. Claims based on
waiver of tort seek ‘restitution’ of benefits received by the defendants, as a consequence of
their tortious conduct rather than damages to compensate the plaintiffs for a loss.43

Justice Cullity certified the proceeding as a class action, grounding the decision in “the
flexibility that now exists in the court’s choice of remedies”44 and a hesitancy to determine
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including pain and suffering from “repuncturing fingers to draw additional blood samples”, diabetic shock, and
loss of income.
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contested issues at the pleadings stage.45 It was held that if the plaintiffs could proceed with
waiver of tort as an independent cause of action, the plaintiffs would have an advantage in
not being required to prove loss.46 Cases contemporary with and following Serhan
compounded the confusion both about the status or availability of waiver of tort as an
independent cause of action or a remedy and the requirement that these questions needed to
be decided on a full factual record.47
The debate continues as to whether waiver of tort is an electable remedy, a parasitic
form of damages, or an independent theory of liability.48 How waiver of tort has evolved and
how the problem and debate continues in the case law is not the focus here and has been
excellently dealt with elsewhere.49 For the purposes of this discussion, the waiver of tort
problem is defined as an example of how judges are trying to answer each of the problem of
loss, the problem of profits, and the problem of individual issues combined in a class actions
case. First, judges suggest that waiver of tort can solve the problem of loss if used as an
independent cause of action that does not require loss. They thus attempt to subvert the
damage requirement in negligence.50 Second, there is a suggestions that waiver of tort can be
45
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used to solve the problem of profits because its purpose is to permit a disgorgement remedy.
However, plaintiffs often plead waiver of tort indiscriminately as both a remedy and
independent cause of action and the issues are not thoroughly analyzed in contemporary case
law.51 Finally, if, as was suggested in Serhan, the plaintiffs’ claim in negligence does not
require proof of loss and the remedy is entirely focused on the defendant, then the problem of
individual issues is solved because no plaintiff-by-plaintiff inquiry is required.
The waiver of tort problem is rooted in class actions judges trying to achieve the
three goals of access to justice, judicial economy and behaviour modification, and ensure
meritorious claims are certified, by analyzing the problems posed by the orthodox
conceptions of damage and disgorgement in a backward fashion. That is, judges analyze the
issues within the framework of a class proceeding and an aggregation of claims rather than
focusing on how the issues ought to be resolved first on an individual basis and then applied
to the class action. By considering the issues only as in relation to waiver of tort and only
within the scope of class actions, the resulting decisions imply potential outcomes that would
impermissibly alter the substantive law.52 As class actions procedure is not meant to create or

ONCA 96 the court held “[w]hile waiver of tort appears to be developing new legs in the class action field … it
is of no assistance to the appellants here. Whether the claim exists as an independent cause of action or whether
it requires proof of all the elements of an underlying tort aside, at the very least, waiver of tort requires some
form of wrongdoing” (at para 82). Courts are still, however, debating the issue (e.g. Malak v Hanna, 2016
BCSC 315 at para 12) and some scholars continue to argue waiver of tort should be considered a separate
theory of liability (e.g. McCamus, supra note 48).
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context of certification. That is, judges are suggesting what the result or analysis could be in a future
examination of the merits but the issues are not being decided on procedural motions. If it is the case that a
decision on the merits follows the analysis that is suggested in many certification decisions, then the substantive
law would indeed be altered. To this point, however, such changes and analysis is only theoretical.
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alter litigants’ substantive rights, the discussion must begin by looking at the private law
generally not work outward from class actions specifically. The biggest hurdle the waiver of
tort problem has created is the notion that “uncertainty about the scope of the wrongdoing
that will come within the doctrine” precludes the issue from being dealt with outside the
“context of a complete record after trial.”53 The questions posed by traditional principles of
negligence, how damage and disgorgement are to be defined, and whether the orthodoxy
ought to be reconsidered should not be answered in a contingent manner based on factspecific circumstances. The answers should not be developed only within the class action
context. While the issues have arisen and been dealt with recently only in class actions, the
questions apply to, and should be answered for, all of private law.
The dissertation concludes that class actions need not modify the substantive law or
alter litigants’ rights and are therefore a defensible procedural mechanism. The answer to the
problems posed by class actions is not to create a separate legal system but to properly
understand and articulate how these problems are bringing to the surface issues that are latent
in the orthodox conceptions of the private law generally. It is because class actions pull apart
the elements of private law in a unique way that rarely, if ever, occurs in two-party litigation
that there are tensions in the interpretation and application of the law. If the function of the
private law is viewed not as focused on compensating loss but on vindicating rights, the law
can be more coherently interpreted and consistently applied across both class actions and
two-party litigation. The consequences of taking this view prompt reconsideration of
foundational principles but not a wholesale alteration.
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1.3

Methodology

1.3.1

An interpretive, rights-based theory of private law

The dissertation mainly relies on primary legal sources. Cases and fact patterns will
be interpreted within the framework of precedential jurisprudence, statutes and relevant
government documents. In order to develop a view that is internally consistent with the
positive law, a doctrinal and descriptive approach is necessary to articulate the orthodox view
of the principles both of private law and of class actions.
The discussion engages with descriptive, interpretive and prescriptive aspects of
legal theory.54 Building on a descriptive analysis of current and precedential case law from
Canada and the United Kingdom, the main project is to offer a view of the private law that
best accounts for how to understand its function, and in so doing deals with class actions to
enable judges to solve problems in a way that is consistent with this function. The aim is to
show the positive law makes better sense if private law is viewed as functioning to vindicate
rights rather than compensate loss. Prescriptive elements are blended with the interpretive
theory by advancing the argument that in deciding cases judges ought to consider issues
within the framework and using the definitions proposed here. In challenging orthodox views
and arguing that damage and disgorgement ought to be re-conceptualized, the conclusions
necessarily contain prescriptive aspects. These arguments are, however, an extension of the
descriptive and interpretive elements of the discussion. By viewing the private law as
focused on the vindication of rights it is necessary to understand the content of those rights
both philosophically and as informed by analysis of case law.
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The project is therefore best described as one focused on developing part of an
interpretive legal theory of the private law: “The best explanations are produced by
examining and reflective on the law…They are attempts to provide coherent and compelling
conceptual accounts of the basis and scope of liability; they are attempts to reveal ‘an
intelligible order in the law’.”55 Limitations in scope necessarily dictate that the discussion
cannot engage with all aspects of the private law and thus the focus is claims in negligence.
Though a foundational point, it is not uncontested that the private law is concerned
with litigants’ rights and is, at least in part, an institution concerned with defining what
constitutes a violation of one’s rights and, once violated, what recourse is available or
dictated by the fact of that violation.56 It is beyond the scope of this discussion to advance a
justification for a rights-based view, or to advance arguments seeking to define the content of
people’s rights generally. In large part the argument adopts the starting position articulated
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by Allan Beever in his work Rediscovering the Law of Negligence.57 Beever undertakes the
project of ‘rediscovering’ negligence by working from what he argues are the foundational
cases establishing the law of negligence58 and maintains that one underlying principle of the
positive law is that it “defines the scope of an actionable injury in terms of the parties’
rights.”59 Beever’s argument defending a rights-based approach is in part based on
dismantling the assumption that the common law is only focused on remedies: “If focusing
on rights enables the academic better to explain the law than the courts with their focus on
remedies are able to do, then she must adopt that methodology.”60 The use of rights language,

57

Beever, supra note 2. The discussion will advance and rely on a rights-based theory, however, as noted there

are many proponents of rights-based views with each having a different theory and conception about how to
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adopt or endorse a corrective justice view in order to agree with Beever’s overall argument that the most
principled understanding of the law is based on a view of negligence as concerned with litigants’ rights.
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Beever argues the foundational cases are Donoghue, supra note 27; Palsgraf v Long Island R. Co. (1928),

162 NE 99 (NY CA) [Palsgraf]; Bolton v Stone, [1951] AC 850 (HL); Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v Morts
Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. (sub nom ‘Wagon Mound 1’), [1961] 1 All ER 404 (PC); Overseas Tankship
(U.K.), Ltd. v Miller Steamship Propriety Ltd. (sub nom ‘Wagon Mound 2’), [1966] 2 All ER 709 (PC).
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Beever, supra note 2 at 120 citing to Lord Atkin, “Law as an Educational Subject” (1932) Journal of the

Society of Public Teachers of Law 27 at 30, and JC Smith & Peter Burns, “Donoghue v Stevenson: The Not so
Golden Anniversary” (1983) 46 Mod L Rev 147 at 147-148.
60

Beever, supra note 2 at 215.
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then, is not advancing a different or adverse approach to the way cases are decided. Rather it
is a “translation not a replacement” of the language of remedies used by the courts. Further,
the use of rights language does not imply that the analysis is wholly abstracted from how
courts decide cases nor does it “involve the adoption of a radical, abstract-theoretical
approach to lawyering.”61 Though the language of rights may be a helpful way to translate
the analytical approach taken by the courts, the concern still remains with identifying what
rights are “as they exist in the substantive law” and not what rights are with reference to
abstract normative moral philosophy.62 Thus, analyzing the problems of negligence through a
rights-based approach, “even though it is unfamiliar, is perfectly consistent with the
traditional common law approach”.63 Beever goes further to conclude that “although the law
gets by in practice without much reference to primary rights, the law cannot be adequately
analysed without them.”64
That private law is concerned with rights is perhaps not a radical notion. As Cardozo
CJ held in Palsgraf v Long Island Rail Co., “[n]egligence is not a tort unless it results in the
commission of a wrong, and the commission of a wrong imports the violation of a right”.65
From an overarching perspective it is perhaps simple to articulate the function of the law as
defining and determining a system of rights, and it is similarly simple and perhaps easy to
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Ibid at 216.
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Ibid.
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Ibid at 216.
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Ibid at 216-217.
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Palsgraf, supra note 58 at 101. As Beever argues, “a wrong is the violation of a right. Hence, a remedy

without the invasion of a right is a remedy without a wrong. But without a wrong, what is one remedying?
Remedies without rights are incoherent” (Beever, supra note 2 at 220).
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accept that “at least in private law, a wrong is the violation of a right.”66 The thornier issues
are found by attempting to determine what precisely is the content of one’s rights.67 It is on
this point that the limits of Beever’s view are arguably reached as he identifies the aim of his
project as understanding the structure of negligence defined in relation to corrective justice
not to articulate what the content of one’s rights are.68 His aim is to understand as a structural
matter against what sorts of behaviour rights protect litigants against and how the law should
respond when a right has been violated.69
Undoubtedly this discussion cannot begin to conclusively or completely determine
these issues. The focus here is largely on the way in which courts have defined and
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Beever, supra note 2 at 220.
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While it may be easy to say that the violation of a right gives rise to a remedy, the justification and reasoning

for why this is so is by no means settled. Does one have a right to a remedy? Are there distinct rights that are
necessarily determined and circumscribed by the violation of one’s rights? Are remedies, though based on
wrongs, something that the court simply grants by order or is the court necessarily bound in justice to grant a
remedy? Civil recourse theory, for example, argues there is a Hohfeldian “power conferred on tort victims [that]
is a power to hold to account a person who has committed a relational legal wrong against the victim” but the
theory does not argue that remedies are limited to, for example, the plaintiff’s compensable loss (John CP
Goldberg & Benjamin C Zipursky, “Rights and Responsibility in the Law of Torts” in Donal Nolan & Andrew
Robertson, eds, Rights and Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 251 at 265; cf Benjamin C Zipursky,
“Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts” (1998) 51 Vand L Rev 1 at 63-65). Civil recourse theory
perhaps fits the best with the arguments advanced here, but though Goldberg and Zipursky identify how it is we
conceive of what the violation of a right entitles someone to, they do not necessarily claim how this determines
what the content of one’s rights are. Their focus is more on the structural features of the relationship: “The
primary claim rights enjoyed by individuals are defined by relational directives – legal norms of non-injury.
Responsibility or accountability exists for those who have invaded rights because of the law’s recognition of a
right to a means of redressing wrongs” (Goldberg & Zipursky at 273).
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Similarly, many other rights-based theories focus on the structure of the relationship rather than determining

the content of litigants’ rights.
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Beever, supra note 2 at 56 and 60-61; cf Beever at 45 n 9 where he accepts a broad definition of a right as the

correlative of a wrong.
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circumscribed litigants’ rights as opposed to advancing a broader philosophical theory. As is
quickly evident, any interpretation of the law and of negligence is inextricably determined by
how the content of rights are defined. The difficulty, however, is that courts often fail to
explicitly recognize that this is the project they are (or by necessity must be) undertaking and
consequently conflicting definitions create a mischief that needs remedying.
1.3.2

Limitations in scope

Though the conclusions purport to be applicable to all of private law, and a critical
element of the argument is that the application of principles and modes of interpretation
ought not differ based on the cause of action at issue, the scope of the investigation is limited.
There is insufficient space to cover in comprehensive detail each type of cause of action or to
undertake an investigation into the content of litigants’ private law rights and duties
generally. Claims in negligence offer the most fertile ground for investigating the relevant
issues because there is greater debate about what litigants’ rights and duties are. For other
types of claims the identification of a violation of a right is more clear-cut because most
claims do not depend on a theoretical examination of damage or loss as a critical element in
order to maintain the cause of action. If, for example, a defendant commits a trespass to land
or intentional bodily injury, these types of claims are not necessarily contingent on the
plaintiff showing some damage in order to bring a claim.70 Whether the plaintiff’s right has
been violated can be analyzed independently of the plaintiff showing loss. In negligence, loss
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Fridman, supra note 27 at 25: “Trespass in all its forms is actionable per se, i.e., without the need for the

plaintiff to prove he has sustained actual damage. The mere infringement of the plaintiff’s right not to be
interfered with in respect of his body, his goods, or his land is wrongful and actionable” (citing Logan v Levy
(1975), 20 NSR (2d) 500 (TD); Baldry v Dixon, [1931] 1 WWR 21 (Man CA)).
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is tied up with the determination of whether the plaintiff’s right has been violated and this
complicates the analysis in interesting ways that are central to this investigation.
Similarly, while the scope deals with common law cases generally, the focus is in
places on class actions specifically. In two-party litigation the issues of damage, loss, harm,
and rights violations are not usually analyzed separately. Because of the structure of class
actions judges are oftentimes required to analyze these issues separately and class actions
cases therefore illuminate the problems differently. The scope will also be limited to deal
more particularly with class actions in Canadian common law provinces. Though Quebec has
a more developed jurisprudence, as it was nearly twenty years ahead of the common law
provinces in enacting class proceedings legislation, the application of the Civil Code
differentiates Quebec courts’ analysis of the private law in general. While some cases are
helpful with respect to interpreting and articulating the application and operation of class
actions procedure, the application of the substantive law with respect to class actions is of
limited assistance.
1.3.3

Jurisdictional focus

The scope of primary legal sources is common law from Canada (including in a
limited fashion Quebec, as mentioned above) and the United Kingdom. Though the United
Kingdom does not have class proceedings legislation, many of the controversial English
cases that will be discussed are aggregated claims and therefore uniquely highlight
particularly the issue of loss similar to Canadian class actions. Of the Canadian common law
jurisdictions, Ontario and British Columbia are the provinces that litigate the most class
actions. There is little analysis of class action cases from the United States as the procedural
requirements are fundamentally quite different from Canada and each state has interpreted
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the substantive law as it applies in certain controversial class actions cases to arrive at
different conclusions. While some American case law and scholarship is helpful, in general
there is broad ideological and procedural divergence from the Canadian understanding both
of negligence and class actions.
Discussion of the development and application of orthodox principles therefore
focuses on Canadian and English law and jurisprudence. As we negotiate the investigation it
is quickly evident that even though the common law has been developing for nearly one
thousand years there are still very fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of the
law that have yet to be settled. This tension gives rise to the problems to which we now turn
to consider.
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Chapter 2
2. Reconsidering Damage in Negligence
2.1

Introduction
Though it may be “hornbook law that damage is the gist of the action in

negligence”,1 the concept of actionable damage is much more complex and normatively
significant than a factual requirement meant only to distinguish negligence from other types
of torts. Damage as the gist of negligence can be understood as identifying a particular
conceptual view about the relational nature of litigants’ rights and duties. It can be
understood as requiring a plaintiff to suffer and prove a particular kind of loss in order to
maintain an action. It can be understood as expressing the boundaries of the types of harms
the law will identify as legal wrongs. But what exactly is damage? Though seemingly the
most effortless and factually based part of the negligence inquiry, damage is not simply
factual loss. Different interpretations of damage result in different conceptions of negligence.
The term ‘actionable damage’ is not used in Canada as often as it is in the United
Kingdom. Rigorous analysis of what constitutes actionable damage has not been taken up as
frequently in Canada as in the United Kingdom with the result that questions such as whether
a risk of future injury is sufficient or whether actionable damage requires proof of loss, have
not been dealt with as squarely. One of the reasons for confusion in the law, such as is
present in the waiver of tort debate, is the dearth of analysis by the Supreme Court of Canada
of these issues. The uncertainty of the law in Canada is evidenced by, for example, Justice

1

Gregg v Scott, [2005] 2 WLR 268 (HL) [Gregg] at para 193 per Baroness Hale.
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Perell’s somewhat startling conclusion in Goodridge v Pfizer Canada Inc. that, “increased
risk of [harm]…is a materialized actual harm”.2 Justice Perell, well known for his careful and
in-depth legal analysis, cites no cases to support this conclusion, but only analogizes to other
similar certified class actions. His lack of analysis illustrates that Canadian courts have not
sufficiently tackled the problem of determining what constitutes actionable damage.
Conversely, in the United Kingdom the House of Lords has taken up the task of clarifying
and defining actionable damage in a series of cases in the last ten years.
As Lord Atkin established in Donoghue v Stevenson, “You must take reasonable
care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure
your neighbour.”3 In order to maintain a cause of action in negligence, one element the
plaintiff must prove is that he or she has suffered injury that falls within the ambit of the type
of reasonably foreseeable harm the defendant has a duty to take care to avoid.4 Equally
important to the negligence inquiry as asking, “[w]ho, then, in law is my neighbour” (the
question that tends to dominate5) is determining what, then, constitutes injury?

2

2010 ONSC 1095 [Goodridge] at para 58. The judgment certified the case as a class action. One of the

plaintiff’s allegations was that a side effect of the defendant’s drug caused a risk of suicidal behaviour.
3

[1932] AC 562 (HL) [Donoghue] at 580.

4

The articulation of how the elements of negligence work together and what precisely is the duty the defendant

owes the plaintiff is the subject of debate and necessarily intertwines issues of the standard of care, remoteness
and causation. As will be discussed further, the argument here will rely in large part on Allan Beever’s
articulation of duty and standard, extrapolated from a reconsideration of what he argues are the foundational
negligence cases: Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). See also
the discussion in Chapter 1 at Part 1.3.1.
5

Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, “The Changing Face of the Gist of Negligence” in Jason W Neyers, Erika

Chamberlain & Stephen GA Pitel, eds, Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 467 at
468.
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A simple starting point for crafting a definition of actionable damage is to
understand its purpose as distinguishing different types of torts. That is, distinguishing
between actions per se (causes of action standing alone without any reference to consequent
damage) and actions per quod (causes of action requiring allegation and proof of loss).6
Actions that are per se are intentional torts7 based on direct violations of a plaintiff’s right
and do not require the plaintiff to establish consequent loss. Identifying the type of action
with reference to loss, however, does not define the difference, if any, between the rights at
issue. Loss does not meaningfully illuminate why the two types of actions are normatively
distinct.
As Jane Stapleton proposed, “[t]he modern law of torts is in need of a coherent
doctrine about the notion of ‘damage’.”8 Stapleton began by describing how we could
embark on such a project by suggesting that the outer limit, or minimum actionable damage,
ought to be determined for four categories of negligence cases.9 In order to understand the
6

Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed, sub verbo “per se” and “per quod”.

7

The intention need not be to harm or violate the plaintiff’s right; the intention need only be to intentionally act.

See, e.g., Turner v Thorne, [1959] OJ No 416 (HCJ) at para 8 (citing Kopka v Bell Telephone Co. of
Pennsylvania, 91 A.2d 232 at 235 (PA SC)):
Before considering the question of the liability of a trespasser for persona injuries suffered by the
possessor of land as an indirect result of the trespass, there are two relevant legal principles to be borne
in mind. The first is that the fact that a trespass results from an innocent mistake and, in that sense, is
not deliberate or wilful, does not relieve the trespasser of liability therefor or for any of the results
thereof.
8
Jane Stapleton, “The Gist of Negligence: Part I – Minimum Actionable Damage” (1988) 104 Law Q Rev 213
[Gist Part I] at 213; see also Jane Stapleton “The Gist of Negligence: Part II – The Relationship Between
‘Damage’ and Causation” (1988) 104 Law Q Rev 389.
9

Stapleton, Gist Part I, ibid at 218: “Class A claims where the outcome is personal injuries, Class B claims

where the effect is physical changes to property owned by the plaintiff at all relevant times, and Class C claims
where the defendant’s action has produced a deleterious condition in property supplied to or occupied by the
plaintiff, … [and] Class D claims [which partially overlap with the last two classes] where the focus is on the
inroad made into the plaintiff’s economic interests.”
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definition of actionable damage, she argued, the principal focus should be on courts’ “overt
formulation of what damage is necessary” for each category of case.10 Stapleton’s challenge
has still not been comprehensively answered. The discussion that follows cannot begin to
tackle all of the issues implicated in attempting to define actionable damage. However, what
we discover is that a coherent doctrine about damage cannot be based on a taxonomy of types
of negligence cases. Though seemingly conceding defeat before beginning, a generally
applicable definition of what damage is in substance cannot be formulated.
If negligence is viewed as relational,11 then the content of litigants’ rights and duties
are defined with reference to the duty and standard of care. The argument advanced here
10

Ibid at 217.

11

This conception of negligence is in line with Beever’s articulation and is the view relied on here (Beever,

supra note 4, esp Ch 4). As set out by Ripstein and Zipursky, negligence can be seen as concerned with
relational, qualified duties of non-injury (Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C Zipursky, “Corrective Justice in an
Age of Mass Torts” in Gerald J Postema, ed, Philosophy and the Law of Torts (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001) 214). The distinction between a relational and non-relational view identifies what
relationship is of concern in the negligence inquiry. If negligence is relational, the relevant scope is only the
relationship as between the plaintiff and defendant. It is not, as with the non-relational view, concerned with
only the defendant’s actions without any reference to the defendant owing a particular duty of care to a
particular class of people. The duty the defendant owes can be qualified or unqualified. Ripstein and Zipursky
cite the example of a qualified duty as being a duty not to cause harmful or offensive touching through harmful
conduct, and contrast this to an unqualified duty of, for example, a duty not to cause another to die. A duty of
non-injury is one that the defendant does not breach unless the defendant in fact injures the plaintiff, which is
contrasted with a duty of non-injuriousness, which can be breached objectively and without reference to the
plaintiff’s injury by generally falling below the standard of care. The relevant duty in negligence, then, is a
relational, qualified duty of non-injury. The relational view of negligence is also discussed by Hurd and Moore
and labelled a fully relational view or a strong harm within the risk (HWR) theory. Hurd and Moore articulate
the position as harm within the risk because on a fully relational view negligence is only made out if the
plaintiff suffers the particular harm that is within the ambit of the risk that the defendant is under a duty to
avoid. Hurd and Moore argue, contra Ripstein and Zipursky, that the HWR view of negligence is indefensible
and adopt what can be called a non-relational view of negligence (Heidi Hurd & Michael S Moore, “Negligence
in the Air” (2002) 3 Theor Inq in Law 333). It may be that the view of negligence as non-relational and not
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contends that in order to maintain a relational view of negligence, the duty and standard of
care must also be defined in reference to the actionable damage. That is, the plaintiff’s
relevant right in negligence is a right to not suffer a particular kind of damage that the
defendant is under a duty to take care to avoid. In order to craft a complete coherent doctrine
of damage, as Stapleton rightly argued is needed, the categorization must be dealt with at a
granular level on a duty-by-duty basis.
Analysis by English and Canadian courts about what constitutes actionable damage
leads to two alternative definitions: one narrow and one broad. The narrow definition of
damage requires that a plaintiff suffer a loss, that is, be worse off physically or financially.
The broad definition requires no such detriment. The narrow definition causes problems in
practice, leads to inconsistent and arbitrary, policy-based decisions, and ultimately is not the
approach that provides a coherent and principled view of the law. If damage, and its function
as determining the content of a legal wrong, is reconsidered and the broad approach adopted,
then the tensions and inconsistencies resulting from a focus on loss can be resolved. To say
focused on the content of the duty of care is the prevailing view of American tort scholars. Stephen Perry, for
example, argues that what he calls the instrumentalist theories (instrumentalist, economic, functionalist,
pragmatist, welfarist, utilitarian and consequentialist theories) “represent the dominant strand of theorizing
about torts in the United States.” This view, he contends, has resulted in the concept and analysis of duty of care
(which he maintains is foundational to a rights-based understanding) as vanishing from American law and
theory. Perry undertakes the project of trying to revive what he calls the view of the rights-based camp within
American scholarship (Stephen Perry, “Torts, Rights, and Risk” in John Oberdiek, ed, Philosophical
Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 38 at 38). Conversely, Heidi Hurd,
for example, forcefully argues for an instrumentalist view of negligence and represents a line of thinking that
does not see negligence as rights-based and argues “negligence is best defined in consequentialist
terms…[which] is fully compatible with, and indeed demanded by, an uncompromising deontological moral
theory” (Heidi M Hurd, “The Deontology of Negligence” (1996) 76 BUL Rev 249 at 251-252). The
instrumentalist view, however, is not the dominant analysis or understanding of negligence in Canada and the
United Kingdom, where, among other things, duty of care still plays an important analytical and conceptual role
in determining liability.
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that a plaintiff must not prove loss is not to say that a plaintiff need not prove damage, and
therefore taking a broad approach to damage does not fundamentally change the nature of
negligence. Rather, it refocuses the issue on determining litigants’ rights and duties in a
different way.
Saying proof of damage is required to maintain a negligence claim is colloquially a
clear enough benchmark. Consequently, relatively few cases are brought before the courts in
which negligence is alleged without demonstrable financially compensable loss. Whether a
plaintiff’s damage is too trivial to constitute the minimum actionable damage required to
maintain a claim is therefore not often analyzed: “Because people do not often go to the
trouble of bringing actions to recover damages for trivial injuries, the question of how trivial
is trivial has seldom arisen directly.”12 This question does arise more frequently in class
actions because the aggregation of trivial claims makes the action more economically
viable.13 For example, if one plaintiff loses $1 as a result of the defendant’s negligence,
litigation about whether the dollar is recoverable is not likely to arise. If there are one million
people in the alleged class, recovery of $1 million makes the litigation more worthwhile.
However, determining what constitutes minimum actionable damage should not be done
through a class actions lens despite the fact that resolution of this issue may impact class
actions more than other cases. That is, whether there are two, twenty, or twenty million

12

Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd (2007), [2008] 1 AC 281 (HL) [Rothwell] at 289.
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This is one of the reasons that class proceedings were introduced in Canada (Ontario Law Reform

Commission, Report on Class Actions (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1982) Vols. I-III [OLRC
Report] Vol. I at 1-5 and Ch. 4). It is not necessary that there be a class proceedings regime in order for these
issues to be dealt with on a class or aggregate basis. The United Kingdom does not have a class proceedings
regime but cases are still brought as aggregate claims and have similar features and raise the same kinds of
issues as class actions in Canada.
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people in the putative class, the question is still whether $1 is sufficient damage to maintain
each individual claim. Though there may be legitimate policy concerns if courts conclude a
defendant is not liable despite having injured one million people because the $1 per person is
insufficient to maintain a claim, it should not be these kinds of facts or outcomes driving the
development and interpretation of the law. The aggregation of claims ought not give
plaintiffs rights as members of a class that they otherwise would not have as individuals.14
Perhaps because this type of problematic outcome is possible, class actions decisions in
Canada contribute to confusion rather than clarity in the law. Questions about who can be a
part of the class (for example, whether it can only include certain plaintiffs who have actually
suffered an injury), what causes of action can be certified (for example, whether certain
defendants owe duties of care to certain classes of plaintiffs) and how common issues are to
be resolved (for example, whether questions of causation can be answered on a class widebasis) are only narrowly dealt with in the context of certification. Judges do not deal with
crucial substantive questions at the threshold procedural stage.15 The solution is not to turn
certification into a merits-based inquiry. However, many of the underlying questions are
legal questions that do not in principle require a fact or merits-based inquiry to be solved.16
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The Supreme Court of Canada continues to reiterate this proposition: Bisaillon v Concordia University, 2006

SCC 19 at para 18; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Green, 2015 SCC 60 at para 62.
15

For example, as discussed in Chapter 1 both lower courts and the Supreme Court of Canada continue to

suggest the questions raised by the waiver of tort debate require a merits-based inquiry that is inappropriate at
the procedural certification stage: Chapter 1 at Part 1.2.4.
16

A helpful approach that courts could take in resolving these issues is advocated by Stephen GA Pitel &

Matthew B Lerner, “Resolving Questions of Law: A Modern Approach to Rule 21” (2014) 43 Advocates’ Q
344. Pitel and Lerner argue that many of these difficult legal questions are properly dealt with in the context of
Rule 21 motions (which the authors note is akin to the s. 5(1)(a) cause of action inquiry) and the current “plain
and obvious” test is too high a threshold to achieve the purposes of Rule 21. An overly restrictive view, and
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The waiver of tort problem – the misapplication and distortion of waiver of tort
motivated by an effort to circumvent the requirement that the plaintiff prove loss – is the
clearest example of how courts’ failure to wrestle with the law clouds the issues. If the
waiver of tort debate is resolved by class actions judges in a way that ultimately eliminates
damage entirely as an element of negligence, then this leads to ultimately incorrect
alterations of the substantive law. One of the central questions of negligence is a principled
understanding of the damage a plaintiff is required to prove in order to maintain an action.
Does damage require loss? Is risk of injury a harm? Must a plaintiff wait until he or she
suffers significant physical or financial detriment before bringing a negligence claim?
Though class actions judges dealing with waiver of tort have alluded to these questions, they
have been asked only in relation to waiver of tort and, implicitly, only in relation to class
actions. Reverting to the position that a full trial is required before these questions can be
answered is not only incorrect it is evasive.
Therefore, the argument begins by setting out some controversial types of cases and
aims to determine whether in any of these cases the requirement of minimum actionable
damage is met. In order to accomplish this goal the first step is to set out a definitional
framework and defend a reconsideration of the terms used to define actionable damage.
Through examination of leading case law from the United Kingdom and Canada, the
argument will turn to analyzing the two different conceptions of damage developed in each
jurisdiction. Application of a narrow definition of damage to controversial cases in the
reliance on the notion that difficult questions of law require a full trial record, is contributing to unnecessary
delays in the civil system. The authors argue that particularly with the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent dictate
in Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, courts should deal with issues more summarily; the time is ripe for
reconsidering unworkable and ultimately unnecessarily high thresholds for determining issues of law on pretrial motions.
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United Kingdom proves problematic and the argument will explore whether a broader
conception of damage, one that does not require or focus on loss, is workable and defensible.
Debate about the definition of damage strikes at the foundational principles of negligence.
The argument here aims to propose a different way in which these principles can be
considered that clarifies and unifies the case law rather than contributes to further confusion.
2.2

Controversial Cases
Recent cases that are at the center of the damage debate can be categorized as (1)

exposure cases, where the allegation is that because of the inhalation of whatever the toxic
substance, the plaintiff is put at risk of disease in the future; (2) failure to diagnose or failure
to inform cases, where the allegation is that the defendant incorrectly diagnosed the
plaintiff’s condition or failed to warn of some side effect or danger and as a result the
plaintiff was put at an increased risk of death or disease; (3) pharmaceutical cases, where the
allegation (usually in conjunction with a claim for failure to warn) is that the drug is
defective and has dangerous side effects that could cause future injury; and (4) medical
device cases, where the allegation is that the implanted device is defective and there is an
increased risk of failure in future that could cause some injury, death or complication. In
these kinds of cases the controversial plaintiffs are those who, for example, have not
contracted mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos, not suffered any further injury because
of a delay in beginning cancer treatment, or experienced no heart attack or permanent heart
damage as a result of taking an allegedly defective medication or having a faulty pacemaker
implanted. Though the traditional principle that a plaintiff must first prove damage to have a
claim in negligence would seem to operate as summarily dismissing these claims, the facts of
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each type of case suggest that a restrictive interpretation of the traditional principle may
require reconsideration.
2.2.1

Exposure cases

Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd.17 and Ring v Canada (Attorney General)18
are two examples of exposure cases; Rothwell is a decision of the House of Lords and Ring is
a decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. In Rothwell the plaintiffs had been exposed to
asbestos by their defendant employers and as a result developed pleural plaques. The pleura
is a membrane that enfolds the lungs and pleural plaques are “areas of fibrous thickening of
the pleural membrane”.19 In Rothwell it was accepted as a fact that pleural plaques are
asymptomatic, do not cause asbestos related disease such as asbestosis or mesothelioma, and
do not result on their own in some kind of disease or disability.20 Each of the employer
defendants accepted the “exposure represented a breach of the duty each owed to its

17

Supra note 12, dealt with four cases, Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd., Topping v Benchtown Ltd

(formerly Jones Bros Preston Ltd.), Johnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd., and Grieves v F T Everard
& Sons Ltd. Ten test cases were selected for trial in which Holland J found in favour of the plaintiffs ([2005]
EWHC 88 (QB)). Seven cases were appealed to the Court of Appeal, which reversed the decision of the trial
judge ([2006] EWCA Civ 27) and four of the plaintiffs appealed to the House of Lords.
18

2010 NLCA 20 [Ring]. The case was certified as a class action at first instance (2007 NLTD 146) and was

reversed on appeal to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. Similar claims regarding the same alleged damage
(spraying of herbicides at CFB Gagetown, discussed further below) were started in seven other provinces but
the only other case that went to the certification stage was Bryson and Murrin v Canada, 2009 NBQB 2004 in
which certification was denied (appeal to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal was adjourned sine die on
consent: [2009] NBJ No 309 (CA)).
19

Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary, 15th ed, sub verbo “pleura”; Rothwell, supra note 12 at para 1.

20

Ibid at paras 1, 2 and 11.
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employees.”21 The plaintiffs were claiming for, inter alia, damages for having contracted
asbestos-related conditions and damages for emotional distress, depression and anxiety due
to having contracted pleural plaques and facing a risk of developing long-term asbestosrelated diseases.22 The court held that the plaintiffs could not recover because plaques are
“injuries that are harmless” and therefore the plaintiffs’ case “is a claim which has no value
at all.”23
In Ring the plaintiffs claimed they had been exposed to herbicides sprayed in and
around Canadian Forces Base Gagetown in New Brunswick. The chemical sprayed was
widely known as Agent Orange,24 which was used during the Vietnam War.25 The plaintiffs
claimed on behalf of all people who were present at CFB Gagetown from 1956 to the present
(2007) that the spraying of the herbicides “caused, materially contributed to or materially
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Ibid at para 64. The question of whether there was a duty owed to Mr. Grieves, one of the plaintiffs, to not

cause emotional distress (he was one of the only claimants who had developed diagnosable depression and was
not just claiming for anxiety about having been exposed) was a separate and contested issue.
22

Ibid at 281-282.
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Ibid at paras 47 and 49.
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As set out in the statement of claim there were various chemical compounds allegedly used but most
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contributed to the risk of causing”26 both Hodgkins and non-Hodgkins lymphoma, and
chronic lymphatic leukemia.27 Two subclasses were proposed, the first composed of people
like Mr. Ring who had developed lymphoma and the second composed of people who had
experienced no known effect from exposure. The second class of plaintiffs claimed for, inter
alia, the cost of testing for certain chemicals in their bodies and monitoring for future
diseases.28 Importantly, however, the plaintiffs abandoned the medical monitoring claim on
appeal.29 The difference between the asbestos-type case and the Agent Orange-type case is
that pleural plaques are a sign that the plaintiff has been exposed to asbestos and there is no
equivalent to evidence exposure to Agent Orange. Though in Ring the second class impliedly
claimed that upon testing there may be the presence of certain chemicals in their system, the
plaintiffs argued on appeal, and the court ultimately held, that “members of the class who
have not been diagnosed with lymphoma would not prove that they had absorbed toxic
chemicals.”30 Therefore the only way the plaintiffs would have been able to show evidence of
exposure to Agent Orange would be to show a diagnosis of lymphoma (such a diagnosis
being uncontroversial sufficient actionable damage). The court denied certification on the
basis that the class definition was unworkably broad: the time frame of over 50 years and the
fact that the class would include people who may never have been present at the base when
the spraying was happening rendered the overall claim impermissibly unlimited.31 With
respect to the second class of people the court held that the damage element was “absent
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from the pleadings” and, relying on Rothwell, held “the risk of a future disease is not
actionable in the absence of a present injury”.32
2.2.2

Failure to diagnose or inform cases

Gregg v Scott,33 a decision of the House of Lords, is an example of a failure to
diagnose case and Laferrière v Lawson,34 a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, is an
example of a failure to inform case. In Gregg the plaintiff developed a lump under his left
arm and consulted the defendant physician to have it examined. The defendant told the
plaintiff the lump was a benign collection of tissue and no further action was required. About
nine months later the plaintiff consulted another physician who referred him for further
examination whereupon the plaintiff was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and it
was found the tumour had by that time spread into the plaintiff’s chest. The plaintiff brought
a claim in negligence against the defendant physician who had failed to initially diagnose
him. Mr. Gregg formulated the case to plead that the damage he suffered was a loss of years
of life by losing a chance to live for ten years beyond the date of diagnosis. He alleged that
had he been treated nine months earlier, his chances of living to or beyond ten years would
have been 17% better. However, his chances of living for ten years or more even with earlier
treatment were less than 50%. Mr. Gregg’s claim was therefore denied on the basis that the
doctor’s negligence did not in fact cause the loss of years of life he was claiming for on a
balance of probabilities.
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In Laferrière the claim was similarly that the defendant doctor failed to diagnose the
plaintiff’s breast cancer.35 Mrs. Dupuis was concerned about an abnormal lump in her right
breast and despite a negative mammogram consulted Dr. Lawson, a noted international
authority on breast cancer, for a second opinion.36 Mrs. Dupuis underwent further testing and
Dr. Lawson then recommended an excisional biopsy of the mass, which was performed. The
pathology report detailing the results of the tests of the removed mass indicated that the
growth was breast cancer but Mrs. Dupuis was not informed of the test results and no followup treatment or monitoring was arranged.37 It was not until almost four years after the
excision that Mrs. Dupuis’ health began to deteriorate. While undergoing testing and
diagnosis of another disorder (ultimately suspected to have been caused by the cancer) a
subsequent physician looked more closely into her medical records and she was then
informed of the initial biopsy results. Mrs. Dupuis immediately had surgery to remove new
nodules that had appeared, required further surgery for removal of her ovaries upon
discovery of the cancer’s metastases, underwent chemotherapy, and died three years later.38
Mrs. Dupuis’ estate claimed, inter alia, that the defendant’s failure to inform about the
cancer resulted in Mrs. Dupuis’ death. At trial the judge held that unfortunately the type of
cancer the plaintiff had was so pernicious that even earlier treatment would not have
prevented her death. However, the Quebec Court of Appeal held the defendant’s negligence
“resulted in the loss of a real and serious chance [for Mrs. Dupuis] to benefit from proper
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medical care.”39 The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the trial judge that the doctor’s
fault could not have been said to cause Mrs. Dupuis’ death because of the nature of the
disease, which was similar to the finding in Gregg. However, the court agreed with the Court
of Appeal and held that she had suffered psychological damage from the misdiagnosis and
was denied earlier treatment that would have improved the quality of the last years of her
life. For these latter two reasons the Supreme Court of Canada awarded $17, 500 in damages.
2.2.3

Pharmaceutical cases

Usually alongside a claim for a failure to warn, pharmaceutical cases center around
plaintiffs’ claims that the defendant’s drug causes some side effect that the defendant did not
adequately test for, did not warn about, or is a result of a defect in the drug.40 A number of
these cases have been certified in Canada but none have been determined on the merits either
at trial or summary judgment. For example, in Goodridge v Pfizer Canada the plaintiffs
claimed, inter alia, that the epilepsy treatment drug Neurontin caused a propensity for
suicidal behaviour.41 One of the originally named proposed representative plaintiffs, Ms.
Burgess, actually committed suicide. But the claim was brought on behalf of all people who
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had consumed the drug regardless of having committed suicide or having experienced
suicidal behaviour or ideations.
In Wilson v Servier Canada Inc. the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the weight
loss drugs Redux and Ponderal caused primary pulmonary hypertension and valvular heart
disease.42 The plaintiffs’ experts proposed that once a person has contracted primary
pulmonary hypertension, 50-60% of those patients die. The certified class was defined as all
people who were prescribed and ingested the drug, regardless of having contracted a disease.
Justice Cumming held the class definition was “not excessively inclusive and improper” even
though it included plaintiffs seeking return of money paid for the drug who suffered no
disease and plaintiffs seeking to recover medical expenses for medical screening and
diagnosis.43
In Tiboni v Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the
cholesterol treatment drug Vioxx caused an increased risk of heart attacks and strokes.44
Though Justice Cullity certified the Tiboni claim in Ontario for all people who had ingested
Vioxx, he suggested that only “those who claim to have suffered harm…will have any
possibility of obtaining relief for Merck’s negligence”.45 Part of the plaintiffs’ claim,
however, was for “loss of quality and enjoyment of life, and reduction in life expectancy”
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which could equally apply to people who did not suffer a heart attack as those who had.
Goodridge, Wilson, and Tiboni all settled and how each of the plaintiffs’ claims would have
fared on a merits-based inquiry is unknown. However, each settlement was only made in
relation to people who had ingested the drugs and suffered one of the alleged side effects.46
2.2.4

Medical device cases

In medical device cases plaintiffs similarly plead that the manufacturer failed to
warn of potential effects,47 but the thrust of the action is that the product implanted in the
plaintiffs is defective and the defect has potential to cause future injury. For example, in
Nantais v Telectronics Proprietary (Canada) Ltd.48 the plaintiffs had been implanted with
pacemakers manufactured by the defendants which were alleged to have faulty lead wires
that over time could become jagged, cut through the wiring insulation, and slice into the
heart. One of the proposed common issues was determination of whether a person with a
normally functioning pacemaker could have a cause of action. Evidence was put before the
court that 16-25% of the leads showed breaks and medical experts concluded that there was a
greater medical risk to plaintiffs who had not experienced breakage in undergoing surgery to
remove the leads.49 The plaintiffs’ expert predicted that all of the leads would eventually fail.
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The case was certified on behalf of all people who had been implanted with the devices. In
denying the motion for leave to appeal the certification decision Justice Zuber held that the
relevant point in time for liability was when the faulty lead was implanted; the plaintiffs’
taking the risk of either failure or removal was a matter of damages.50 The case ultimately
settled without a reported decision on the merits.51
In Andersen v St Jude,52 one of the few class actions to go to trial,53 the plaintiffs
were implanted with the defendant’s mechanical heart valves coated with its proprietary
product Silizone, a silver, palladium and titanium compound intended to inhibit inflammation
of the heart tissue and reduce other post-operative complications. The plaintiffs alleged that
Silizone had an adverse effect on tissue healing and caused a risk of other complications.
Justice Lax decided in favour of the defendants at trial because, among other reasons, she
found the defendants did not fall below a standard of reasonable care and the plaintiffs did
not make out general causation that Silizone increases adverse effects on tissue healing or
materially increases the risk of medical complications.54 Whether plaintiffs who did not
experience injury were entitled to a remedy for medical monitoring was moot in light of the
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finding that Silizone patients did not require any further monitoring than post-operative
patients generally. In her obiter discussion regarding waiver of tort, Justice Lax opined that
had she found the defendants breached the standard of care their negligence would have
exposed Silizone patients to an increased risk of a serious medical condition.55 Whether this
ought to lead to liability, however, was a question “as fundamental as what exactly it is that
directs the law to deem certain conduct wrongful”; a question she therefore declined to
answer.56
As was argued by certain experts in Andersen with regard to the waiver of tort
debate,57 it is often said that compensating plaintiffs in any of the above categories of cases
where the risk has not yet materialized into injury leads to the conclusion that “proof of
injury” is no longer required.58 As Justice Lax rightly stated, these issues touch on the
fundamental nature of tort law; therefore answering whether plaintiffs in these kinds of cases
can or should recover is not a class action-specific inquiry. The fact patterns in these
categories of cases are a helpful guide for the discussion. The goal is to understand and
justify conclusions about whether in any of these categories of cases plaintiffs have sufficient
actionable damage to maintain an action in negligence.
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2.3

Reconsidering the Definitional Framework

2.3.1

Separating injury, damage, and loss

Part of the difficulty in defining actionable damage is that the terms used in
discussing negligence blend together distinct ideas. It is important to distinguish both
conceptually and terminologically the concepts of injury, harm, damage, and loss – terms that
are often used interchangeably and defined with reference to each other. Multiple, colloquial,
or common sense meanings of these terms make it difficult to analytically parse out their
underlying concepts and normative implications. Injury, for example, is rightly used to
describe a broken leg. But injury also takes on a different meaning when used as a term to
define a ‘wrong’. The distinction between injury and harm, or between injuria and damnum,
is said to express the distinction between a wrong and its consequences and is “central to
understanding the law of torts.”59 Injuria is defined as a ‘wrong’, being the “breach of one’s
legal duty” or the “violation of another’s legal right”.60 Damnum or ‘damage’ is defined both
as a “loss” and as “damage suffered”.61 Injuria sine damno62 or ‘injury without damage’ is
defined as “a legal wrong that will not sustain a lawsuit because no harm resulted from it.”63
Problematically, however, ‘harm’ is also defined as “injury, loss, damage; material or
tangible detriment”.64 The primary difficulty arising from each of these concepts being
59
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circularly defined is determining whether actionable damage requires monetary or
compensable loss. As Donal Nolan argues, it is “rather elementary…that the issue of the
damage sufficient to establish a cause of action should not be confused with the harms for
which recovery is permitted once the cause of action has been established.”65 However
elementary, the point is not terminologically or analytically clear.
The aim here is to substantively define “damage suffered”. To separate the concepts
and attempt to achieve a measure of precision the key terms will be defined as follows: (1)
“Actionable damage” or “damage” is equated with damnum and defined as the damage
suffered which the plaintiff is required to prove in order to maintain an action in negligence.66
(2) Injuria or “injury” is equated with and defined as a “wrong”; that is, the violation of the
plaintiff’s legal right by the defendant is an injury. (3) “Harm” is equated with and defined as
a “loss”, which is a demonstrably worse off state of affairs for the plaintiff, either physical or
economic.67 Each of these definitions will be discussed further. Analysis and defence of
these concepts as defined is in large part the heart of the matter.
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2.3.2

Two categories of risk

Further analytic difficulty arises by using the term ‘risk’ indiscriminately. A range
of cases conflated under a generalized umbrella definition does not adequately identify
categories of risk. There is a difference between, for example, the defendant driving
recklessly, taking a corner too quickly and narrowly missing the plaintiff and the defendant
exposing the plaintiff to some material that results in the plaintiff being physically changed.
In each instance it can be said that the defendant is putting the plaintiff at risk, but the
implications and consequences of one scenario are quite different from the other. We can
attempt to segregate categories of risk by plotting the cases on a spectrum:

In each of categories (1) to (4) the plaintiff is put at some risk, but the categories are
differentiated by both the kind of risk and the relationship between the parties. The kind of
risk can be either one of non-serious or serious damage, and the relationship can be either
one of non-interference or interference. Interference is defined as a material change in the
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plaintiff or the plaintiff’s circumstances. Instances where there is no interference with the
plaintiff by the defendant can be understood as cases of ‘pure risk’; that is, while the resultant
risk can be causally linked to the defendant’s action, it is not the consequence of the
defendant’s direct interference with the plaintiff. In cases of pure risk there is no change in
the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s interference that contributes to or is linked to the
risk. The risk is defined entirely in relation to the defendant’s action. Instances where the
defendant directly interferes with the plaintiff can be understood as cases of ‘consequent
risk’; that is, the risk is the result of the defendant’s interference with the plaintiff and there is
some change in the plaintiff that contributes to or is linked to the risk. The risk is defined in
relation to both the defendant’s action and the plaintiff’s position. These two features of kind
and relation are normatively significant for determining whether any of these categories of
risk can support a claim in negligence.
There is significant debate about whether putting someone at risk is a wrong and
whether in any of these categories of cases the plaintiff’s right is violated from a moral
standpoint.68 Adequately engaging in this debate is beyond the scope of this discussion in part
because the question about whether a person has a right not to be put at risk is morally
complex and cannot be fully dealt with here. More importantly, however, is that save an
exceptional few, none of the cases at the center of the controversy are in fact category (1) or
(2) cases. They are not cases of non-interference and therefore they are not cases of pure risk.
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Though the broader debate about the moral nature of risking is important, the focus cases
here are of consequent risk and not pure risk.
An example of a pure risk case is Healey v Lakeridge Health Corp.69 in which the
plaintiffs alleged emotional distress from having been notified that they might have been
exposed to tuberculosis (TB) at the defendant’s hospital. In one of the few class actions to be
fully determined on the merits, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decision granting
summary judgment in favour of the defendant hospital.70 The appeal was brought on behalf
of a class of uninfected persons: people who were present at the hospital and could have been
exposed to TB, were subsequently notified of the possible exposure, were tested, and tested
negative therefore indicating they had not come in contact with TB. The Court of Appeal
held that while the defendant hospital owed the uninfected persons a duty of care not to cause
injury, none of the claims met the threshold of being a recognized psychiatric illness and
many plaintiffs had not in fact even consulted a doctor about their complaints.71 Healey can
be categorized as a pure risk case because the uninfected class of plaintiffs were only ever at
risk of exposure and there was not in fact any interference as a result of exposure.
If each of the exposure, loss of chance, pharmaceutical, and medical device cases
are examined more closely, or perhaps in a different way, it becomes clear that they are not
in fact cases of pure risk. The central allegations are that the plaintiffs have been interfered
with by the defendant or the defendant’s thing, been physically changed in some way, and
because of that change there is a future risk that they will be put in some physically or
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economically worse off position. The way a plaintiff pleads the action can frame the issue as
pure risk, which perhaps contributes to confusion about how the case ought to be analyzed.
For example, in Gregg, the plaintiff pled his damage was that but-for the defendant’s
negligence he would have had a 17% better chance of surviving. The damage, then, was the
loss of chance to live for ten or more years or, inversely, an increased risk of dying within ten
years. In Laferrière the claim was recast by the Quebec Court of Appeal as the damage
being increased pain and suffering of undergoing more painful treatment and living with
more advanced cancer as a result of untimely treatment. The damages were not, as the
plaintiff had cast them, awarded for a loss of chance of survival. In Gregg, though the
plaintiff’s claim was ultimately denied, the reasons of the majority suggest that had Mr.
Gregg framed the case akin to Laferrière’s reformulation, he would have recovered. A fact
scenario can be reframed as a case of pure risk. But if the claim centers on the consequence
of the defendant’s interference with the plaintiff causing some change in the plaintiff that is a
part of the risk at issue, on the categorization here the claim is one of consequent risk.
Whether a case is pled as a claim for damages for an increased risk has no bearing
on whether it is properly categorized as a case of pure risk or a case of consequent risk. The
controversial cases and examples discussed throughout are all considered cases of
consequent risk.
2.4

Reconsidering the Relationship Between Damage and Injury
In Palsgraf v Long Island Rail Co., Cardozo CJ articulated the now oft-quoted

maxim: “Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected
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interest, the violation of a right. ‘Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.’”72
This principle can be understood as maintaining that determining liability in negligence is not
an inquiry into only the defendant’s behaviour as measured against a non-relational standard
of care. Rather, negligence is only made concrete as a relation between the plaintiff and the
defendant and the principle therefore sets out what is called the relational view.73 The right
that is violated by the defendant is a right the particular plaintiff holds against the defendant,
not a generalized right held by the world (with the plaintiff as part of this group) that the
defendant act in a certain way.74
The right the plaintiff holds against the defendant can be limited or qualified in a
further way. If we understand the plaintiff’s right as being general, for example, a right to
bodily integrity, then any invasion of the plaintiff’s bodily integrity could ground the
defendant’s liability in negligence. If a person pushes you, your right to bodily integrity is
violated. Though this grounds a cause of action in battery, without some kind of damage you
have no cause of action in negligence. Actionable damage is the “gist” of negligence because
the action is “not maintainable without [it]”; that is “the cause of action is not complete
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without proof of damage”.75 Therefore, if the right to bodily integrity is insufficient to ground
a claim in negligence, the “legally protected interest” Cardozo CJ is referring to cannot be
this broad or general type of right. Though the plaintiff may have suffered an injuria in that
he or she suffered the violation of some other right, the right to bodily integrity, the plaintiff
has not suffered whatever right it is that he or she has in negligence as against the defendant.
In Nicholls v Ely Beet Sugar Factory, Limited, Lord Wright MR discussed the
concept of actionable damage as the gist of negligence at some length. He concluded that the
actionable damage was required in order to show a rights violation:
In all these cases [of negligence, malicious prosecution, conspiracy to injury and deceit] there
is no actionable wrong unless damage has been caused to the plaintiff by what has been done
or omitted. Thus, in the case of negligence, the plaintiff is not entitled to complain unless
he is injured by the negligence; otherwise the negligence does not interest or concern
him…there is in those cases no interference with a right, no disturbance or invasion of a right
of property or any other right; thus, e.g., the cause of action is not merely that the
defendant was negligent, but he was negligent in such a way as to damage the plaintiff.76

If actionable damage is understood in this way the damage is considered as a necessary
condition for the violation of the plaintiff’s right. That is, there is no rights violation unless
some damage has been made out. There are two subtly distinct ways that the relationship
between injuria and damnum can be understood. It can be said that the plaintiff must show
the violation of a legal right and additionally that the violation of that right caused damage.
75
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Or it can be said that the plaintiff must show that the defendant caused damage in order to
prove the violation of a legal right.
If the first articulation is correct, then the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff is to act in
accordance with a particular standard of care. If the defendant’s act falls below the standard
of care, the plaintiff’s right has been violated. If damage is considered as an additional factor
and not entailed in the definition of the duty, then any damage suffered by the plaintiff that is
caused by the defendant’s act is sufficient. For example, a pharmaceutical manufacturer has a
duty of care to test properly and warn patients about the side effects of its drugs. Say the
defendant falls below the standard of care and does not adequately test for or warn about the
potential side effect of an increased risk of heart attacks. If the first articulation is correct the
plaintiff’s right is violated and injuria is suffered. If the plaintiff takes the negligently
manufactured drug and has a one in a million adverse allergic reaction that the defendants
could not have tested for or foreseen, a reaction based on the idiosyncrasies of the plaintiff’s
biology, the plaintiff still suffers damage because of taking the drug. The plaintiff can
therefore recover. On this view of the relationship between injuria and damnum the only
requirement is a causal connection between the failure to meet the standard and the damage.
However, this is not how negligence in the common law is understood. As
established in Wagon Mound (No. 1)77 and Wagon Mound (No. 2)78 the Privy Council
circumscribed the kind of damage that a plaintiff can claim for as that which is reasonably
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foreseeable.79 It is not the case that any damage is sufficient, rather, it must be that the
damage is something that is reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. The content of the
defendant’s duty owed to the plaintiff is therefore qualified by risk of damage that is
foreseeable and not unbounded so as to include any damage that could be factually caused.80
For example, the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff not to make negligent
misrepresentations that lure the plaintiff into investing in a ponzi scheme. The defendant does
not owe the plaintiff a duty to ensure that other people the plaintiff might convince to
participate do not harm the plaintiff. Therefore if the plaintiff loses ten thousand dollars
investing, this is the kind of actionable damage to ground a claim in negligence, but the pain
and suffering from the plaintiff being punched in the nose by his or her sister-in-law who also
lost all of her money is not.
Whether the fact that the defendant can foresee his or her actions may cause harm to
the plaintiff is sufficient to give rise to a duty of care is a separate debate and one with which
courts continue to grapple.81 What is clear, however, is that the duty is defined in relation to,
and circumscribed by, reasonably foreseeable damage. The plaintiff’s right, then, as
correlative to the defendant’s duty, is a right not to suffer a certain kind of damage as a result
of certain kinds of the defendant’s behaviour. The first articulation of damage as anything
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factually caused by the defendant’s breach of the standard, while perhaps independently
defensible, does not reflect the way the duty of care requirement is understood in Canadian
and English positive law. Therefore the second articulation is the better way to understand
the relationship between injuria and damnum and arguably aligns more closely with doctrine.
Actionable damage is not separate from the relevant legal right the plaintiff has against the
defendant. Therefore there can be no injuria without damnum – the damage is a necessary
condition for the violation of the plaintiff’s right in negligence.82
Conceiving of injury in this way clarifies the relationship between injury and
damage and furthers the inquiry about what the substance of actionable damage is. If the
plaintiff’s right in negligence is defined in relation to the actionable damage, then the concept
of damage is broadened beyond simply being defined as harm or loss. Recall that harm or
loss is defined as a physically or economically worse state of affairs than the plaintiff’s
original position. As Robert Stevens argues, it is “meaningless to talk of a right not to be
caused loss. If loss is suffered, it is a consequence of a breach of a duty; it cannot go to the
definition of what D is under a duty to do or not do.”83 If the concept of actionable damage is
considered distinct from harm or loss then the plaintiff’s right is defined independent of
whatever consequent loss may result from the damage. The plaintiff’s right, then, is not a
right to not be caused loss, but a right to not be damaged. It follows that injury does not
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necessarily require loss, but it could be that the definition of actionable damage in substance
requires loss.84 It is to answering this query that we now turn.
2.5

A Narrow Definition of Damage
Perhaps the most simple and intuitively attractive view of actionable damage is to

define it as something that leaves the plaintiff worse off. Actionable damage, then, is
whatever has caused the plaintiff physical or economic detriment in a way that is “not
insignificant” and “beyond what can be regarded as negligible.” 85 In Rothwell the House of
Lords took up the analysis of defining actionable damage in this way.86 In the leading speech
Lord Hoffmann articulated the definition as:
an abstract concept of being worse off, physically or economically, so that compensation is
an appropriate remedy. It does not mean simply a physical change, which is consistent with
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making one better, as in the case of a successful operation, or with being neutral, having no
perceptible effect upon one’s health or capability.87

The existence of pleural plaques was considered of “evidential” rather than “substantive”
significance in that the plaques signified the plaintiff had been exposed to asbestos, but the
resulting change was insufficient to be considered in substance actionable damage.88
Lord Hoffmann maintained that bodily change is not enough absent some proof that
the plaintiff is materially and recognizably worse off: “[S]ymptomless bodily changes with
no foreseeable consequences, the risk of a disease which is not consequent upon those
changes and anxiety about that risk are not, individually or collectively, damage giving rise
to a cause of action.”89 Lord Scott added that because the plaques “are not visible or
disfiguring”, the appellants did not consequently suffer from “any disability or impairment of
physical condition”, and because the inhalation of the asbestos fibres “involved no pain or
physical discomfort” the pleural plaques “could not per se suffice to complete a tortious
cause of action.”90 The court recognized that the requisite detriment need not be financial loss
in comparing the case to Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd.91 In Cartledge the plaintiffs had
inhaled silica dust in the course of their employment but their claim differed from Rothwell
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in that the inhalation of the dust had caused the onset of pneumoconiosis (a respiratory
disease), pain in their lungs and trouble breathing when exerted. Cartledge was distinguished
by the fact that there the plaintiffs were considered to have suffered sufficiently serious
injury to be considered actionable damage.
Rothwell sets out a definition of damage that can be called the narrow approach.
That is, damage is first qualified as being something that is reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant (drawing from the discussion above), and further qualified in that the damage must
result in a detriment or loss to the plaintiff. There is therefore no damage without loss; loss is
not some separate thing that the plaintiff must prove. Further, the concept of loss is
understood as being one of degree and must rise above that which is non-negligible: “It is for
a judge or jury to decide whether a man has suffered any actionable harm and in borderline
cases it is a question of degree.”92 The narrow definition accepted by the court in Rothwell is
also implied in scholarship. For example, Stephen Perry argues that the definition of harm
(what is here referred to as damage) is “a relatively specific moral concept which requires
that a person have suffered serious interference with one or more interests that are
particularly important to human wellbeing”.93 Similarly, Peter Benson argues that the
definition of misfeasance depends on there being a “foreseeable risk of sufficiently
significant damage”, the defendant acting in light of that risk without taking proper
precaution, and the result of the action being an interference with the plaintiff that
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“materializes as a loss”.94 It is only when the plaintiff suffers loss that it can be said the
defendant exercises a sufficient degree of control over the plaintiff and consequently
subordinates the plaintiff’s interests to the defendant’s own.95 Both of these articulations of
what constitutes a rights violation can support a normative justification for the narrow
definition of damage. While the narrow definition seems to be accepted, and is perhaps
morally and normatively defensible, it is clear through the court’s reasoning in Rothwell (as
well as the court noting decisions turning on this definition are delivered with regrets)96 that
the narrow definition presents difficult analytic hurdles and arguably produces incorrect
results.
2.5.1

Challenging the narrow approach

In Rothwell Lord Hope nicely alludes to one problematic issue with the narrow
definition at the beginning of his reasons: “I do not think that it is an abuse of language to
describe pleural plaques as an injury.”97 Lord Hope’s discussion goes on to struggle with the
difficulty in stating that the pleural plaques were of no consequence to the plaintiffs or could
not constitute an interference with the plaintiffs’ bodily integrity. Because of the exposure to
asbestos the plaintiffs’ bodies had been changed. Similar to a medical device case, where
there is a potentially defective foreign object implanted in the plaintiff’s body, it seems
simply incorrect to say that the plaintiffs’ bodies in Rothwell had not at least been
compromised by the exposure. By calling the interference an injury it is at least implied there
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was the violation of some right. In saying it is not an abuse to identify the plaques as an
injury, it can be inferred that the crux of the issue was not determining whether there had
been any interference with the plaintiffs. Lord Hope’s comments can be read as identifying
the difference between cases of pure and consequent risk. That is, the issue the court was
contending with was not determining whether the plaintiffs could claim for pure risk in that it
was recognized there was some interference. The difficulty then turned to determining why
the interference experienced by the plaintiffs was insufficient to constitute actionable
damage.
Similar to Lord Worth MR’s analytic approach in Gregg, in which he opened by
labeling the problem as “an important issue of policy”,98 Lord Hope turned to the principle de
minimis non curat lex – the law does not concern itself with trifles – as the mode to
determine actionable damage. The problem was framed as a need to define the limit of the
degree of triviality of damage required to conclude the plaintiff has in fact suffered a
detriment. However, as Lord Hope himself struggled with, reliance on this principle is also
problematic:
It is not right to say that the law does not concern itself with matters of small moment or
which are trivial in amount. The dishonest taking of an item of trivial value – a bun from the
bakery, for example – is just as much theft as it is when the item taken is of high value. And
in strict legal theory every wrong, however slight, attracts a remedy. Every right, of
whatever value, may be enforced.99

Lord Hope went on to analyze the de minimis principle in part on the basis of policy
considerations and implied that it is a claim of legal policy rather than the application of strict
legal theory that leads to the conclusion that “the law is not to entertain a claim for damages
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where the physical effects of the injury are no more than negligible.”100 Lord Hope’s example
intending to incite caution is instructive: If actionable damage is not bounded by the de
minimis principle “the smallest cut, or the lightest bruise, might give rise to litigation the
costs of which were out of all proportion to what was in issue”.101 However, a small cut or a
light bruise is a violation of bodily integrity. What is problematic about introducing the de
minimis principle to determine actionable damage is that the content of litigants’ rights is a
case-by-case determination of degree rather than kind.102
Though, as discussed above, a plaintiff’s right in negligence is not to something as
broad as bodily integrity generally, if the damage falls within the ambit of that which the
defendant ought to reasonably foresee and take care to avoid the degree is irrelevant if the
damages is of the requisite kind. For example, we can articulate a surgeon’s duty of care to
perform operations with skill and ensure that he or she does not violate the bodily integrity of
his or her patient in a manner that the patient did not consent to or is outside the scope of
what is required in order to adequately complete the surgery. A cut, however small, is a
piercing of the skin and on a common sense view a violation of one’s bodily integrity. In the
course of surgery the surgeon is not paying attention and not taking sufficient care with the
100
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tools and because of the lack of attention drops a scalpel; as it fall it cuts the patient on the
operating table. What difference does it make if the cut is large or small? There may be an
evidentiary difference between a large gash that compromises other organs and seriously
injures the plaintiff or leaves an unsightly scar and a small knick that bleeds but does not
require stitches and heals without scarring, but what is the normative difference?
Similarly, in a pharmaceutical case it is perhaps accepted that causing the side effect
of a heart attack is sufficiently serious to constitute actionable damage. But if a heart attack is
seen at the most serious end of a scale of adverse effects to the heart generally, what about
creating a heart murmur that itself is perhaps harmless but is still a change in how the heart’s
valves operate?103 The problem with using the de minimis principle to introduce a concept of
degree permits policy to have the effect of circumscribing the content of litigants’ rights in an
arbitrary way. Where is the line? Is what amounts to change between couch cushions a
sufficient loss? One dollar? Ten dollars? On what principled basis can a benchmark be
formulated? If the plaintiff has a right that the defendant does not misrepresent and induce
the plaintiff into a fraudulent investment, the actionable damage is losing any money to the
scheme. Be it 10¢ or $10 million, the injuria has been made out if the plaintiff suffers
damage of the kind the defendant has a duty to avoid. Introducing policy principles that are
not capable of bright line definitions or justification contributes to what has been referred to
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as “the modern mess” of negligence because the implication is that litigants’ rights are not
determined by principled or consistent rules.104
However, taking a more principled path can still arrive at the same end. Though it
may be that for policy reasons the institution of the law will not entertain a claim for
damages because small claims should not be clogging up the courts, dismissing a case on
these grounds is different from concluding that as a result of the application of the de minimis
policy a person’s legal right has not been infringed. If we recognize damage is separate from
loss, we can propose that the de minimis principle apply to the determination of whether
something will count as a loss rather than whether something will count as damage. That is,
the damage that indicates a rights violation can be, as Lord Hope suggests, trivial. A bruise or
a cut is indeed a violation of bodily integrity and if one has a right not to have his or her
bodily integrity interfered with in a way they did not consent to as a result of the defendant’s
failure to act in accordance with the standard of care, then the fact of it being a small injury
does not negate the rights violation. However, we can differentiate the rights that the
plaintiff has as against the defendant (defined by the damage) and when it is that the
institution of law will become involved (defined by the loss).105 The de minimis principle,
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then, could be viewed as a limiting policy principle about a threshold to invoke the
institutional mechanism of the courts rather than modifying the substance of the plaintiff’s
rights.106
If we view damage in this way, and are concerned with keeping this second policy
issue separate, then we must view loss as an entirely separate requirement that is not
connected to the right that the plaintiff has. That is, there is a difference in saying that the
plaintiff has a right not to be damaged and entailed in the definition of damage is a
requirement of suffering loss, as opposed to saying that in order to maintain a cause of action
the plaintiff must prove damage and then there is an additional requirement that the plaintiff
prove resulting loss from that damage. Though it may sound like the second iteration is what
negligence already requires, and the distinction may be of little practical consequence, it in
fact adds conceptually and analytically an extra element to the negligence inquiry. If we are
concerned with not letting policy dictate the content of rights, as many rights-based theorists
seem to be,107 then perhaps we ought to understand negligence as requiring this second extra

duty incumbent on the state to rule justly. This includes, inter alia, ensuring the mechanism of private recourse
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step. It may be that this is what courts are doing, but the analysis is silent. If these
distinctions and different analytical positions are made explicit then we can reconcile the
types of issues that suggest courts are deciding cases on the basis of policy.
Because of the interchangeable use of the terms injury, damage, and harm, it is not
clear whether the court’s conclusions in Rothwell instantiated the distinction between damage
and loss in this way. But it is clear, particularly in Lord Hope’s reasons, that the court did
consider that there had been some injury done, whether equated with the physical change in
the plaintiffs or the employers’ admission of breaching a duty they owed to their employees.
Though Rothwell seems to confuse rather than clarify the analysis, the decision does assist to
sharpen the problem. If Rothwell is correct either (1) loss is part of the definition of damage
or (2) loss is a separate requirement the plaintiff must prove in order to maintain a cause of
action. If the first conclusion is true, then this is conclusive acceptance of a narrow definition
of damage in the United Kingdom. The plaintiff’s right is to not be put at unreasonable risk
of reasonably foreseeable damage that causes the plaintiff non-negligible physical or
economic loss. If the second conclusion is true, then actionable damage does not require loss
but the plaintiff must nonetheless prove separately he or she is left physically or financially
worse off.
If either conclusion about the function of loss is correct, it should follow that any
plaintiff who does not suffer detriment cannot sustain a claim in negligence either because
the plaintiff’s right has not been violated (there has been no loss, therefore no actionable
damage, and therefore no injury) or because the plaintiff has not satisfied the separate,
secondary requirement of proving non-de minimis loss. This supposition, however, does not
always hold true.
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In The Mediana, Lord Halsbury set out the leading definition of nominal damages:
‘Nominal damages’ is a technical phrase which means that you have negatived anything like
real damage, but that you are affirming by your nominal damages that there is an infraction
of a legal right which, though it gives you no right to any real damages at all, yet gives you
a right to the verdict or judgment because your legal right has been infringed.108

The plaintiff can recover nominal damages for per se actions regardless of any loss suffered,
that is, for a violation of the plaintiff’s right, which is broadly construed. Take trespass to
land, for example. If the defendant walks over the plaintiff’s lawn the plaintiff may not have
suffered any recognizable harm but the plaintiff’s right to property has been infringed by the
trespass. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to nominal damages to signify and vindicate the
violated right. Similarly, a person has a right that others not interfere with his or her bodily
integrity and if the defendant pushes the plaintiff the defendant commits a battery regardless
of the plaintiff suffering any harm as a result of the push.
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With the definition of nominal damages in mind, if actionable damage is equated
with or requires loss then absent such loss all decisions should follow the line of analysis
holding nominal damages are not available for cases of negligence: “Such damages are
available only where a plaintiff establishes a tort which is actionable per se but fails to
establish loss caused by the wrong.”109 However, there are many instances of courts doing
just the opposite.
In cases of solicitor’s negligence, for example, the plaintiff alleges that because of
his or her solicitor’s negligence, perhaps missing a limitation period, the plaintiff was unable
to bring the claim the solicitor was hired to prosecute. In these types of cases the court
undertakes a ‘trial within a trial’ or an ‘action within an action’ to determine whether the
underlying claim the solicitor allegedly fouled up would have succeeded. In Kitchen v Royal
Air Force Association Lord Evershed MR analyzed how to deal with these cases:
If, in this kind of action, it is plain that an action could have been brought, and if it had been
brought that it must have succeeded, of course the answer is easy. The damaged plaintiff
then would recover the full amount of the damages lost by the failure to bring the action
originally. On the other hand, if it be made clear that the plaintiff never had a cause of
action, that there was no case which the plaintiff could reasonably ever have formulated,
then it is equally plain that the answer is that she can get nothing save nominal damages for
the solicitors’ negligence.110
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Kitchen has been followed in Canada and continues to be followed in the United Kingdom.111
Though the analysis establishes that damage suffered need not be financial loss, it makes it
difficult to understand what the courts see as the actionable damage. As Lord Evershed
continued, “what the court has to do (assuming that the plaintiff has established negligence)
… is to determine what the plaintiff has by that negligence lost. The question is, has the
plaintiff lost some right of value, some chose in action of reality and substance?”112 If the
claim could not have succeeded the plaintiff has lost nothing; arguably the plaintiff did not
even lose a chance to win (if it is ever that outcomes of trials could be conclusively
determined). It could even be said that the plaintiff benefitted from saving the expense of
litigation or avoiding a potential adverse cost award. Despite the plaintiff not having lost, it
has been repeatedly held that if the underlying claim could not have succeeded the plaintiff is
entitled to nominal damages.
If Kitchen is understood as justifying nominal damages for the injury alone, then this
is to recognize that the plaintiff has a claim in something that is not negligence or that the
plaintiff has right as against the defendant that does not bear relation to the damage. That is,
it is enough that the defendant owed a duty of care and breached the standard to claim the
plaintiff’s right is violated. This view alters negligence as understood in Canadian and
English common law because it supports a broadly instrumentalist conception.113 If this is
correct, then we should be seeing nominal damages awarded in every case in which the
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plaintiff establishes a breach of the duty and standard of care but does not establish damage.
Indeed, a plaintiff could bring a claim without ever even alleging damage. Such conclusions,
as Justice Lax rightly pointed out in Andersen, fundamentally change the way that negligence
is understood.114
Awards of nominal damages in cases where no loss is proven are not limited to
solicitor’s negligence cases. In Boase v Paul115 the plaintiff’s dentist had recommended that
the plaintiff have almost all of his upper teeth removed because of the poor state of tooth
decay. The plaintiff, wary and not wanting to remove any teeth at all, finally agreed to have
the worst tooth removed. The plaintiff’s dentist referred him to the defendant dentist for the
procedure and there was apparently some confusion as to what the referral entailed. The
plaintiff claimed that he made clear to the defendant dentist he wanted only the one tooth
removed, but believing it was the plaintiff’s wish to have all his teeth removed, the defendant
dentist extracted twelve of the plaintiff’s upper teeth rather than just one. The plaintiff’s
claim in negligence ultimately failed on the basis of a statutory limitation period.116 It was
also found as a fact by the trial judge that the plaintiff was in a better state of health due to
the removal of his decaying teeth. Had the action proceeded on its merits the trial judge
would have awarded damages of $800 for the wrong suffered, any pain, and expenses for the
false teeth. On appeal Mulock CJO held that the defendant’s action “caused no damage to the
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plaintiff, but on the contrary was a benefit to him, and if he were entitled to maintain this
action he would… be entitled to merely nominal damages.”117 Each of the justices held that it
was negligent to have removed the further eleven teeth,118 and the only appropriate award on
the merits was nominal damages. As in Kitchen, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s analysis in
Boase implies a conception of negligence as being determined only with reference to a
failure to meet the standard of care (and thus sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the
plaintiff’s right) and not requiring loss to be proven in order to conclude either that the
plaintiff’s right had been violated or that he could maintain a claim in negligence.
There are too many cases decided with similar analysis to conclude that in each
instance the case is wrongly decided, or the judges are misapprehending the purpose or
definition of nominal damages or are not understanding the requirements of negligence
generally.119 What is clear from all of these cases is that the courts consider what was done to
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the plaintiff a violation of some right and vis-à-vis that violation the plaintiff suffered
sufficient actionable damage regardless of the consequences being a loss, neutral, or a
benefit. The only way that these cases can be reconciled as examples of a completed claim in
negligence, with the principle injuria sino damnum governing, is if the injuria and the
damnum can be considered as distinct elements of the claim and that the definition of
actionable damage does not require loss. If we say the plaintiff’s right as against the solicitor
is to have the claim prosecuted properly, the actionable damage is the solicitor failing to
bring the claim. If we say the plaintiff’s right is one to bodily integrity such that the
defendant is under a duty not to inadvertently do something to the plaintiff’s body without
consent, or even more specifically a right that the defendant dentist only perform procedures
the plaintiff understands and consents to, the actionable damage is removing more than one
of the plaintiff’s teeth.
These kinds of cases imply either that the recovery of nominal damages signifies the
violation of a non-relational right against the defendant that he or she not act negligently, or
that actionable damage does not require loss. If we accept the former interpretation then the
client suffered no loss. That is the appropriate disposition here. The plaintiff is entitled to an award of
$100.
Another line of applicable cases are those in which because of the plaintiff’s failure to put evidence before the
court, there is no evidence establising a loss though factual loss is alleged (which is not the same as cases in
which the assessment of damages is difficult for scientific or other evidentiary reasons). In these cases despite
there being in theory no damages proven to the court because there is no evidence properly before the court,
nominal damages are still awarded: e.g. Poulain v Iannetti, 2015 NSSC 181; Everatt v Elgin Electric Ltd et al,
[1973] 3 OR 691 (HCJ). Analogously there are many cases that do not deal with awards for nominal damages
but are awards of damages based on circumstances in which there is arguably no loss. For an excellent
discussion and analysis of these types of cases in search for a definition of ‘loss’ see Andrew Tettenborn, “What
is a Loss?” in Jason W Neyers, Erika Chamberlain & Stephen GA Pitel, eds, Emerging Issues in Tort Law
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 441. Any circumstance in which courts have made an award of damages where
the plaintiff has arguably benefitted or not suffered physical or economic detriment is one that would have to be
considered wrongly decided if the narrow definition of damage is correct.
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defendant’s duty is a broad, non-relational duty to act in accordance with the relevant
standard of care. If we accept the latter interpretation then we can maintain the litigants’
rights are relational. Proving actionable damage, however, does not require proving loss.
2.6

Arguing for a Broad Definition of Damage
As Andrew Tettenborn argues, “the idea that there is some unitary concept of ‘loss’

waiting out there for the finding is unhelpful and ultimately unworkable.”120 If the narrow
definition of damage is accepted, then it must follow that many cases must be decided as an
exception to the rule, which quickly devolves into arbitrary and inconsistent analysis.
Further, and more normatively significant, the narrow definition of damage cannot
adequately account for all the circumstances that are rights violations. However, if we adopt
a broad definition of damage the problems caused by the narrow definition fall away.
As proposed above in the discussion about reconsidering the relationship between
damage and injury,121 if the defendant’s duty in negligence is defined as a duty to act in
accordance with the standard of care and not put the plaintiff at an unreasonable risk of
reasonably foreseeable damage, the plaintiff’s right is defined as a right not to suffer that
damage as a result of the defendant’s failure to meet the standard. Loss is separated from
damage and the actionable damage required in order to maintain the claim is to suffer any
degree of the kind of damage the defendant is under a duty to avoid. This is the broad
definition. As stated at the outset, however, articulating the definition of actionable damage
in this way does not fully answer the question about what the substantive content of
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plaintiffs’ rights are. There still remains a determination on a duty-by-duty basis in order to
determine the kind of damage that falls within the ambit of each category of duty of care.
A comparison of the narrow and broad approaches is well-illustrated by the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Winnipeg Condominium Corporation No. 36 v Bird
Construction Co.122 In Winnipeg Condominium the court considered the question of whether
a contractor was liable in tort to a subsequent purchaser of a building, who had no
relationship of contractual privity with the contractor, for the cost of repairing defects in the
building created by the contractor’s negligent construction. Though the court held that the
case was an opportunity to “address the question of recoverability in tort for economic
loss”,123 the decision is based on an analysis of the duty of care and the concept of actionable
damage that has broader implications beyond the debate about pure economic loss.
Justice LaForest, for a unanimous court, ultimately rejected the line of cases relied
on by the lower courts (mostly from the United Kingdom) that a subsequent purchaser can
only recover in negligence where the “negligence causes physical injury to the purchasers,
damage to their other property, or where a special relationship of reliance has developed
between the contractor and the purchaser”.124 This can be read as a rejection of the narrow
definition requiring loss as necessary in order for there to be actionable damage. Justice
LaForest concluded that the divergence of the Canadian approach from the English approach
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was due in part to the development of the conception of duty of care and how the two
jurisdictions had applied Anns v Merton London Borough Council.125
Justice LaForest observed that Anns “was the high water mark for recovery of
economic loss in tort in England” and subsequently English courts had repudiated Anns and
“retreated from the broad approach to recoverability in tort” the case had established.126
Subsequent English decisions reverted to the limitation that liability in negligence requires
that the plaintiff suffer actual harm or loss.127 Justice LaForest explicitly rejected this
retreating formulation and attributed the divergence in view to the Supreme Court of
Canada’s position about the duty of care test as formulated in Anns. The court affirmed the
Anns approach in several cases and ultimately concluded that it would not revert to the
narrow definition.128 The court in Winnipeg Condominium ultimately held that if liability in
negligence could be established where the negligent construction of a building in fact caused
harm to persons or property, it follows that there is also liability “where the dangerous defect
is discovered and the owner of the building wishes to mitigate the danger by fixing the defect
and putting the building back into a non-dangerous state.”129 Justice LaForest reasoned that
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“[i]n both cases, the duty in tort serves to protect the bodily integrity and property interests of
the inhabitants of the building.”130
The analysis implies that if a defect is discovered and harm to people or property
could result, such circumstances can ground liability. The actionable damage is either the risk
of future injury or the defect. It makes sense that the actionable damage is the defect and this
is what circumscribes the extent to which recovery is limited to the cost of remedying that
defect. The way that all of these issues of duty, injury and damage are brought together is
neatly illustrated by Justice LaForest’s conclusion: the contractor had a “duty in tort to
subsequent purchasers of a building to take reasonable care in constructing the building, and
to ensure that the building does not contain defects that pose foreseeable and substantial
danger to the health and safety of the occupants.”131
The actionable damage, then, is the defect that poses foreseeable and substantial
danger to the health and safety of people, not the risk of future injury. While the actionable
damage is concrete, it is defined in relation to a risk of loss and does not require actual harm
or detriment to have resulted or to ever result. If we understand the content of the duty in this
way, in an exposure case, for example, the defendant’s duty is articulated as running its
business in accordance with the expected standard of care to ensure that the occupants or
employees on its premises are not exposed to dangerous substances or hazards that could
pose a substantial danger to their health and safety. If the duty is viewed in this way, the
actionable damage is the evidence of the interference with the plaintiff demonstrating that
there has been exposure; evidence of exposure is then sufficient to demonstrate actionable
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damage regardless of the manifestation of any injury. Similarly, in a pharmaceutical or
medical device case, as in Winnipeg Condominium, if the defendant’s duty is understood as a
duty to take reasonable care in manufacturing products to ensure its products do not contain
defects that pose foreseeable and substantial danger to the health and safety of its consumers
then the existence of the defect is the actionable damage. Therefore, the plaintiff consuming a
drug that changes his or her body and is now biologically prone to heart attacks, or living
with an implanted pacemaker that has faulty leads that could slice his or her heart, is
analogous to living in a building that has a cracked foundation and could collapse tomorrow.
The violation of the right does not happen at some future date only if loss results. The
defendant’s duty is based on protecting the plaintiff’s and therefore it is not necessary to
show injury in order to demonstrate that the plaintiff has been interfered with in a legally
relevant way.
To say, as Justice LaForest did, that the duty serves to protect bodily integrity, for
example, is not to say that the plaintiff’s relevant right in negligence is broadly construed as a
right to bodily integrity generally. Rather, this can be understood as articulating the source
from which litigants’ rights are derived. Recall Perry and Benson’s definitions of rights
violations as being an act by the defendant that interferes with one of the plaintiff’s
fundamental interests.132 Though each conception of an interference turned on terms of loss
and harm, we can see in the cases discussed above that loss and harm are not necessarily
required for there to be a normatively relevant interference with the plaintiff. That is, a rights
violation can be established in some cases regardless of loss. If we conceive of the morally
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relevant interference with the plaintiff’s fundamental interests as that which is demonstrated
by the damage, the justification applies to the broad as well as the narrow approach.
If a plaintiff’s rights are grounded in and derive from the conception of people as
being free, equal, and entitled to pursue their interests without interference from others, a
broad definition of damage better encapsulates what a violation of these interests are.133 The
conception of people as being entitled to be free from interference need not require loss in
order to show this right of non-interference or the plaintiff’s ability to exercise autonomy in
fulfilling his or her fundamental interests has been compromised. In Laferrière, for example,
at the moment Dr. Lawson negligently failed to inform Mrs. Dupuis of her situation, her right
that her doctor take care to properly diagnose and treat her was violated. Her fundamental
interest in making choices about her life and health were interfered with. At that point the
damage crystalized though she had not yet suffered loss or harm. In Boase, the plaintiff’s
fundamental interest in bodily integrity was compromised. In both these cases the plaintiffs
had a right of non-interference against the defendant, and the defendants had a correlative
duty not to damage the plaintiffs in a particular way. That the damage is or is not physical
contact of some kind is not determinative of an interference with a fundamental interest.
133
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The broad approach can better account for the kinds of rights that tort law protects.
That is, rights not to be interfered with in certain kinds of ways. Whatever the result of the
interference, it is possible to violate one’s right without consequent loss resulting. The
tension in requiring loss as a condition of finding a rights violation is evident in certain cases
in which the narrow approach is applied. Dispensing with loss as entailed in the concept of
actionable damage can provide a more coherent and principled view of negligence law.
2.6.1

Answering objections to the broad approach

There is a divergence between Canadian and English law insofar as the Supreme
Court of Canada has not stated as clearly as the House of Lords that actionable damage
requires loss. This divergence may be based on differing views of the articulation of the duty
of care or based on differing views of what rights the duty is meant to protect. However, it is
not the case that they represent incompatible views of negligence. That is, both the narrow
and broad definitions are based on a relational view of negligence and the relevant duty is
one of non-injury. Neither account leads necessarily to the conclusion that negligence is
determined non-relationally or is ‘in the air’. The primary objection to the narrow approach is
that it is not applied consistently across all cases of negligence and it leads to arbitrary,
policy-based reasoning that causes tension in the law. Objections can be similarly launched
against applying the broad approach, namely that instances of liability will explode and (or
because) the nature of negligence will be fundamentally changed.
No simpler answer to the first objection is needed other than Lord Nicholls’
poignant conclusions in Gregg: “This approach would represent a development of the law.
So be it. If the common law is to retain its legitimacy it must remain capable of
development…‘Floodgates’ is not a convincing reason for letting injustice stand
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unremedied.”134 The narrow definition inevitably devolves into a mass of exceptions and
shifting requirements of degree and it is contingent on an elusive definition of loss. The
broad approach is more principled and coherent because it is not contingent on a sliding scale
of degree defined by typically lawyerly but practically unhelpful terms like ‘non-negligible’,
‘more than trivial’, and ‘not insubstantial’. The de minimis principle is policy-based and it
ought not normatively determine the content of litigants’ rights. If the defendant’s negligent
misrepresentation causes the plaintiff to lose $1, is this not a legitimate and compensable
loss? Does the plaintiff somehow not have a right to that dollar because it is so small a sum?
No. Whether $1 or $1 million, if the defendant is under a duty not to cause the plaintiff loss
as a result of negligent misstatements any amount more than zero counts as the kind of
damage that shows the plaintiff’s right has been violated. It may be the case that liability
explodes, but in practicality the conclusion here is not to say that as a result of increased
findings of negligence defendants are therefore going to be liable to pay more in damages. If
the damage to the plaintiff is trivial then nominal damages are appropriate. If the concern is
that cases for trivial sums ought not be brought because they clogs up courts, then the de
minimis principle can be introduced as an extra step in the negligence inquiry to set a
threshold under which a claim will not succeed. This approach, however, is a policy decision
that must be made explicit through legislation because it is a limitation on access to the civil
system.
If the concern is that the de minimis principle and reliance on loss as a limiting
factor is in place, and should be retained, for the types of policy reasons articulated above,
then elimination of loss is indeed a fundamental change to negligence. However, it is
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somewhat disingenuous to say that the negligence inquiry is not being changed in this kind of
way already. In many cases proof of loss is not required and in others lack of compensable
harm is a bar to maintaining the action. The foundational feature of loss is already on shifting
sands. Proposing to differently describe the oscillation of the waves is not a drastic change.
However, the more pointed concern is that the broad approach fundamentally alters
the relational nature of negligence and morphs it into a scheme of strict (or non-relational)
liability. The proposal that actionable damage does not require loss does not eliminate or
alter the relational, qualified nature of the duty of care. Practically, if a plaintiff is seeking
the highest amount of damages possible, then he or she will formulate the claim in order to
maximally describe the recoverable damages. In Gregg, the consequence of a finding that the
plaintiff’s damage was in fact lost years of life would have meant that all annual income and
many other amounts would be recoverable. In his dissent Lord Hope agreed with plaintiff’s
counsel that the doctor’s “duty was to prevent that happening which did happen – a reduction
in the appellant’s prospects of a successful recovery.”135 Had the plaintiff in fact pled the case
in this way, and consequently pled that the recoverable damages he was seeking were
compensation for whatever additional pain and suffering or additional time off work that was
required because of the delay in treatment, the claim may have succeeded. Baroness Hale for
the majority reiterated that “it matters how the claimant, and the law, define the damage
which is the gist of the action.”136 She went on to discuss ways that the case could have been
framed and some recovery awarded. However, “none of [these options] appears to have been
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explored before the judge. This was presumably because the focus before him had been on
establishing that the claimant would otherwise have achieved a complete ‘cure’.”137
Gregg is but one example of a claim being formulated in a way that obscures the
real damage at issue in order to seek the maximum compensation. The majority’s decision in
Gregg implies that if the claim had been formulated as seeking damages flowing from delay
of treatment, and not for several years of income based on a claim that the doctor’s
negligence made it more likely than not that he would die, he could have recovered.
However, the recovery would be limited. This outcome is precisely the conclusion the
Supreme Court of Canada reached in Laferrière.138 Viewing the amount of compensation
available as limited to the actionable damage pled, as the court implied was a necessary
consequence of not requiring loss to have materialized in Winnipeg Condominium by limiting
the recoverable amount to the cost of repair, courts are perhaps unwittingly supporting a
corrective justice position. If the content of the plaintiff’s right determines the measure of the
remedy, plaintiffs will inevitably draft the pleadings to claim as broad a remedy as possible.
Consequently, plaintiffs are more likely to plead the defendant owes an overly broad duty. As
taken up in the next chapter, there is vigorous debate about whether remedies must be limited
to the compensable value of the pled damage or loss. Taking a position in that debate,
however, is not required in order to accede to the conclusion suggested here that actionable
damage does not require loss.
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2.6.2

A note about loss of chance and risk of harm

Aside from the question about whether actionable damage requires harm or loss,
there is a separate but related debate that was alluded to earlier – namely can a risk of future
damage or risk of future harm (loss) be actionable damage? The inverse of risk of future
harm is loss of chance.139 A doctor fails to diagnose the patient’s cancer and as a result
treatment is delayed by six months, and if treated earlier the patient would have had a 90%
chance the cancer could have been dealt with fully. Because of the delay the cancer spreads
and the chance for full recovery is reduced by half. It can be articulated that the patient has
been put at an increased risk of death or that the patient lost a chance of being cured. There is
a deep well of scholarship on issues such as whether putting someone at risk is a wrong,
whether a loss of a chance is in fact a loss, and whether loss of chance cases irreparably
confuse the causation requirements of tort law.140 It is not within the scope here to engage
with that debate, but the implications of this argument for the risk and chance debates should
be briefly noted.
Within the terminological framework defended here we can answer the question of
whether risk of damage is sufficient to constitute actionable damage in the negative as a
matter of logic: it is tautological. Risk of the actionable damage cannot itself be actionable
damage. If the plaintiff must show damage in order to prove there has been injuria of the
relevant right in negligence, then risk of damage by definition means the actionable damage
139
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has not been made out and there has been no injury. If the risk of damage were sufficient,
then, as discussed in arguments above, this would support a view of negligence that is based
on a non-relational determination of the defendant’s failure to act in accordance with a
standard of care and not based on a relational duty. This argument aligns with but is very
different from arguments of the type that maintain that there cannot be a duty not to put
someone at risk, and therefore one cannot hold a right to not be risked. The logic still prevails
even if the duty is described in terms of risk. If the defendant’s duty is framed as a duty to
not put the plaintiff at risk, the plaintiff’s correlative right is a right not to be put at risk and
such risk is the relevant actionable damage. If the duty is articulated in this way it cannot not
be that risk of the actionable damage is sufficient because then the requisite damage is
defined as being put at a risk of being put at a risk. It is logically incoherent to say that the
risk of damage is sufficient to be the damage. Therefore, the relevant risk at issue must be
exposure to a risk of harm or loss.
If the analysis proceeds based on the terminological and conceptual framework
developed here, the controversy shifts and is better understood as determining whether
increased risk or loss of a chance is sufficient to constitute loss and not as whether a risk or
deprivation of a chance are wrongs. In the cases discussed here, arguably the real question of
whether loss of chance or increased risk of harm count as a sufficient detriment has not been
grappled with squarely because the courts tend to view these cases as claiming risk is damage
rather than asking whether risk is loss. Sufficient analysis of the cases that do explicitly deal
with this issue is beyond this dissertation’s scope, but it is important to note that for the
purposes of the argument advanced here in favour of a broad view of damage that all of the
controversial cases dealing with risk are not cases seeking to define the damage as a risk.
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They are all cases of consequent risk (or consequent loss of chance) and therefore not pure
risk or chance cases. Recovery for consequent risk is accepted as non-controversial and any
difficulties of analyzing the value of a loss of chance or increased risk therefore fall within
the scope of analyzing quantification of damages.141
2.7

Reconciling Controversial Cases with a Broad Approach to Damage
If the broad approach is accepted, determining whether there has been actionable

damage is an inquiry into whether the plaintiff has been interfered with in the relevant way to
show that he or she has suffered damage of the kind that falls within the ambit of what the
defendant is under a duty not to do. In exposure cases, the pleural plaques, for example, were
of evidential importance in showing the plaintiffs had been exposed and therefore had been
interfered with. If the defendants’ duty is understood as being a duty to ensure in the course
of running their business that their actions do not expose employees or occupants of their
buildings to dangerous substances or hazards that could pose a substantial danger to their
health and safety, the existence of pleural plaques in Rothwell satisfies both the evidentiary
and substantial requirement of proving the actionable damage. In Ring the plaintiffs rightly
could not maintain the cause of action because there was no similar evidentiary proof of
exposure.
In cases like Goodridge, Justice Perell’s conclusion about the risk of harm being a
materialized actual harm can be better understood as a conclusion that consequent risk is
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recoverable. The actionable damage in each of Goodridge, Tiboni, and Wilson is the
physiological interference with the plaintiffs in having ingested the allegedly defective drug.
Justice Lax’s implication in Andersen that had it been found that the defendants fell below
the standard of care that the consequent risk of increased likelihood of cardiovascular
complications would have been considered a material harm can be justified on the view that
the actionable damage was the implantation of a defective device.
If the broad approach is accepted then it is not necessary to excise cases as wrongly
decided or exceptional. Cases like Boase and Kitchen reflect the correct view that there can
be interference and violation of a right without consequent loss. By shifting the inquiry about
loss away from the definition of damage the issues of what is recoverable and how to
properly quantify harms like loss of chance can be more properly analyzed as separate from
the inquiry of determining rights violations. How to go about that quantification and
determining what remedies are available once actionable damage is established and liability
proven is the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
3. Reconsidering Disgorgement and its Availability in Negligence
3.1

Introduction
Limiting the remedies available for the tort of negligence to the traditional principle

of compensating loss does not always achieve justice. Tort law serves multiple functions and
compensating plaintiffs, while an orthodox and accepted goal, is not the only purpose courts
focus on when determining the type or quantum of damages. Certain cases require a remedy
defined in relation to a defendant’s gain. Similarly, deterrence has been held by courts to be a
justifiable and legitimate purpose and function of tort law, and awards seeking to strip
defendants of gains made from wrongdoing are often held to further this purpose. However,
two distinct concepts of disgorgement, one as a remedy and one as a method of deterring
behaviour, are conflated in case law and scholarship. This confusion, combined with the
debate about the scope and application of waiver of tort, is inimical to a principled and
consistent understanding of the law.
The most prevalent example of this confusion is evident in the ‘waiver of tort
problem’. As discussed at the outset, the problem is not with the doctrine of waiver of tort
itself, although there is significant debate about how the doctrine should be properly
understood. The problem is that judges and lawyers alike are unsure of what waiver of tort is,
how it ought to apply, and what the status of the law is in Canada. Waiver of tort is being
used as a solution to the dilemmas of loss, profits, and individual issues. This approach,
however, obfuscates what the proper methodological focus should be; that is, parsing out and
separately analyzing the underlying issues of the definition of damage and the availability of
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gain-based remedies. The first question was dealt with in Chapter 2, and this chapter will
aim to answer the second question – what scope of wrongdoing gives rise to gain-based
remedies?
Awards focused on the defendant’s gain disgorge benefits obtained as a result of
wrongdoing. “Disgorgement ought to play a more prominent and principled role within tort
law”1 and this discussion will aim to define and analyze disgorgement in order to contribute
to a more clear and principled understanding. The discussion will begin in Part 3.2 by
situating the argument as separate from, though ultimately related to, the debate about the
doctrine of waiver of tort. The focus here is to develop an analysis of disgorgement as a
remedy. To accomplish this, a definitional framework is established first in Part 3.3 and from
this framework the discussion will develop the primary argument that disgorgement is
available as a remedial measure, in the form of ‘disgorgement damages’, that is available as
of right as an alternative to compensation. The discussion in Part 3.4 will trace awards of
disgorgement damages through the common law to demonstrate an expansion of the
rationales underlying disgorgement remedies beyond mere limitation to property-based torts.
By extension, it will be argued there is no justifiable reason that the violations of some rights
should give rise to disgorgement damages while violations of others do not, and further that
disgorgement damages are in principle available for negligence.
It is important to note at the outset that the focus of the discussion in this chapter
assumes that all elements of the negligence claim have been made out and liability has been

1

Mitchell McInnes, “Account of Profits for Common Law Wrongs” in Simone Degeling & James Edelman,

eds, Equity in Commercial Law (Sydney: Lawbook Co., 2005) 405 at 430. McInnes’ comment is preceded by
the argument that disgorgement should not be available as a response to “every wrongful enrichment” which, it
should be noted, is contrary to the argument presented here.
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established. Regardless of agreement or opposition to how the definition of damage ought to
be articulated, questions in this chapter dealing with how to approach disgorgement as a
remedy assumes that the damage at issue is sufficient to maintain a claim. There are still
examples that are not controversial in terms of the definition of damage that turn on the
plaintiff suffering a small harm for which the compensation may be very minimal. For
example, a pharmaceutical case in which the plaintiff pleads negligent design, manufacture,
or failure to warn of side effects. Imagine the plaintiff suffers from the side effect of
headaches. If the drug were properly designed or tested, use of the drug would not have
caused this side effect or it would have been discovered in testing such that the plaintiff could
have been warned and perhaps the plaintiff would not have taken the drug had such a
warning been given. The headache, though perhaps minor, is a physical injury and a
recognizable harm.2 If the plaintiff did not take any time off work, or the headaches did not
manifest in such a debilitating way as to substantially impact the plaintiff’s life, there is no
identifiable financial damage. The defendant drug manufacturer may have made significant
profits from the sale of the drug but a traditional application of the principle of compensation
and restriction on gain-based remedies for negligence would result in any damages awards to
the plaintiffs being minimal while the defendant retains the profits from their wrong.
Developing an answer justifying whether plaintiffs can recover a remedy based on
the defendant’s profits in this type of case is the goal of this chapter. It is important to note at
the outset that the argument works off the starting point of the plaintiff establishing liability
2

As in many of the cases discussed in Chapter 2, the injury need not result in a large loss in order to qualify as

damage. In Greenway v Johnson Matthey PLC, [2016] EWCA Civ 408, for example, it was accepted as
uncontroversial that the plaintiffs who had been exposed to platinum salts and consequently developed an
allergy had sufficient actionable damage. Similar to a headache, an allergy is a relatively minor injury and
compensation for pain and suffering from the injury would not objectively be valued as very high.
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and therefore establishing a rights violation. The argument here does not advance the position
that disgorgement is available without proof of damage or without a completed cause of
action. As discussed in Chapter 1, and briefly discussed further below, part of the waiver of
tort problem is that it has spawned arguments that suggest disgorgement of profits may be
available without proof of an underlying tort. As analyzed in Chapter 2, dispensing with the
requirement that a plaintiff prove monetary loss is not the same as dispensing with the
requirement that a plaintiff prove actionable damage. The arguments advanced in this
chapter, that disgorgement is available generally as a remedy, are predicated on the plaintiff
first proving a rights violation including, where required, proving actionable damage.
3.2

Separating Disgorgement and Waiver of Tort
What has been described throughout as the waiver of tort problem refers to how the

three dilemmas of loss, profits, and individual issues converge and lead to the misapplication
or misinterpretation of the law as judges are seeking to find a solution to these problems. The
waiver of tort problem, that is, the misunderstanding or incorrect use of waiver of tort in class
actions cases, is not a problem with the doctrine of waiver of tort itself. Rather, the problem
is that the debate about the scope and application of waiver of tort has broadened beyond
simply an analysis of the historical doctrine. As Jeremy Martin argues, the confusion about
waiver of tort and the revival of its use in class actions, particularly “at a time when class
actions are growing in popularity and geographical scope, is contagious and damaging.”3
Martin undertakes the project of tracing the historical development of waiver of tort through
the common law and his analysis provides immense clarity of the issues, particularly by

3

JM Martin, “Waiver of Tort: An Historical and Practical Survey” (2012) 52 Can Bus LJ 473.
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illuminating the points throughout the law and in scholarship that the definition and
discussion of waiver of tort have incorrectly confused the doctrine.
The purpose of the discussion here is not to reiterate the scholarly and judicial
debate about waiver of tort.4 However, the conclusions that Martin draws are a starting point
and form the foundation of the arguments developed in this chapter. First, waiver of tort is an
election of remedies.5 Waiver of tort is not based in equity and the plaintiff’s entitlement to
the remedy is not discretionary:
Waiver of tort is not and never has been an originating process; it is the election the plaintiff
makes after having established the defendant’s liability in tort and her own entitlement to the
profits from the goods wrongfully possessed by the tortfeasor. Having proven the tort and the
proprietary interest, the plaintiff chooses to treat those facts either as a tort, claiming
compensation; or as a quasi-contract, claiming disgorgement in assumpsit.6

Martin argues that the part of the current debate about whether waiver of tort can be pled as
an independent cause of action is answered entirely in the negative as an historical fact about
the law. As an election of remedies, waiver of tort was not borne from equity7 and has always
been predicated on an action in assumpsit “or a cause of action demonstrating an entitlement
to both a compensatory remedy in tort and a proprietary remedy”, and “has never been
anything more than the term of art used to describe the binding election to take the
proprietary remedy”.8 Building on this conception, this chapter argues that a plaintiff’s
entitlement to disgorgement is similarly non-discretionary. If disgorgement is understood as a
remedy that is an alternative measure to compensation, then the plaintiff is similarly entitled
as of right to elect a measure based on the defendants profit as to a measure based on his or
4

See discussion and references at Part 1.2.4.

5

Ibid at 492, 501-504, 516-517 and 534.

6

Ibid at 535.

7

Ibid at 481.

8

Ibid at 535-536.
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her compensable loss. Part 3.5 discussed, as an alternative argument and conception,
discretionary damages based on the fact that a defendant has profited from wrongdoing may
be awarded on the basis of equitable principle. However, the primary argument is that a
plaintiff is entitled to disgorgement as a remedy as of right and not because of the application
of judicial discretion or equity.
Second, as the definition above indicates, the limit of the historical doctrine of
waiver of tort is an application to proprietary interests and not personal torts. As Martin
notes, this fact was not developed or determined in the common law as a result of a moral or
normative debate about the nature of litigants’ rights:9 “What little normative guidance
history may provide on the subject amounts to this: the normative basis for waiver of tort has
always been that a plaintiff should be entitled to the vindication of his or her established
rights.”10 Arguments about whether disgorgement ought to be available for personal torts are
therefore beyond the historical scope and application of waiver of tort and, perhaps more
important to note, are not supported historically through the common law:
In order to argue that disgorgement should be available by waiving a personal tort, one must
establish that there is another remedy to which the plaintiff is entitled, and that the plaintiff
may elect to claim instead of compensatory damages: that the plaintiff was already entitled
to those profits by virtue of suffering tortious injury. That is not, and never has been the
law. It is, of course, open to the courts to determine that the measure of a plaintiff’s
damages generally should be the profit accruing to the defendant in some degree of
connection to a tortious injury it inflicted, rather than compensatory damages. Nothing short
of that, however, will permit the doctrine of waiver of tort as it has historically been
understood to entitle the plaintiff to a disgorgement of profits. In order for that result to be
reached the concept of waiver of tort would have to be re-imagined wholesale.11

9

The article presents a detailed discussion of the historical development of waiver of tort as a legal fiction

crafted by courts in response to procedural limitations.
10

Ibid at 532.

11

Ibid at 534.
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Taking up the discussion about whether the measure of the plaintiff’s damages should be the
defendant’s profit is the aim of this chapter. Arguments about the availability, definition, and
scope of disgorgement should not be confused with or necessarily confined to the debate
about waiver of tort. As Greg Weber argues, the way forward is to leave the waiver of tort
debate behind and develop “a principled approach to the availability of disgorgement.”12
While that is the focus of this chapter, the conclusions here should not be read as calling for
abandonment or supplanting of the doctrine of wavier of tort. As Martin notes, though there
may be “sound and pragmatic arguments for the discontinuation of waiver of tort”, the
doctrine does have useful features that are not duplicated by other remedies or causes of
action.13 The discussion here engages with a debate about the question of whether
disgorgement of profits should be available for non-proprietary torts: “This is a normative
question that an historical and practical survey is not competent to answer”.14 We thus
venture beyond, but keep in mind, the debate about the proper interpretation and application
of waiver of tort.
Though the argument here engages with waiver of tort, and this dissertation has
defined the waiver of tort problem as one impetus for the discussion, the issues and analysis
are broader than how the doctrine should be interpreted and applied. Answering the question
of whether disgorgement is an appropriate remedy should not be developed through the lens

12

Greg Weber, “Waiver of Tort: Disgorgement Ex Nihilo” (2014) 40 Queen’s LJ 389 at 424.
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For example, Martin notes waiver of tort is more advantageous to the plaintiff in respect of claiming a

proprietary remedy than the doctrines of unjust enrichment or constructive trust because (1) unjust enrichment
and constructive trust are equitable doctrines which disadvantages the plaintiffs; (2) waiver of tort does not
entirely overlap with conversion; and (3) historically the doctrine has provided rights to the plaintiff that would
be eliminated and not retained by other areas of the law (supra note 3 at 528-531).
14

Ibid at 545.
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of class actions alone or considered only in the context of the waiver of tort debate. If the
underlying general principles of remedies and the private law are reconsidered and clarified,
the dilemmas posed for class actions can be resolved. As Weber suggests, the “waiver of tort
experiment [in class actions] underscores the need to refocus on the fundamentals of our
common law legal system.”15 Taking this way forward is the aim of this chapter.
3.3

Definitional and Conceptual Framework
Of foremost importance is clarifying the terminology used in deciding these issues

and particularizing what is entailed in the concept of a remedy. One part of the current
confusion about gain-based remedies, as well as the confusion created by waiver of tort, is
that the concept of disgorging profits is lumped together with and referred to as a type of
restitution or as a restitutionary remedy.16 It is difficult to analyze gain-based damages
independently when they are frequently described alongside other conceptually distinct
remedies and labeled as being sought for “unjust enrichment for restitution or as an election
of disgorgement over compensatory damages”.17 Sometimes disgorgement is wrongly
blended with unjust enrichment. One categorization that has been set up forces all gain-based
remedies within the rubric of unjust enrichment: referring to either unjust enrichment by
subtraction (the defendant has been enriched by subtracting from the plaintiff something of

15

Weber, supra note 12 at 424.

16

See, e.g., Serhan (Trustee of) v Johnson & Johnson, [2004] OJ No 2904 (SC), aff’d [2006] OJ No 2421 (Div

Ct) [Serhan] at para 34: “Claims based on waiver of tort seek ‘restitution’ of benefits received by the
defendants, as a consequence of their tortious conduct rather than damages to compensate the plaintiffs for a
loss.” This type of analysis is confusing in that it defines waiver of tort as restitution when there has been in fact
no loss from the plaintiff that can be restored.
17

Weber, supra note 12 at 395.
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value) or unjust enrichment by wrongs (where the defendant has been enriched by a
wrongdoing but the enrichment does not equate with the plaintiff’s loss).18
Another part of the confusion about gain-based remedies is that they are seen as
something wholly different from compensatory remedies. It is for this reason that using the
language of rights, and considering private law as being concerned with remedying or
vindicating violated rights, provides a clearer framework for analysis. If a wrong is defined
as the violation of a plaintiff’s right, a remedy can be understood as a measure or mode of
vindicating the violated right.19 The traditional compensation principle then can be
understood as a measure by which the amount that is required to vindicate a violated right is
determined; that is, an amount equaling the plaintiff’s loss. If this language is adopted, then
the analysis is more amenable to accepting disgorgement similarly as a measure by which
rights are vindicated rather than viewing gain-based remedies as doing something wholly
different from compensation.
Gain-based remedies are here defined as remedies that are measured with reference
to the gain of some value that the defendant has made as a result of his or her allegedly
18

See Anthony Duggan, “Gains-based Remedies and the Place of Deterrence in the Law of Fiduciary

Obligations” in Andrew Robertson & Tang Hang Wu, eds, The Goals of Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2009) 365 at 365-66; cf Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1989) at
6.
19

This argument and interpretation is not meant to establish that this understanding is uncontested – there are

many theories and arguments about what is a right and what is a remedy: e.g., Donal Nolan and Andrew
Robertson, eds, Rights and Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012); Peter Birks, “Rights, Wrongs, and
Remedies” (2000) 20 OJLS 1; Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007);
Ernest J Weinrib, “Two Conceptions of Remedies” in Charles EF Rickett, ed, Justifying Private Law Remedies
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 3; Arthur Ripstein, “As if It had Never Happened” (2007) 48 Wm & Mary L
Rev 1957; Benjamin C Zipursky, “Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice” (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal
695; John CP Goldberg & Benjamin C Zipursky, “Tort Law and Responsibility” in John Oberdiek, ed,
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 17.
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wrongful act; a gain which otherwise would not have been made but for violating the
plaintiff’s right. The outcome of granting a remedy that is gain-based is that the defendant is
made to disgorge some or all of that benefit or profit. Though the concept of a profit obtained
by wrongful action fits a literal interpretation of unjust enrichment, in that the defendant has
been enriched unjustly, unjust enrichment is now a developed, separate cause of action20 and
is analyzed independently of its generalized literal definition. The test for whether unjust
enrichment has been made out as a cause of action should remain distinct from a
determination of whether a gain-based remedy is available.
The framework set out by James Edelman will be relied on here, as his definitions
clearly separate the concept of disgorgement from restitution and unjust enrichment. Part of
the problem, as Edelman identifies, is that restitutionary damages and disgorgement damages
are often run together. Breaking up the conceptualization of damages to separate
restitutionary and disgorgement damages “paves the way for a straightforward and principled
approach”.21 Edelman defines disgorgement damages based on a gain “which has accrued to
the defendant as a result of the wrong” irrespective of whether that gain is a transfer from the
plaintiff or matches the loss of the plaintiff.22 Separately, restitutionary damages are defined
as damages based on a “gain received by the defendant which has been wrongfully
transferred from the claimant”.23 The main purpose the distinction serves is to highlight that
restitutionary damages focus their measure on the plaintiff’s loss that has accrued to the
20

Deglman v Guaranty Trust Co of Canada, [1954] SCR 725; Garland v Consumers’ Gas Co, [2004] 1 SCR

629.
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James Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property (Oxford: Hart

Publishing, 2002) at 65.
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defendant as a gain and disgorgement damages focus their measure on the defendant’s gain
regardless of the source or matching the gain to the plaintiff’s loss.
For the purposes of this discussion Edelman’s definition of “disgorgement damages”
will be adopted, defined as remedy that is an award of damages quantified based on the profit
or benefit from any source that has accrued to the defendant as a result of the wrong.24 The
distinction between disgorgement and restitution is not novel and has been recognized by the
Supreme Court of Canada: “Usually an accounting [of profits] is not a restitutionary measure
of damages. Thus, while it is measured according to the defendant’s gain, it is not measured
by the defendant’s gain at the plaintiff’s expense.”25 The legal distinction having been
established, all that remains is the adoption of a consistent definitional framework.
Another point Edelman discusses is that the use of the word “damages” is often
thought to apply only to monetary awards that compensate for loss. He challenges this notion
and shows that “‘damages’ means nothing more specific than a monetary award for a
24

Though not discussed by Edelman, it is important to highlight that the profit is to be considered as a benefit

or gain from any source is meant to address the situation in which a defendant’s profits may include profits that
can be traced to having come from the plaintiff, but are to be distinguished from restitutionary damages. The
problem with restitutionary and disgorgement damages blending together crops up despite Edelman’s
distinction. If, for example, the case is one of products liability what can be called ‘primary profits’ (those direct
profits made by the sale of the product as being the purchase price less cost of production) will be encompassed
in the cost of the product to the consumer. Therefore a compensatory award for either the cost of the product, or
some part thereof, could technically be considered restitution because it is the transferring back to the plaintiff
all or part of the defendant’s wrongful gain. The definitions ought not be parsed so finely and thus the concept
of disgorgement damages is meant to focus on the defendant’s gain, not the plaintiff’s loss, and encapsulate the
concept of profit from any source (the defendant’s ‘secondary profits’, see the discussion, infra at Part 3.4.3) to
make clear the distinction between disgorgement and restitution. This distinction ought to stand despite the
practical reality that in some cases that the defendant’s profits will be made up in whole or in part of some value
transferred from the plaintiff.
25
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wrong.”26 We can see in the courts awarding punitive damages,27 aggravated damages,28 and
nominal damages29 that there are ‘damages’ awards that are not limited to or measured by
compensation for the plaintiff’s financial loss. In many cases courts recognize that damages
awards are not solely limited to compensation.30 ‘Damages’ is therefore still an appropriate
label for awards measured by the defendant’s gain. 31
What must be distinguished, however, is that the types of damages awards Edelman
relies on to support the argument that there is no objection to using the term ‘damages’ are
not necessarily remedies awarded as of right that are akin to compensatory damages. Similar

26

Supra note 21 at 5.
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Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 [Hill] at para 196; Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co.,

[2002] 1 SCR 595 [Whiten] at para 36-37:
Punitive damages are awarded against a defendant in exceptional cases for ‘malicious, oppressive and
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punish the defendant rather than compensate a plaintiff…punitive damages straddle the frontier
between civil law (compensation) and criminal law (punishment). Punishment is a legitimate objective
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Whiten, ibid at para 116: “Aggravated damages are the proper vehicle to take into account the additional harm
caused to the plaintiff’s feelings by the reprehensible or outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant.” As
held by the Supreme Court of Canada in Vorvis v Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 1085
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also The “Mediana”, [1900] AC 113 (HL) at 116.
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to the problem created by labeling a defendant’s wrongful gain an unjust enrichment because
it fits a literal definition, punitive or other kinds of damages fit within a literal interpretation
as part of remedying the wrong done to the plaintiff. As Peter Birks rightly identifies, “All
meanings of ‘remedy’ have one thing in common, namely, [that] which is referred to as a
remedy is represented as a cure for something nasty. To remedy is to cure or make better.”32
However, labeling all types of non-compensation-based damages awards as remedies
stretches the conception of a remedy in a way that many scholars may not agree to.33 The
interpretations offered here are not meant to suggest that there is a conclusive theory about
the nature of a remedy that is obviously correct or uncontested. What the argument here
suggests, to be discussed further in the following parts, is that courts understand
compensation for loss as a remedy that arises as of right when a cause of action establishing a

32

Birks, supra note 19 at 9.
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Civil recourse theory, for example, can be understood as more flexible in defining remedies in that injured

individuals have “a legal power to exact a remedy from the wrongdoer” and this remedy is not necessarily
bounded by a duty to repair, thus not necessarily limited to compensating the plaintiff’s monetary loss (see, e.g.,
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 19 at 28-29). Civil recourse theory, as being focused on the defendant’s
responsibility and accountability to others for wrongdoing, more readily accepts, for example, punitive
damages. On the other hand, corrective justice theories, for example, do not accept that supra-compensatory
awards such as punitive damages are a legitimate remedy as the defendant’s only obligation is to make whole
the plaintiff’s loss and awards amounting to more than that loss are an affront to justice. As Weinrib argues
punishment is a one-sided consideration and one that is outside of the correlative relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant as the sufferer and doer of injustice. Punitive damages, then, are not justified within
corrective justice theory and “in effect, function as a reward [to the plaintiff] for providing the socially useful
service of acting as a private prosecutor” (Ernest J Weinrib, “Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract
Remedies” (2003) 78 Chicago-Kent L Rev 55 at 86). An understanding of a remedy as the compensation the
plaintiff is entitled to as of right is much less contested than, for example, understanding punitive damages as a
remedy the plaintiff has similarly as of right.
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wrong has been proven.34 While issues such as the measure of compensation, what losses for
which the plaintiff can claim compensation, and the remoteness of the loss from the wrong
are debated in the case law, it is not the case that courts debate the fact of entitlement to
compensation once liability is established.
To use punitive damages as a counterexample, it is not the case that if a plaintiff is
wronged he or she is automatically entitled to punitive damages as a remedy though the
courts are always at liberty to award them. Even if the plaintiff is wronged in the requisite
way and the defendant’s behaviour is “malicious” or “high-handed” and meets the threshold
for being deserving of punishment, it is still within the court’s discretion to determine the
appropriateness and proper quantum of punitive damages.35 Compensatory damages are not
discretionary in the same way punitive damages are. If a defendant is found liable in
negligence, for example, it is of no moment that the amount of the plaintiff’s loss is
disproportionately high to the wrong suffered.36 If liable, the defendant must compensate the
plaintiff. The concept of using the defendant’s profits as the measure of a remedy, that is, the
concept of disgorgement damages as a gain-based remedy, must be conceptually
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“[A] tort or delict instantaneously gives rise to the right to compensation”: Dikranian v Quebec (Attorney
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established that fairness is determined not by whether the amount sought by the plaintiff is disproportionate,
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justifiable” (at 243-244).
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distinguished from disgorgement as a discretionary or additional type of damages award akin
to punitive damages. Using disgorgement to serve a different function than remedying a
wrong37 must therefore be distinguished both conceptually and terminologically from
disgorgement damages as a gain-based remedy. Discussion of using disgorgement to serve a
deterrent function will be taken up in Part 3.5 and will present an alternative argument to the
main focus of the chapter.
The primary focus, and the argument to which we now turn, is justifying
disgorgement damages as a gain-based remedy that is available in cases of negligence.
3.4

The Availability of Disgorgement Damages as a Remedy to Vindicate Rights

3.4.1

Re-interpreting the orthodox rationale for disgorgement damages

Disgorgement damages have traditionally been available for violations of certain
kinds of rights, or violations of rights in certain kinds of ways. Violations of property rights,
including actions for trespass, conversion, or patent infringement, have historically given rise
to disgorgement damages.38 Disgorgement of profits made from the expropriation or
37

Understood as compensating for and vindicating the violation of a right.
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violation of one’s property have been justified on the basis that the profit is linked to the
property and the plaintiff as the owner of the property is entitled to any benefit the property
produces. It is not necessary that the plaintiff show he or she would have made the same use
of the property to generate the profit or that he or she suffered any loss as a result of the
defendant making that profit in violation of the plaintiff’s rights.39
The principle of the right-holding plaintiff deserving profits made off his or her
property conceptually extends to cases of trustees’ breach of fiduciary duty, another category
of case in which disgorgement damages are routinely awarded. 40 For example, a trustee
dealing with a beneficiary’s trust fund inappropriately and making a personal profit is an
extension of the principle that profits a defendant has made on something that the plaintiff
owned ought to be disgorged.41 The traditionally named remedy in breach of fiduciary duty
cases is the in personam remedy of an account of profits.42 Cases dealing with accounts of
profits moved from the remedy being in rem in respect of a constructive trust over property
to in personam being a claim as against the accounts of the fiduciary personally.43 This shift
is an important extension away from gain-based remedies being confined only to propertythese cases would admit of a disgorgement remedy and plaintiffs were entitled to elect to waive the tort and
receive disgorgement of the defendant’s profits as a restitutionary remedy (at 508).
39
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based wrongs. Equally important is the shift extending the availability of an accounting of
profits to breaches of fiduciary duties generally and not limited to certain types of fiduciary
relationships.44 The case law establishes courts moving away from limiting disgorgement
remedies only to infringements of plaintiffs’ property rights and focusing on broader
rationales underpinning liability.
Though it has been argued that some of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions
“reveal a deep-seated ambivalence about the appropriateness of gains-based remedies for
breach of fiduciary duty and other wrongs”,45 there is, on the other hand, an equally clear line
of cases that expresses no such ambivalence. The Supreme Court of Canada has long
maintained its concern with ensuring a fiduciary “must not be allowed to use his position as
such to make a profit.”46 Abuse of a particular type of relationship or violating a right in a
certain kind of way underlies the court’s rationale in recognizing categories of cases in which
disgorgement damages are awarded to include breaches of confidence and deceit.47 The
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court’s reasoning throughout the line of cases in which disgorgement damages are awarded
breaks from a closed view of requiring a link to a property-based tort and refocuses the
foundation of disgorgement on the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant and the
nature of the defendant’s conduct.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada incrementally shifts further from a narrow
view that disgorgement is always and only an equitable remedy.48 As debated at length
between Justice McLachlin and Justice LaForest in Canson Enterprises Ltd. v Boughton &
Co,49 how and whether common law principles limiting damages ought to be applied to
equity-based remedies are unsettled issues in the private law.50 Canson dealt with a solicitor’s
breach of fiduciary duty in failing to disclose a secret profit he made buying a property and
selling it to his clients. Justice LaForest, for the majority, held that where the same
underlying principle applies to the circumstances giving rise to a cause of action in both
equity and at common law there is no reason to apply different principles in determining the
measure of damages: “The truth is that barring the different policy considerations underlying
one action or the other I see no reason why the same basic claim, whether framed in terms of
a common law action or an equitable remedy, should give rise to different levels of

48

As Martin notes, supra note 3 at 481, disgorgement based in assumpsit and waiver of tort was never equitable

and he argues “modern academics and jurists have wrongfully categorized the doctrine of waiver of tort as an
equitable doctrine or as sharing an affinity with equitable arguments or considerations, probably because its
disgorging effect is similar to the more familiar equitable action in unjust enrichment. As the early cases show,
however, waiver of tort unquestionably originated in the courts of common law.”
49

[1991] 3 SCR 534 [Canson].

50

The debate in the case centered primarily on whether principles of remoteness, mitigation, causation and

contributory negligence apply to equitable remedies, but the discussion about the nature of remedies being
linked to the cause of action is generally applicable.

113
redress.”51 Justice McLachlin advocated that while the measure of a remedy in equity is not
unlimited, damages for equitable claims should not be measured by analogy to common law
claims because different fundamental principles underlie each type of claim.52 Justice
LaForest does seem to rely throughout his judgment on the controversial view that the
merging of the courts of law and equity by the Judicature Act53 implied a partial or
substantive fusion of the common law and equity, a view that is argued by many to be
incorrect.54 However, the view that “the courts have tended to merge the principles of law
and equity to meet the ends of justice as it is perceived in our time” is one that underlies the
court’s remedial flexibility.55
The rationale underlying Justice La Forest’s analysis, that the courts and the
common law are sufficiently flexible and will adapt to refine an approach to what the
circumstances of justice require, is sound and recognized as part of the fabric of the law. In a
further and more dramatic shift, but similarly relying on the evolutionary capability of the
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common law the House of Lords’ watershed analysis in Attorney General v Blake expanded
the use of disgorgement damages:
Damages are measured by the plaintiff’s loss, not the defendant’s gain. But the common law,
pragmatic as ever, has long recognised that there are many commonplace situations where a
strict application of this principle would not do justice between the parties. 56

In awarding disgorgement damages for breach of contract, Lord Nicholls supported the Court
of Appeal’s view that “the law of contract would be seriously defective” if the court were
limited and unable to award disgorgement as the most appropriate remedy.57 Though the
circumstances of the case were akin to a breach of confidence, the action was a claim for
breach of contract and the general propositions set out by the court analyzing the court’s
ability to award remedies in order to achieve justice were not curtailed or limited to a
particular cause of action. The reasoning in Blake that the common law is sufficiently
flexible to adapt in order to “do justice between the parties” has been taken up by the
Supreme Court of Canada seemingly as an extension of well-established Canadian law: “The
rule that damages are measured by the plaintiff’s actual loss, while the general rule, does not
cover all cases.”58 Whether disgorgement damages are appropriate or justified for breach of
contract has generated much academic debate.59 While the availability of gain-based
remedies in every type of case is not an accepted extension of Blake’s rationale, Canadian

56

[2001] 1 AC 268 (HL) [Blake] at 278.

57

Ibid at 277.

58

IBM Canada Limited v Waterman, [2013] 3 SCR 985 at para 36.

59

See, e.g., Anthony Robert Sangiuliano, “A Corrective Justice Account of Disgorgement for Breach of

Contract by Analogy to Fiduciary Remedies” (2016) 29 Can JL & Jur 149, and articles cited therein at n. 11;
Caprice L Roberts, “A Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary Disgorgement for Breach of Contract”
(2008) 65 Wash & Lee L Rev 945; Mitchell McInnes, “Gain-Based Relief for Breach of Contract: Attorney
General v Blake” (2001) 35 Can Bus LJ 72.

115
courts are becoming more comfortable recognizing compensation is not always adequate and
disgorgement damages can be considered.60
Several conclusions can be drawn from the rationales throughout case law in which
disgorgement damages are awarded:
1) Intentional harm ought to be prevented: disgorgement is awarded in cases
where wrongs are committed deliberately or are cases of bad faith, breaches
of confidence, conspiracy and fraud;61
2) Important institutions should not be undermined: disgorgement is awarded in
cases of breach of fiduciary duty, cases about property and about
“institutions which require such a degree of protection that the prospect of
gain for even inadvertent wrongdoing should be removed”;62
3) Intentional, malicious or otherwise exceptional conduct is not required:
disgorgement is awarded where the tortfeasor is innocent, for example an
innocent trespass or innocent breach of fiduciary duty;63
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4) It is not required that the plaintiff suffer any loss in order for disgorgement
damages to be an available remedy;64
5) Disgorgement damages have been historically awarded based on claims both
in equity and common law for both personal and proprietary torts;65 and
6) The measure of disgorgement damages, when awarded, is the entirety of the
defendant’s profit, not some portion or an amount determined on a
discretionary basis.66
The traditional view of the underlying features that tie these rationales together is that
disgorgement is appropriate in cases when certain kinds of profit-bearing rights are violated
and certain types of wrongs or behaviour should be deterred. Reconsideration of this
traditional position also leads to an interpretation that what is fundamental to each of these
cases is first, the plaintiff’s right is violated, and second, there is no compensatory measure to
rely on in order to vindicate the plaintiff’s right. Though disgorgement damages can be seen
as serving a deterrent function or protecting certain institutions, the rationales throughout the
cases can be reinterpreted and understood as highlighting courts’ endorsement of the fact that
rights are worthy of protection. A right to one’s property, a right not to be intentionally
harmed, a right not to be deceived in transactions – each of these rights ought to be protected
64
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and vindicated regardless of the violation resulting in a financial loss. Absent loss there is no
measure by which the compensation principle can properly apply or operate. The gain that
the defendant has made can then be understood as an alternative remedial measure and one
the plaintiff is entitled to by virtue of the fact that his or her right has been violated. While
the compensation principle generally works as perhaps a primary or default measure of
valuation, application of the principle will not ensure adequate vindication of the rights
violation in all circumstances.
It is therefore not the case that the fact a defendant profits that is doing the analytical
work in determining when disgorgement damages are available. Nor is it the case that all
awards of disgorgement damages invoke equitable principles that render all of these awards
discretionary. As Martin notes with respect to awards of disgorgement based on waiver of
tort, the plaintiff has a right to elect a remedy based on the defendant’s profits that is not
based on an exercise of the court’s discretion.67 Rather, the questions courts are concerned
with ask what measure of damages will vindicate the violated right, and what should that
measure be? Though the orthodox and historical view limits disgorgement damages to certain
types of cases, the evolution of the orthodoxy is an example of the “organic capacity of the
common law”.68 We can view the expansion of the availability of disgorgement beyond the
historical categories as another step towards improving and developing the law.
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3.4.2

Extending the availability of disgorgement damages to negligence

Part of the current debate about the availability and scope of disgorgement damages
centers around trying to formulate limiting principles or normative justifications because
arguing that disgorgement should be routinely awarded seems like a radical departure from
the settled law. Though it is no doubt a departure from settled law to consider disgorgement
available for every kind of tort, disgorgement itself is arguably not as rare or radical a
remedy as the liveliness of the current debate might suggest: “It is not immediately clear to
the modern reader from cases cited in treatises why it is that on the facts of a tort plaintiffs
have apparently been entitled to claim the defendant’s profits for centuries.”69 As Martin
notes, without understanding the history of the cases in that the plaintiff’s entitlement was
based on title to the property at issue, “normative explanations necessarily begin to develop
in place of historical ones.”70 We can view a plaintiff’s entitlement to disgorgement damages
as a product of history and not rooted in the common law having come to a definitive and
normative conclusion about the nature of the rights at issue. As a matter of history, Martin
argues that “20th century courts did come to contemplate that personal torts could be
waived”71 and it is perhaps not as wholly radical as it seems at first blush to suggest that
disgorgement damages are available in principle, as of right, as an electable remedy for the
violation of a plaintiff’s rights. The next step in the development is to answer whether
disgorgement damages are available for any type of wrong.
There is some attraction to the argument that certain types of rights are of a different
order and therefore disgorgement damages should be limited to violations of certain types of
69
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rights. For example, property rights have been treated as different from other types of rights
for a number of reasons including: property rights are in rem and survive the plaintiff;72 the
institution of property must be protected and owners of property given security of exclusive
enjoyment of what they own;73 and that property “enshrines the freedom and equality of
juridical persons.” 74 Similarly, the argument that disgorgement ought to be limited to
intentional or fraudulent rights violations is attractive because it is acceptable to argue that
such behaviour ought to be deterred. However, as Lord Nicholls questioned in Blake, “it is
not clear why it should be any more permissible to expropriate personal rights than it is
permissible to expropriate property rights.”75 His comments hint towards the conclusion that
it is not the type of right at issue that is driving the availability of disgorgement remedies.
Though property rights may be considered different from other rights, it seems at
least antithetical to an understanding of the genesis of the legal system and legal rights that
violation of a certain right attracts a higher or different degree of attention by the courts such
that disgorgement damages are available but that no such remedy is available for the
violation of all rights. Aside from arguing that perhaps we should take property rights less
seriously,76 it seems there is little basis in the case law that can maintain the view that all
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rights (of property, person, and contract) are not worthy of protection or that violations of all
these rights are not equally worthy of vindication. 77
The orthodox view is that the kinds of wrongs that lead to gain-based remedies are
violations of a right such that “the defendant’s gain is of something that lies within the right
of the plaintiff.”78 Thus, torts dealing with another’s property give rise to disgorgement
damages, but torts dealing with personal injury do not.79 The rationale for this conclusion is
based on the plaintiff’s entitlement to a gain-based remedy only if the right that has been
violated could equally have been the source of profit in the plaintiff’s hands as in the
defendant’s. It has been argued that because people cannot be bought and sold as things, we
do not have the ability to sell and commoditize ourselves in the same way that we can do
with our things.80 The measure of our right to bodily integrity therefore is not profit-bearing
in the same way our rights to things are (or, the rights created through contracts).
Exceptions, however, are easily admitted and examples are easily constructed, such
as Birks’ well-known example of the thug hired to hurt someone.81 It cannot lie in the thug’s
mouth to say that the victim is not entitled to the thug’s profits because “having treated the
plaintiff’s bodily integrity as an item that the thug is in effect selling for a price…the thug’s
77
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relationship to the [plaintiff’s] bodily integrity has become property-like through the thug’s
conduct.”82 Admitting this exception, however, shows that bodily integrity can be valued and
profit bearing in the requisite way.83 Further, as McCamus argues, “there is simply no
historical foundation for the notion that waiver of tort claims must be restricted to the context
of the proprietary torts” and ultimately concludes that limiting the availability of
disgorgement to property torts is a “clear non-starter”.84 If a defendant’s profit cannot be
made but for the violation of the plaintiff’s rights, then all rights can be profit-bearing in the
requisite way.
Similarly, there is no principled reason to limit disgorgement to intentional torts or
only to cases such as fraud. If the courts are concerned with vindicating rights violations,
then there is no distinction in remedying a negligently violated right as opposed to an
intentionally or fraudulently violated right. One approach to the definition of a rights
violation is Peter Benson’s proposed definition of misfeasance. For Benson, the plaintiff has
rights to exclude the defendant from exercising control over the plaintiff’s person or property
and this right of exclusion “enshrines the freedom and equality of juridical persons”.85 This
82
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definition relies on what was discussed in Chapter 2 as distinguishing damage by kind in
terms of interference and non-interference. Where the defendant or the defendant’s thing
materially changes or alters the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s circumstance, the result is
demonstrative of interference with the plaintiff in a normatively significant way. Benson
articulates the right of a plaintiff in a general way as based on a right of exclusion. He argues
the sources of rights are the “irreducibly basic modes of entitlements that specify the content
of the private-law relation”: bodily integrity, property, or contract.86 Misfeasance is an act by
the defendant that amounts to the defendant taking control over the plaintiff’s person or an
object that has the effect of “subordinat[ing] the other person or property to the pursuit of
one’s own purposes”.87 We can understand the content of the plaintiff’s right to exclusion
being qualified in certain ways depending on the nature of the source – that is, in contract, for
example, the content of the plaintiff’s rights and correlative duties are derived from the
agreement between the parties. In negligence, the content of the rights and duties within a
particular relationship are circumscribed and defined by the damage, duty and standard of
care.
Benson’s definition is clear and provides a principled basis for understanding the
notion of a rights violation that goes beyond the principle of liability being based on a factual
distinction between action and omission. A rights violation does not depend on a concept of
intention that requires intention to harm, but requires “conduct that externally manifests a
certain kind of exercise of control”.88 Within this framework, what demonstrates liability in
negligence, that is what demonstrates the defendant acting in the requisite way so as to
86
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exercise control over the plaintiff’s person or property, is the actionable damage. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the issue of what degree or type of damage is required as sufficient to
maintain a cause of action in negligence is contested. Within the scope of this chapter,
however, it is not necessary to take a position on the issues surrounding actionable damage in
order accept the premise that determining whether damage has been suffered is a distinct
inquiry from determining the quantum of the financial loss flowing from that damage.
For example, a plaintiff is negligently run off the road by the defendant’s car while
riding a bicycle and is consequently hurt because the defendant was not paying attention to
the merging of the bicycle and car lanes. That damage is sufficient to demonstrate a rights
violation and the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy. The orthodox understanding of negligence
is that the plaintiff is compensated for the loss arising from the injury. Let us assume that the
plaintiff did not suffer much financial loss as a consequence of being hit – perhaps only a few
minor bruises – and general damages would amount to very little. Though an identifiable
financial loss is indicative of the fact of the defendant’s taking control over the plaintiff’s
body or property in the relevant way, the financial loss is not the operative harm indicating
the violation of the plaintiff’s right; the bruises and bodily injury are. Let us assume further
that the defendant was in a race and won a prize in the race as a result of driving recklessly,
too fast, and in disregard of cyclists. Is the cyclist not entitled to that gain as the measure of
the value of his violated right?
If we change the example slightly we could assume that the bicycle lane was
privately owned. Travelling in the bicycle lane was the shortest path through a certain block
of the city, and because of taking this short cut the driver won the race and received the gain
of the winnings. An application of the traditional principles would result in a conclusion that
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because the right violated was a right to property, and trespass ought to give rise to
disgorgement, the owner of the property on which the bicycle lane is situated is entitled to
the driver’s winnings. The act of driving negligently, crossing over a line, and violating
someone’s right as a result of crossing that line applies equally in both iterations of the
example. The behaviour was equally wrongful, equally worth of deterrence, and equally
profit-bearing in each case. Why in one case can we conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to
the defendant’s gain but not in the other?
If the source of the right that the plaintiff has as against the defendant is the same for
wrongs against both person and property, that is, that the plaintiff has a right to his or her
person and property to the exclusion of the defendant,89 then the violation of that right,
negligently or otherwise, is worthy of vindication. On what basis can we maintain that a
violation of a property right is worthy of vindication despite identifiable financial loss but the
violation of a right to bodily integrity is not? It is sometimes argued that a distinguishing
feature underlying disgorgement damages is that the defendant’s conduct was intentional or
objectively blameworthy. One line of argument differentiating intentional torts from
negligence-based torts is that the former invokes a degree of moral culpability that ought not
be attributed to a negligent tortfeasor.90 It is also sometimes argued that because negligence
does not result from an intentional action or an intention to harm that it does not meet the
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required threshold of exceptional conduct that can trigger disgorgement damages.91 However,
courts have adopted the notion that negligence entails moral culpability: “[L]iability for
negligence…is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for
which the offender must pay.”92 And, as repeatedly demonstrated in case law, it is accepted
that disgorgement damages are awarded in the case of an innocent tortfeasor.93 There is no
reason the availability of disgorgement damages ought not be extended to negligent
tortfeasors.
Another objection against extending disgorgement damages to cases of negligence is
that negligent behaviour cannot be deterred because of the nature of negligent wrongs and the
lack of intentional action. One possible argument is that disgorgement damages should be
limited to cases where there was intention to profit from the violation of the plaintiff’s rights.
However, a limitation to cases where the enterprise is in pursuit of profit is no limitation at
all. Any corporation is presumably running a business to make a profit, and therefore any
claim against a corporate actor would always open up the possibility of disgorgement
damages. This broad conception gives rise to concerns of over-deterrence and perhaps
unbounded liability.
Motivation to profit is not by itself sufficient to trigger disgorgement damages, but it
does further an answer to the objection that negligent behaviour cannot be deterred. If we
91
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admit that the subjective valuation of plaintiffs’ rights by the defendant, as in the hired thug
example, is a case in which disgorgement damages are appropriate, the rationale in this case
depends on the defendant valuing the right such that the contemplated profit depends on the
rights violation. The profit could not have been made without violating the plaintiff’s right.
Similarly, as in the case of the negligent driver, regardless of any intention to cause harm, the
driver still intentionally chose to drive recklessly and as a result of failing to act in
accordance with an appropriate standard of care caused injury. Simply because there was no
intention to harm does not mean that the resultant injury was caused completely by accident.
The driver was still willful and having acted in a careless way made a gain as a result of that
action.
It is not the type of right or the manner of violation that triggers the right to a
remedy of compensatory damages. If a plaintiff is wronged, he or she is entitled as of right to
that remedy. The nature of the remedy or the type of right is not the trigger – the rights
violation is. If we dispel the notions that disgorgement damages are awarded only for certain
types of rights, or are only awarded if rights are violated in a certain type of way, are only
awarded for behaviour that is capable of being deterred, then there is nothing that prevents
the extension of the application of disgorgement damages in principle to cases of negligence.
3.4.3

Justifying the valuation of a right based on the defendant’s gain

Even if the availability of disgorgement damages can be justified on the basis that
all violated rights are deserving of vindication, there remains the objection that plaintiffs are
not entitled to an amount that is more than what is required to compensate their loss. It is
argued that disgorgement damages are an impermissible windfall to plaintiffs and on that
basis should be rarely awarded. As discussed above, one goal underlying each theory of
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remedies can be understood as attempting to articulate a principle of limitation.
Compensation is a rational limit for the extent of a defendant’s liability and is perhaps quite
consistent with many theories of remedies. For example, the theory of corrective justice
holds that the purpose of damages is to rectify the injustice as between the two parties to the
litigation and the measure of the injustice is what the plaintiff has lost.94 This and other views
of remedies suggest the plaintiff is only entitled to claim damages based on a compensatory
measure, and any amount higher than what the plaintiff has lost is an inappropriate windfall.
What is being proposed here, however, is not a position that disgorgement damages
are unlimited or do not sufficiently limit remedies in the same way as compensation. Rather,
what is being proposed is that within the confines of the relationship between the plaintiff
and defendant disgorgement is an equally legitimate measure of damages. The amount of a
defendant’s gain is an equally justified limiting principle as the amount of a plaintiff’s loss.
If the only relationship of concern is as between the plaintiff and the defendant, and
the valuation of the injustice must not be entirely one-sided to focus on only the defendant’s
conduct, why is the appropriate valuation only concerned with the loss as reflected by what
the violation of the right is worth to the plaintiff? It is equally appropriate to focus on the
defendant’s position both pre and post-wrong as it is to focus on the plaintiff’s position.
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Compensation functions as a method of valuing the plaintiff’s rights. Though compensation
is perhaps a good measure and one that is often available and appropriate, it is not the only
potential measure available.
A right does not have an inherent monetary value.95 Rights are ascribed value when
the quantum of vindication is determined vis-à-vis damages. If the defendant chooses to
disregard the risk of foreseeable damage and nonetheless acts, the defendant is necessarily
valuing the right of the plaintiff not to be interfered with as less than or subordinate to
whatever the defendant sees as the value in achieving his or her purpose. Therefore, prior to
the wrong, there is some measurement of the value of the plaintiff’s right that has no relation
to the loss the plaintiff has suffered. If the defendant understands a risk, takes into account
what the cost of that risk will be, and nonetheless decides that economically the reward of the
profits is worth the risk that the plaintiff will or may be harmed, is this not commoditizing the
plaintiff and the plaintiff’s rights in the relevant way? If a defendant’s gains depend on
violating the plaintiff’s rights, then this means the plaintiff’s right is worth something to the
defendant. In deciding to act, in having that action harm the plaintiff, and knowing the profit
is dependent on that harm, the defendant is valuing the plaintiff’s right not to be harmed by
reference to the profit the harm creates. This is no different than the thug who values the
person he is hired to hurt. Therefore, in the same way that the plaintiff is entitled to the thug’s
commissions, the plaintiff is entitled to the portion of the profits the defendant made as a
consequence of violating his or her rights.
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However, for the same reasons that the intention of the defendant to profit does not
matter in determining the measure of damages a fiduciary owes, the prior or intentional
valuation by the defendant of a plaintiff’s right does not matter either. The amount of profit a
defendant makes from a tortious use of the plaintiff’s property is not objectively valued prior
to the commission of the tort. It is not required that the tortfeasor monetize the plaintiff’s
right to property by placing some value on it by determining the amount of profit the
defendant is seeking prior to committing the tort. There is simply recognition that the
plaintiff’s right is potentially profit-bearing.
The relevant consideration is the result of a gain being made at the expense of the
plaintiff’s right. Thus the manner in which the right is violated, negligently or otherwise,
does not alter the possibility of valuing that right ex post facto in relation to either the
plaintiff’s loss or the defendant’s gain. Disgorgement is still a limiting principle in the same
way compensation is a limiting principle in that the referent used to value the right is still
something that is contained within the plaintiff-defendant relationship. When viewed this
way an award of disgorgement damages is not in fact a windfall to the plaintiff. The
defendant’s profits can be viewed as the measure of a valuation of the plaintiff’s right and, in
the same line of reasoning that plaintiffs are entitled to profits they otherwise would not have
made off of their own property, the plaintiff is entitled to the profit the defendant made off
whatever right was violated, be it contractual or a right to bodily integrity.
The measure of the damages should not be broader based on an unbounded policy or
some number that bears no relation to any relevant amount as determined by the position of
either party. As with the application of the compensation principle, there are a several issues
that courts must consider in quantifying disgorgement damages. These will not be discussed
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at length here, but rather outlined only briefly. Whether the exercise of quantification is in
practice difficult on a case-by-case basis ought not impact or otherwise affect the underlying
conclusion that disgorgement damages are an available remedy.
The first problem of quantification is whether the courts ought to measure
disgorgement damages by the so-called ‘harsh rule’ or ‘mild rule’. The harsh rule holds that
revenues should be disgorged with “no set-off for expenses incurred in earning that
revenue”.96 The mild rule conversely allows for the gain to be calculated net of expenses.97
Quantification of these measurements is rooted in cases of conversion and the distinguishing
factor determining which rule ought to apply is whether the defendant knowingly committed
the tort or acted in bad faith.98 The same principles can be applied to any case in which the
defendant benefited and either rule could be applied to account for whether costs, for
example of manufacturing, marketing, or overhead, should be deducted. Application of the
harsh rule, however, “does more than award disgorgement of the tortfeasor’s gain; it imposes
a punitive sanction.”99 While it is permissible for punitive damages to “relieve a wrongdoer
of its profit where compensatory damages would amount to nothing more than a licence fee
to earn greater profits”,100 awarding disgorgement in an amount beyond calculation in
accordance with the mild rule is punitive and ought to be recognized as such. The practical
difficulties that remain for courts in determining quantification are in answering the more
nuanced questions of what types of expenses ought to be deducted, and in what amount.
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These questions will vary on a case-by-case basis, but the problems such issues of
quantification may pose are not otherwise a limiting factor that undermines the conclusion
that disgorgement damages of only the defendant’s net benefit is not a punitive sanction.
The second problem of quantification is dealing with issues that are argued as
problems for the determination of remedies generally, such as remoteness, causation and
mitigation. As discussed above, the Supreme Court of Canada engaged in extensive debate in
Canson about the application of these principles to limit damages on claims that were based
equally in equity as well as in tort. Canson was divided on the issue but subsequently in
Hodgkinson v Simms, another case about breach of fiduciary duty, Justice LaForest reiterated
that “a court exercising its equitable jurisdiction is not precluded from considering principles
of remoteness, causation, and intervening act where necessary to reach a just and fair
result.”101
How the principles of remoteness, causation and mitigation ought to apply is not
necessarily clear, settled, or subject to bright line rules. This debate, however, is one about
remedies generally and ought not otherwise be interpreted as applying differently to
disgorgement damages. There may be difficulties in determining to what extent various
levels or types of profit are considered as appropriately falling within a disgorgement
award.102 These difficulties and determinations of fact, however, are the mainstay of the
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common law. Nothing about the practicality of analytical challenges undermines the
conclusions about the availability of a disgorgement remedy.
3.5

The Availability of Disgorgement as Deterrence Damages for Negligence
Much of the current debate about the availability and justification for disgorgement

damages is based on deterrence theory. As McCamus argues, “the answer to the question
should be fashioned by considering whether the tortious misconduct in question is of such a
nature that the deterrence or disincentive rationale is engaged and disgorgement of the profit
secured through the wrongful conduct is an appropriate form of relief.”103 Setting aside the
primary argument that disgorgement damages are a remedy the plaintiff is entitled to as of
right, this section briefly outlines an alternative argument that the court can award
discretionary damages – ‘deterrence damages’ – based on the fact that a defendant has
profited from a wrong.
An award of this type, however, should not be conflated with disgorgement damages
as defined above. That is, the primary argument does not depend on the justification that
disgorgement serves a deterrent function in order to legitimate a gain-based remedy. If courts
are going to award damages aimed at disgorging defendants’ profits, but for the purpose of
deterring certain behaviour, then analysis of these damages should be distinguished and not
conflated with disgorgement damages as a remedy.

103

McCamus, supra note 64 at 352. McCamus’ argument is focused through the lens of determining when the

doctrine of waiver of tort can be used for non-proprietary torts.

133
3.5.1

A hierarchy of purposes served by damages

The orthodox view of damages in tort, and the orthodox view of the “essential
purpose of tort law”, is to compensate plaintiffs by returning them to the position they were
in but for the wrong.104 However, courts have long recognized that civil damages can serve
more than one purpose, the most clearly accepted of which is to punish certain types of
defendants’ behaviour with the awarding of punitive damages.105 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Canada has established that civil damages equally and legitimately function to serve
a prophylactic purpose of deterring certain behaviour.106 The questions about whether
damages should serve a purpose other than compensation or whether tort law ought to have
distinct goals are by no means settled and are not here taken for granted as being
conclusively answered from a theoretical perspective.107 However, the Supreme Court of
Canada has in practice clearly established that private law damages serve multiple functions.
Whatever other function damages and tort law may serve, compensation for loss is
undeniably paramount. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the purposes of damages
awards are always meant to be more than compensatory but that typically the compensatory
measure will achieve other goals such as deterrence.108 If the various purposes of damages are
viewed as being hierarchical, it can be said compensation is primary with other purposes
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such as punishment or deterrence being secondary.109 The primary purpose of compensation
cannot be displaced by a secondary purpose, but damages may be awarded focused on a
secondary purpose as an additional consideration after the compensatory purpose is satisfied.
3.5.2

Disgorgement as deterrence damages

Disgorgement has roots in the well-established equitable principle that a person
ought not profit from wrongdoing.110 Awards that are considered to complement
compensatory damages in order to serve a deterrent function and ensure a defendant does not
profit from wrongdoing are typically analyzed under the rubric of punitive damages. It will
be argued in this part that the analysis and awarding of damages serving a deterrent function
ought to be kept separate from consideration of whether punishment is warranted. Damages
awarded to serve prophylactic purposes and deter certain types of behaviour that are
considered wrongful conduct and result in a gain accruing to the defendant are here defined
as “deterrence damages”. Just as the court always has a discretion to award punitive damages
to serve a legitimate punitive function, the court always ought to be free to award deterrence
damages to serve a legitimate prophylactic and deterrent function. Disgorgement awards
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have long been recognized as serving to deter certain types of behaviour and do not focus or
depend on a determination of the plaintiff’s loss.111
Despite the primacy of the compensation principle, Canadian courts are willing in a
variety of circumstances to recognize that the application of this principle is not always
sufficient to achieve the goals of tort law or to do justice in the circumstances. If courts were
only limited to awarding damages confined by the plaintiff’s identifiable, monetary loss, “the
law would say to the rich and powerful, ‘Do what you like, you will only have to make good
the plaintiff’s actual financial loss, which compared to your budget is negligible’”.112 A
perhaps unprincipled approach that engenders confusion is failing to separate out the cases in
which awarding compensatory damages is insufficient to serve other functions of tort law
from cases in which defining the measure of compensation as determined by the plaintiff’s
identifiable loss will not adequately vindicate the plaintiff’s right.
If courts do not adopt a principled view of disgorgement damages as a remedy (as
outlined in the primary argument above), then the concept as articulated in cases like Blake,
that the concept of “doing justice between the parties” is the rationale for fashioning
discretionary awards seeking to strip defendants of profits, can be seen as far too nebulous
and arbitrary. Where there is no clear link or test applied as to when damages can be
quantified based on a defendant’s gain there is cause to be wary of simply invoking a broad
deterrent function in an unprincipled way. As discussed above, it is not the case that
disgorgement damages as a remedy should either be arbitrarily applied or should require
111
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extremely exceptional behaviour. However, certain behaviour is worthy of deterrence
regardless of whether it is done in such a manner as to trigger punitive damages. Rather than
either changing the standard for punitive damages or confusing the principles on which
disgorgement damages are available as a remedy, deterrence damages should be recognized
as their own category.
In many circumstances the prospect of having to compensate for a plaintiff’s loss,
and any eventual compensatory award, is a sufficient deterrent. Litigation is expensive and
the potential compensation for serious injuries resulting from a defendant’s negligence can
amount to hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars. For most defendants the prospect of a
finding of liability and a large judgment against them does the job of deterring negligent
behaviour. For other types of defendants, for example large corporations or the rich and
powerful, damages awards that would bankrupt an ordinary citizen or business have no
deterrent impact.113 The function of a deterrence award is not punitive, nor should it be
arbitrary or based on the fact of a defendant’s wealth in general. Rather, deterrence damages
should be awarded in circumstances in which the defendant has profited from his or her
wrong, and the incentive to continue this type of behaviour is not at all curtailed by having to
pay a comparatively small compensatory award.
In addition to the traditionally recognized categories of cases in which damages
focused on deterrence may be warranted,114 the rationales throughout the case law supporting
113
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damages serving a deterrent function can be interpreted as defining a broad category: cases in
which a compensatory award alone is insufficient to satisfy the deterrence function because,
for example, the plaintiff’s loss is negligible compared to the defendant’s profit. Though
perhaps a broadly formulated test, it is no broader than the test underlying punitive damages
as determining in which circumstances compensatory damages will be insufficient to satisfy
the purpose of punishment. Harkening back to the foundational principle that a person ought
not profit from wrongdoing, it is as appropriate to evaluate how the defendant’s position has
been changed and determine to what extent the defendant ought to remain enriched.
One objection could suggest that deterrence damages ought not be separated from
punitive damages, and the two purposes can be analyzed together. However, not all
circumstances requiring deterrence are sufficient to meet the threshold of behaviour
deserving of punishment. For example, in Keeton v Bank of Nova Scotia the Ontario Court of
Appeal reiterated that punitive damages “are awarded only in extreme cases to address
misconduct that represents a marked departure from ordinary standards of decent behaviour”
and the court went on to hold that even fraud is insufficient by itself to warrant an award of
punitive damages.115 A disgorgement remedy was granted at trial in Keeton and the plaintiff
was successful in proving the defendants had committed fraud in making personal profits
from a kick-back scheme of billing for services that were not performed in order to draw
money from a line of credit that had been extended to the plaintiff for the purposes of setting
up a medical clinic. At trial it was held the defendants’ conduct amounted to fraud but was
“not the type of nefarious fraud that warrants an award of punitive damages”.116 This type of
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example and analysis confirms an award disgorging profits need not be conflated with
punitive damages, and does not necessarily require the defendant’s conduct to met the high
standard of reprehensible conduct.117 While the fact a defendant profits from the wrong may
be part of the consideration in determining whether punitive damages are warranted,118 the
assessment of these damages is and ought to be separated “for the purpose of making the
analytical process used for calculating damages more explicit.”119
One familiar objection to extending the cases in which supra-compensatory damages
are awarded is centered on how to reconcile the principles underlying deterrence damages
with the traditional function of tort law as being compensation:
The broad proposition that a wrongdoer should not be allowed to profit from his wrong has
an obvious attraction. The corollary is that the person wronged may recover the amount of
this profit when he has suffered no financially measurable loss… [T]he corollary is not so
obviously persuasive.120

In cases where punitive damages are awarded, the paramount concern is not whether the
plaintiff will receive a windfall but whether the court sufficiently punishes and condemns the
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defendant’s behaviour. However, there is a well-established history of awarding damages in
amounts greater than what is required to compensate plaintiffs. As discussed at length in
Whiten, the notion that a defendant ought to be condemned to pay “a multiple of what is
required for compensation… reache[s] back to the Code of Hammurabi, Babylonian Law,
Hittite law (1400 B.C.), the Hindu Code of Manu (200 B.C.), ancient Greek codes, the
Ptolemaic law in Egypt and the Hebrew Covenant Code of Mosaic law”.121 There is nothing
radical in the notion that courts can, do, and should, focus on the conduct of the defendant;
the measure of compensation is not always the central concern. Though perhaps not in line
with the general compensation principle, the common law does not preclude plaintiffs from
being the beneficiary of awards aimed at condemning and deterring defendants’ behaviour.
The argument here is simply that deterrence and punishment are separate purposes,
and accordingly should be distinctly analyzed as giving rise to two separate forms of
damages. There are some instances in which behaviour is worthy of deterrence, but that
behaviour does not rise to the level of conduct required such that punitive damages are
appropriate. The benefit of separating the analysis in this way is that courts are not
necessarily confined to an all or nothing approach and can fashion an award of deterrence
damages that is based on but not necessarily equivalent to the total amount of the defendant’s
profits.
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3.5.3

The availability of deterrence damages for negligence

It is suggested that only cases of gross negligence are appropriate circumstances for
supra-compensatory damages awards.122 This argument is based on a rationale akin to the
conclusion that disgorgement is only appropriate in cases of intentional wrongdoing. Thus
only negligent behaviour that falls very seriously below the requisite standard of care ought
to be worthy of deterrence. As argued above, the factor of intention should not be
determinative of whether disgorgement is appropriate in the circumstances. Rather, the focus
should be on determining whether a right has been violated, and determining what measure
of damages is required for vindication. Negligent behaviour is equally worthy of deterrence
regardless of whether it rises to the level of gross negligence or is otherwise deserving of
punitive sanctions.
Another objection to permitting deterrence damages for negligence is that this type
of award could result in over-deterrence and have the result of halting otherwise socially
useful practices. As discussed by Justice Lax in Andersen v St Jude Medical Inc.123 there is
concern that deterrence damages “will have a negative impact on product innovation and will
over deter socially desirable behaviour.”124 Law and economics theories suggest that limiting
and linking remedies to losses actually suffered best achieves the deterrence function of tort
law.125 However, these arguments depend on the notion that defendants are in fact valuing the
cost of potentially wrongful behaviour and measuring it against potential profits. To return to
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the pharmaceutical example, we can imagine a case in which the potential harm or side effect
is minor, such as a headache. It is difficult to determine conclusively how defendants are
evaluating what a risk like this is worth and how that valuation is factoring into the
assessment of determining the scope of acceptably risky behaviour. If a current calculation
factoring in the cost of testing or improving the product so, for example, that there is no side
effect of headaches, is based on knowing this type of injury will not result in any
compensatory award, then there is no deterrent effect being achieved because the cost of
taking the risk will be negligible, if anything.
While there is merit to the concern that socially useful behaviour should not be overdeterred, if the calculus is changed, such that courts recognize harms amounting to violations
of rights should be vindicated with an amount that is greater than zero, this is a better state of
affairs than effectively licensing certain kinds of wrongs by contending that some harms are
not worthy of compensation. Though recognizing that all violations of rights are prima facie
worth some amount may necessitate a re-evaluation of a cost-benefit analysis on behalf of
defendants, this is an improvement not a drawback. Additionally, an award of deterrence
damages, as distinct from disgorgement damages as a remedy, would be discretionary in
terms of quantification in the same way punitive damages are. That is, deterrence damages
are not required to amount to the entirety of the defendant’s profits but are based on and
limited to the amount of the defendant’s gain.
3.6

Conclusion
Though an orthodox interpretation of the common law sees compensation as being

private law’s main focus or function, the common law has a well-established history of
awarding damages based on a defendant’s profits rather than a plaintiff’s loss. While
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disgorgement may be widely considered as a rare or radical remedy, a reconsideration of the
rationales underlying the development of the common law show that the courts’ primary
concern is with ensuring the vindication of violated rights. In the common law disgorgement
damages have traditionally been awarded for claims based on infringement of property
rights, but there is no principled reason that the rationale permitting plaintiffs to elect a gainbased rather than a compensation-based remedy for proprietary torts should not be extended
to cases of negligence. If it is the violation of a right that is giving rise to a remedy, then it is
of no moment whether the plaintiff’s right is based in property, contract, or bodily integrity,
and it matters not whether the right is violated intentionally or negligently. Measuring the
value of the violated right in relation to the defendant’s gain is equally legitimate to a
measure in relation to the plaintiff’s loss, and disgorgement damages are therefore not an
affront to the relational nature or structure of private law.
When courts award disgorgement damages based on principles of equity, this is
because the underlying claims are equitable and not because the nature of disgorgement as a
remedy is inherently or necessarily discretionary. Disgorgement damages as a remedy ought
not be justified on the basis of remedial flexibility or as serving a deterrence function.
Analysis of whether an award aimed at deterring a defendant’s behaviour, while based on the
fact that a defendant has profited from wrongdoing, should be kept distinct from analysis of
the plaintiff’s entitlement to a remedy. As the argument here suggests, deterrence and
punishment are distinct purposes and functions of civil damages, and perhaps disgorging a
defendant’s profits based on deterrence is warranted in certain cases even if the bar for
punitive damages has not been met. The purpose of the argument here is not to conclusively
determine every circumstance in which deterrence damages will be appropriate. Rather, the
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hope is that a sufficient basis has been presented to show that case law and theoretical
perspectives do not prevent extending the conclusions that there is behaviour worthy of
deterrence and courts are permitted to fashion damages awards in order to achieve this
purpose to cases of negligence.
The history of disgorgement and waiver of tort is confusing. The modern debates
about the scope and limits of application of these remedies are fuelled by uncertainty in the
law and the lack of clear appellate authority dealing with the contemporary views of these
issues. As suggested by Weber, Martin, and others, rather than be constricted and limited by
history, we should aim to understand the historical underpinnings of disgorgement and
waiver of tort but then recognize that the way forward is a departure from orthodoxy: “It is
not only open to the common law to ‘repurpose’ arcane rules to fit modern needs – it is
occasionally to its great and especial credit that it does so.”126 As the current debate in class
actions suggests, there is a modern need for the common law to evolve once again. The hope
is that some basis has been presented here to show that the time is ripe, and it is justifiable, to
reconsider disgorgement and support its availability in negligence.
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Chapter 4
4. Resolving Class Actions Dilemmas
Armed with a reconsidered view about damage and disgorgement, we can revisit the
problems of loss, profits, and individual issues and propose principled solutions. If a broad
approach to damage is taken, then the plaintiffs’ relevant right in negligence is a right not to
suffer a kind of damage that falls within the ambit of that which is reasonably foreseeable to
the defendant as a result of the defendant’s failure to live up to the standard of care. Loss is
not required in order to prove damage, and the task instead in solving the problem of loss is
to determine whether the damage the plaintiff class suffered falls within the scope of the
defendant’s duty to avoid. As concluded in Chapter 2, the investigation into the substance of
actionable damage in each case must be on a duty-by-duty basis.
As one example, drawing from the Supreme Court of Canada’s articulation of a
builder’s duty of care in Winnipeg Condominium Corporation No. 36 v Bird Construction
Co.,1 the defendant’s duty with respect to manufacturing dangerous products can be
articulated as a duty to take reasonable care that the manufactured products do not contain
dangerous defects that pose foreseeable and substantial danger to the health and safety of its
consumers.2 Cases such as Serhan v Johnson & Johnson,3 and the controversial medical and
pharmaceutical cases4 can be analyzed within this articulation of the duty of care. The

1

[1995] 1 SCR 85 [Winnipeg Condominium].

2

Ibid at para 54, articulating the constructor’s duty in tort to subsequent purchasers of a building.

3

[2004] OJ No 2904 (SC), aff’d [2006] OJ No 2421 (Div Ct) [Serhan].

4

See Chapter 2 at Part 2.2.
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actionable damage as defined by the duty is consuming or using the defective product. Each
plaintiff in a pharmaceutical case ingests and is biologically changed by the defendant’s
products. Each plaintiff in a medical device case is either implanted and physiologically
fused with or relies on the defendant’s products in order to maintain his or her health.
Whether plaintiffs in any of these cases suffer a stroke, commit suicide, have their heart
sliced by a lead, or experience diabetic shock, the actionable damage of being interfered with
or altered by a dangerously defective product is made out and sufficient to maintain the
claim. Losses flowing as a consequence of that damage are not required.
In order to analyze cases like the example of the faulty washing machines, we can
now view the question the courts must ask as one that is legal and not fact dependent. That is,
the question in the case is not whether plaintiffs who have not experienced flooding should
be included in the class or could ultimately recover. Rather, the question is, as a matter of law
that is determinable at the pre-trial stage, does a defendant manufacturer owe a duty of care
to its consumers to make non-defective products? If that is answered and the content of the
duty defined, then the question of actionable damage can be resolved on a class wide basis
independent of loss.
The problem of individual issues can be resolved in whole or in part in some cases
by proving damage without detailed inquiry into each individual case. Each member of the
class must only prove he or she took the drug or was implanted with the device and this kind
of information is readily available in the records of the defendants or health authorities. In
other cases the evidence to show the actionable damage is still a particularized inquiry. In
exposure cases, for example, each plaintiff must show evidence of pleural plaques to
establish exposure to asbestos or evidence of a diagnosis of lymphoma to establish exposure
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to Agent Orange.5 Individual issues determinations are still required in order to prove the
actionable damage has been suffered and defining damage as not requiring loss does not
eliminate this burden for the plaintiffs in the class.
Similarly, concluding that actionable damage does not require loss does not
eliminate the plaintiffs’ requirement to prove causation, both general and specific. As in
Andersen v St. Jude6 it was found that the defendant’s heart valves, and more specifically the
coating on the valves, did not in fact cause tissue damage and the defendant had not fallen
below the standard of care in manufacturing the product, therefore the valves were not in fact
defective. Defining actionable damage without reference to loss does not eliminate the
plaintiffs having to prove each of the elements of negligence.
In some cases – many pharmaceutical cases for example – the element of causation
is highly dependent on individual factors of age, weight, prior existing medical conditions,
and lifestyle. In Wilson v Servier Canada Inc., 7 for example, the plaintiffs claimed the
defendants’ weight loss drugs caused pulmonary hypertension and other diseases. Despite the
actionable damage being proven if each member of the class can prove he or she took the
allegedly defective drug, the defendants rightly argued that individual circumstances such as
whether any given plaintiff smoked, had pre-existing medical conditions or received
adequate information from their physician would have to be resolved in order to make out
causation.8 Reconsidering the definition of actionable damage does not eliminate any
defendant’s ability to launch an affirmative defence as against each individual in the class.
5

See the discussion and cases in Chapter 2 at Part 2.2.1.

6

2012 ONSC 3660 [Andersen].

7

[2000] OJ No 3392 (SC).

8

Ibid at paras 108-113.
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Though individual issues are not a bar to certification, and can be dealt with in a more
expedited way through the class procedure, in many cases the problem of individual issues
cannot be, and should not be, overcome by a reconsideration of the definition of damage.
If in a certain case causation can be determined on a class wide basis and the
damage is proven for the class, turning to the discussion of quantifying the remedies for each
member need not devolve into individual inquiries. As set out in Chapter 3, if it is accepted
that violations of rights in any way, negligently or otherwise, can give rise to disgorgement
then the problem of profits can be answered by the reconsideration of the availability of
disgorgement damages. If it has been proven there is a rights violation and liability is
established, and if the defendant’s profits were dependent on violating the plaintiffs’ rights,
then the measure of the remedy can be justifiably quantified based on the defendant’s gain.
Disgorgement damages can be determined without reference to individual circumstances and
the damages inquiry can be answered as a common issue. In theory, the class represents all of
the rights violated that comprise and were necessary for all of the defendant’s profits. The
measure of damages is not a windfall to the plaintiffs, but the proportionate share of the
profits that represents the rights of the plaintiffs that were violated. Distribution of the profits
among all the class members can be determined as a common issue because the
quantification of the right can be determined without reference to individual circumstances.
Class actions are prima facie the type of case in which disgorgement damages will
be the most appropriate remedy. The quintessential class action is one in which the plaintiffs’
measurable financial loss is small and compensation will be inadequate to do justice in the
circumstances. Class actions’ three goals of access to justice, judicial economy and behaviour
modification may then be best achieved by an award of disgorgement damages which will at
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the same time ensure the rights of class members are vindicated, be more efficient in not
requiring individual assessment in order to determine a remedy if liability is established, and
better deter defendants’ behaviour by ensuring they cannot profit from their wrongdoing.
Judges will no longer be required to stretch the conception of a remedy beyond rational limits
or be forced to alter the substantive law in such a way as to suggest that plaintiffs need not
prove loss. Measuring the amount required to vindicate class members’ rights by reference to
the defendant’s gain does not uncouple or eliminate the rational link between the wrong and
the remedy. As long as the inquiry is confined to the facts of the relationship as between the
class members and the defendant, quantification based on the defendant’s gain is justifiable.
Though difficulties may arise in determining certain questions about valuation such as the
application of mitigation, remoteness or causation principles, these types of legal questions
are often discussed and well-established in private law generally and there is no need to
otherwise alter the substantive law in order to fit class actions cases.
Finally, for cases in which compensation can be awarded to the plaintiffs but is still
insufficient to achieve deterrence or behaviour modification, judges can determine whether
deterrence damages are appropriate in the circumstances and award them in addition to
compensation. If deterrence damages are viewed as a separate type of award, and
discretionary in the same way that punitive damages are, judges are free to determine a
proportionate amount of damages that is rational in the circumstances and can achieve
deterrence without necessarily over-deterring. Viewing deterrence damages as being based
on the defendant’s gain but not defined as the entirety of the defendant’s gain provides more
flexibility. Not all cases present circumstances that are deserving of a punitive award but it
may be that certain behaviour requires deterrence without meriting punishment. If the
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analysis of punitive and deterrence damages are separated a more principled approach can be
developed in order to determine more precisely what types of behaviour ought to be deterred.
When deterrence damages are seen as complementary to compensatory damages a clearer
analysis of damages awards serving all of the functions of tort law and of class actions can
proceed.
4.1

Conclusion
Though the issues underlying the waiver of tort problem may be uniquely

highlighted in class actions, these issues are relevant to all private law and answers ought not
be developed only through the class actions lens. Resolving questions about the definitions of
damage and disgorgement has the ancillary effect of resolving some of the dilemmas class
actions judges face. A definition of damage that does not require loss is supported in the case
law, is normatively justifiable, and brings coherence and certainty to analysis of difficult fact
patterns. A definition of disgorgement as both a remedy and a non-compensatory form of
damages can be justified and applied to all violations of rights, even in cases of negligence.
The task that remains is to have further judicial debate and clarification about how
the substantive law ought to advance in respect of the use of the concepts of damage and
disgorgement in private law generally. In order to answer the challenge of developing a
complete and coherent doctrine of damage, the investigation must continue on a duty-by-duty
basis to determine the kind, rather than the degree, of requisite damage required to maintain a
claim. In order to move away from the confusion and history of waiver of tort and develop a
principled approach to the availability of disgorgement, these questions must be tackled
directly by judges and not held over to be determined after trial.
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Class actions are the type of case in which these issues are perhaps most common
and the class actions bench and bar is the vanguard developing the law. If the issues raised
here are clearly pled and argued these questions can brought squarely before the courts and
decided as a matter of law generally, not only applicable to class actions specifically.
Confusing damage with loss and muddling disgorgement with waiver of tort ought to be
abandoned in favour of adopting a more analytically rigorous path forward that identifies and
conceptualizes the fundamental elements of negligence. Rather than remain in a cloud of
uncertainty, we must move forward to improve the law with clarity.
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